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ABSTRACT
MEANING AND MODALITY
FEBRUARY 2018
JESSE J. FITTS
B.A., UNIVERSITY OF NEVADA LAS VEGAS
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Phillip Bricker
I intended to write four papers whose topics faintly concerned separate issues in
meaning and modality. As it turned out, chapters 1-3 all roughly concern the same
topic: propositions. While I argue for two different theses in chapters 1 and 2, I try
to understand the changing propositions literature in both. In addition to arguing
for the respective theses in chapters 1 and 2, accounting for this change is a parallel
goal for the chapters taken together. Chapter 3 examines particular propositional
roles—the objects of the attitudes and the objects of credence. Finally, chapter 4
changes the subject to the second conjunct in the title—modality, specifically of the
epistemic kind.
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CHAPTER 1
ICONIC PROPOSITIONS
Abstract
I motivate the need for, and then sketch, an iconic theory of proposi-
tions according to which propositions are like or similar to their objects
of representation. Propositions on this theory are properties that the
mind instantiates when it simulates the world. I connect the theory to
recent developments in the propositions literature as well as to a strain
of cognitive science that explains some kinds of mental representation
in terms of iconicity. To fill out my theory, I compare it to prominent
theories in the contemporary literature.
1.1 Introduction
I explore the following argument in this paper:
1. Mental representation is fundamental and propositional representation derivative—
what I will call the mind-first view.
2. If the mind-first view is true, then the nature and existence of propositions
depends, in some way to be determined, on how the mind, in fact, represents.
3. The mind represents, to some extent, not linguistically but iconically.
4. Therefore, the nature and existence of some propositions depends on iconic
representation.
I say “explore” rather than “defend” for the following reasons. Premise 1 I provi-
sionally accept for the sake of this paper because the mind-first view is significant
enough to explore its consequences, but I won’t defend the mind-first view itself.
Premise 2 is a trivial fact about the mind-first view. I want to be most explicit
1
about the status of premise 3. The literature on iconic representation, from multiple
sources, is vast, and writers have explored iconic representation in many forms—
mental models, mental maps, mental imagery, to name a few. It only matters to
me that such views, in some shape, are plausible, for I only want to explore the
consequences of combining the mind-first view with iconic representation supposing
premise 3 is true. Given this supposition, I bracket any objections to iconic repre-
sentation itself. For the bulk of the paper, then, I explore the consequences of the
conclusion. Combining the mind-first view and iconic mental representation raises
an important question for the propositions theorist: How, metaphysically, ought we
understand propositions on such a combination? I answer that iconic propositions
are a kind of property—one that both the mind and the world instantiate when
agents successfully simulate the world. In other words, when the mind represents
iconically, its content represents because, at some level of abstraction, it’s similar to
its object of representation.
The structure of this paper will follow the above argument. §1.2 covers premises
1 and 2. This consists in contrasting the mind-first view with its opposite, the
proposition first view, which takes propositional representation as fundamental and
mental representation as derivative. In explicating the mind-first view, I review its
two main proponents: Jeff King and Scott Soames. In this section I also consider the
issue of pluralism about propositions. If the existence and nature of propositions
depend on the mental processes that result in representation, and if the mind
represents multi-modally, then the possibility of pluralism arises. §1.3 considers
cognitive scientific views of iconic representation. §1.4 presents my theory sketch of
iconic propositions, compares it with King’s and Soames’ theories, and evaluates
the theory on various desiderata in the current propositions literature.
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1.2 Mind and Proposition First
In this section I contrast the traditional approach to propositions, proposition
first, with the new approach, mind-first. I want to flag that I’m not primarily
interested in the history of propositions—whether the timeline of old/new matches
up perfectly to proposition first/mind first. What matters is that we have two
broadly different approaches and that, at least currently, the focus is on mind-first
style approaches.
1.2.1 General character of each thesis
Schiffer (2003) captures how philosophers have traditionally understood propo-
sitions. According to this view, propositions are abstract objects that have truth
conditions essentially and absolutely—i.e., respectively, it’s necessarily true that a
proposition has its particular truth conditions, and a proposition has those truth
conditions without relativization. Contrast that essentiality and absoluteness with
sentences: It’s contingently true that sentences have their particular truth condi-
tions, and they have their truth conditions only relative to a given language with
its various conventions. Though Schiffer doesn’t use this language, traditionally,
propositions represent, or have their truth conditions, intrinsically—i.e., they rep-
resent the world purely in virtue of the way the proposition is. Any duplicate of
a proposition will represent like the original copy. Last, propositions are mind-
and language-independent in two senses. First, their existence doesn’t depend on
humans or agents of any kind. Second, multiple languages can express the same
proposition, but any one proposition doesn’t belong to a given language.
The important aspect of this traditional picture is the mind-independent bit.
The recent propositions literature has taken an empirical turn in which the nature
and existence of propositions is in some way mind dependent. To start, we can
understand this turn to mind independence in terms of whether propositional
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representation is derivative or fundamental. Some things represent because we confer
that power upon those things. The sentences on this page represent in virtue of
various conventions set up regarding written language. Thus we humans partially
conferred representational properties on written language. But what about our hu-
man representational capacities? Are we the ultimate wellspring of representation,
or do our mental states represent derivatively—because they have as their contents
abstract objects—viz. propositions—which themselves are the ultimate wellsprings
of representation? Note that this question is importantly distinct from the question
of whether propositional representation is intrinsic or extrinsic. The source of a
property and whether an object has that property intrinsically are different issues.
The mind-first view rejects the fundamentality of propositional representation.
The two mind-first representatives that I discuss below, King and Soames, see this
rejection as perhaps the key innovation of their views. It’s unclear, historically,
whether philosophers really held that propositions were the ultimate source of
representation or whether the issue simply wasn’t investigated. Whether philoso-
phers such as King and Soames are bucking tradition in this respect or exploring a
before-now under-explored issue is unimportant. And while the question of the
source of representation is important, it’s too large to explore in this paper. The
issue for us is, supposing minds, not propositions, ultimately represent, how does
that affect, if at all, our theories of propositions? Since I will be referring back to the
mind- and proposition-first views repeatedly, let’s set off and define each:
Proposition-First (P1) The thesis that propositions exist, and have their nature,
independently of minds, and propositions are the ultimate source of represen-
tation while mental representation is derivative.
Mind-First (M1) The thesis that propositions depend for the existence and na-
ture on the mind,and minds are the ultimate source of representation while
propositional representation is derivative.
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Both theories will agree on aspects of Schiffer’s characterization of propositions.
According to both, propositions will be abstract objects. Both views will have some
way of understanding representation, truth conditions, or some general notion of
propositions characterizing the world,1 and that world characterization will be in
virtue of an intrinsic feature of propositions. The main disagreement between P1
and M1 will be in terms of the priority of the propositional and the mental.
1.2.2 P1 theories and their benefits
The usual way of dividing up theories of propositions is in terms of grain—
whether propositional identity cuts finer than truth conditions—and structure—
whether propositions contain semantically significant constituents. P1 theories
come in different combinations, and most of these theories are familiar, so I will be
brief. The main unstructured, coarse-grained theory is the possible worlds theory,
according to which the proposition that p is the set of worlds where p is true (or a
function that pairs p-worlds with truth and non-p worlds with falsity). According
to the tuple theory, the main fine-grained, structured theory, propositions are
structured entities comprising some kind of entities depending on one’s semantic
commitments. The basic idea is that the proposition that Rachel reads comprises an
entity having to do with Rachel and something to do with the property of reading,
and the proposition is structured in some way related to the syntax of the sentence
“Rachel reads,” something like the following:
〈R, r〉 .
1I’m being deliberately vague about this aspect because of the variety of theories in the literature.
Some theorists think propositions must have or determine truth conditions while other theorists
think propositions are truth conditions. Yet other theorists think that propositions don’t represent
at all—which may sound like heresy—but still in some way can determine truth conditions—this
is Jeff Speaks’ view. Any P1 or M1 theory will have some way of characterizing various states of
affairs in a way that is independent of those states of affairs obtaining.
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If one is a Russellian, then Rachel, the person, and the property of being a reader
comprise the proposition. For a Fregean, the relevant senses do. The other combina-
tion in the literature is fine-grained and unstructured.2 These are theories such as
Schiffer’s in which propositions are sui generis entities that lack structure and that
have primitive, fine-grained representational capacities.
All such theories are supposed to adhere to Schiffer’s general definition. Sets of
worlds (or characteristic functions thereof), object- or sense-containing tuples, and
sui generis propositions are all abstract. If each theory succeeds, propositions are or
determine truth conditions that are held intrinsically, absolutely, and essentially.3
And what’s more, sets, functions, and tuples don’t depend on humans for their ex-
istence or their representational capacities, and sui generis theories usually stipulate
that their propositions likewise are mind independent.
We should say why one may be attracted to P1 for reasons other than age
and historical inertia. Perhaps the greatest virtue of P1 theories is their ability to
make sense of some of the metaphysical roles of propositions. First, propositions
bear alethic properties, such as contingent and necessary truth. There were truths
(and falsities) before any beings existed, and there will be truths once we’re gone.
Whether there are truths and falsehoods doesn’t seem to depend on whether there
are beings with representational powers. If there are truths before beings, we
need something to bear those alethic properties, and P1 theories can provide such
propositions.
Relatedly, there are not just infinitely many truths, but continuum many. If
this is the case, then we need that many propositions. As Armstrong (2004, p.9),
citing Stephen Read, says, “[f]or all being, there is a proposition (perhaps one
2I’m unfamiliar with any coarse-grained–structured theories. I don’t think such a combination is
possible.
3I say “if” because, as we’ll see shortly, there are good reasons to doubt that such propositions
represent intrinsically.
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never formulated by any mind at any time) that truly renders the existence and
nature of this being.”4 But if the existence and nature of propositions depends on
beings with representational powers, we straightaway face a problem: a dearth of
propositions. The representational capacities of any being are in some way limited,
and if propositions depend for their existence on such beings, then propositional
existence will in some way be limited. As we’ll soon see with King’s theory, one
may employ various recursive devices to generate infinitely many propositions—in
the way that a grammar can generate an infinity of well-formed sentences. Be that
as it may, recursive devices will generate at most denumerable infinities, with the
result being that there are truths with nothing to be true.5
The last benefit of some P1 theories is their ability to understand logical rela-
tions.6 Propositions are supposed to be the entities that bear logical relations to one
another—relations of entailment, logical strength, etc. We can understand these
relations elegantly with world or tuple theories. Take the worlds theory, which
understands logical relations in terms of set relations and operations. A proposition
p is true on the worlds theory just in case the actual world is a member of p; a
proposition p entails q just in case p is a subset of q; and so on.
Pluralism—whether one class of entities plays every propositional role or not—
complicates how important P1’s benefits are (and whether it’s a major cost to M1
should they fail on such issues).7 If pluralism is true, then it may not be a cost
4This quote isn’t a direct rejection of the mind-first program. The mind-first program needs
to account for propositions that no being has actually entertained. They do this, as we’ll see, by
appealing to recursive devices.
5For a specific objection along these lines to Soames’ theory, see Keller (2017).
6It’s unclear how sui generis theories understand such relations unless they appeal to set theoretic
devices as models, which I discuss in chapter 2.
7This area is tricky because there is a pluralism of pluralisms. The kind I’m discussing here is plu-
ralism about roles—that we may need different kinds of content for different kinds of propositional
roles, which naturally split into metaphysical, semantic, and epistemic roles. This is a different issue
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to the M1 theorist if she can’t account for the objects of logical relations and the
objects that bear alethic properties before there are representing beings. We should,
however, primarily address the issue of having the right amount of contents to
serve as the contents of any given (iconic) content-bearing mental state. And we
should understand the objects that enter into logical relations in the sense of the
objects that enter into the reasoning of representing agents.
1.2.3 M1 theories and their benefits
My explication of M1 will be more in depth given M1’s heterodoxy. I start with
the two main examples of M1 theories from King and Soames. I then say something
about how we should understand M1 theories in general before listing the problems
that M1 theories are meant to solve. To close this section, I argue how an acceptance
of M1 can motivate the view of propositions of this paper.
Mind dependency is the key to an M1 theory, but different theories do this in
different ways. The general M1 strategy is to identify propositions with abstract
objects whose existence is the result of mental processes that are responsible for
mental representation. The main M1 theories come first from Jeff King and then
from Scott Soames. King’s propositions are based on syntactic and semantic mental
processes: The members of our lexicon bear semantic relations to their semantic
values, and lexical objects also bear syntactic relations to each other. Humans put
together this information to calculate content—a process that is familiar from formal
semantics in which, for a given sentence, one composes semantic values at each non-
terminal node in a syntactic tree to reach a proposition at the top for a declarative
sentence. The result of these calcuations is an abstract object—a fact—that King
identifies with propositions. Soames’ theory is similar but employs mental events
than the pluralism that arises in the M1 approach in which, if beings represent multimodally, we’ll
have a pluralism of proposition types for each mode.
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rather than facts based on formal semantics—though it’s unclear how different
King’s and Soames’ theories are. I will now quickly explicate King’s and Soames’
theories in more detail, but if the reader is familiar with the theories, the reader can
skip to §1.2.3.3.
1.2.3.1 Example 1: King’s theory
Propositions, for King, are facts, and a fact, according to King (2007, p.26), is
an object possessing a property or n objects standing in an n-place relation. This
might sound striking: A fact is typically taken to be the part of reality that true
propositions represent, and rather than being true or false, facts obtain or they do
not obtain. The kind of fact that is the proposition that the following express—
(1.1) Rachel reads
—must obtain regardless of whether the fact that Rachel reads obtains or not, though
the fact contains the components of the proposition: Rachel and the property of
reading.8 If the fact that Rachel reads obtains, then the fact that is the proposition
that Rachel reads will be true, and it will be false otherwise. So what kind of fact is
a proposition?
Consider the LF representation, in tree form, of (1):
(1.2)
Rachel reads
A syntactic relation, which the tree represents, obtains between “Rachel” and
“reads”—call it R. While syntax relates the lexical items “Rachel” and “reads" to
each other, both lexical items stand in semantic relations—they have Rachel, the
person Rachel (the person, on one view of the meaning of proper names), and the
property of being a reader, respectively, as their semantic values. We can represent
being a semantic value with asterisks:
8Though the proposition contains more.
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(1.3)
Rachel
Rachel*
reads
reads*
We’re building propositions—i.e., meanings independent of any particular language—
so we existentially generalize over the specific lexical items, represented with stars:
(1.4)
F
Rachel*
F
reads*
Now what is it about this fact that gives it its truth conditions and thus gives us
good reason to believe that it is the proposition that Rachel reads? According to
King, nothing at this point. For, a syntactic relation could have different semantic
significance in different languages. Another way of stating this is that the syntax
provides instructions to the semantics regarding how and whether semantic values
compose. It’s in principle possible that a syntactic relation could instruct the
semantics to combine Rachel and the property of being a reader and return truth
just in case Rachel does not have the property of being a reader. Thus, we need to
make sure that the syntax deploys the instantiation function in order to get the truth
conditions: The syntax instructs the semantics to interpret syntactic concatenation
as the instantiation function. Leaving out some details dealing with indexicals,
we’re in a position to picture and describe King’s full account:
(1.5) I
F
Rachel*
F
reads*
I represents that R encodes the instantiation function. Here is the proposition that
(5) expresses, which will serve as a statement of King’s account applied to a single
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proposition: There are lexical items x and y of some language L occurring at the
left and right terminal nodes, respectively, of the sentential relation R that in L
encodes the instantiation function, where the semantic value of x is Rachel and the
semantic value of y is the property of being a reader. What’s important for us is that
propositions come to exist on King’s account because humans interpret R as I. In
doing so, we brought into existence the facts that King identifies with propositions.
1.2.3.2 Example 2: Soames’ theory
According to Soames, propositions are certain kinds of event types. According
to this account, to entertain a proposition is to engage in a cognitive activity—the
mental act of predication, which for Soames is a primitive mental act, basic among
others. When an agent sees o as red, there is an event token of her predicating
redness to the object o. Now of course this event token can’t be the proposition that
o is red. Instead, Soames takes the cognitive event type of predicating redness to o
to be the proposition that o is red expresses. And more complex propositions and
differing propositional attitudes are built upon the mental event act of predication.
Regarding other attitudes, some examples: To judge that o is red is to predicate
redness to o and then to endorse that predication; to believe that o is red is to
predicate redness to o and to be disposed to judge that o is red (and so to be
disposed to endorse the predication of redness to o). Regarding more complex
propositions, an example: To entertain the proposition that o isn’t red is first to
predicate redness to o and then to predicate not being true to the result of that first
predication.
1.2.3.3 General characterization of M1
Now let’s see if we can draw out the distinctive features that King and Soames
share that qualify them as mind-first theorists. Toward that end, let’s introduce a
distinction, between the basis of content and content itself, that will help to capture
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the mind-first program in general.9 The basis of content is whatever mechanism
is responsible for some certain kind of content. In humans and other animals, the
brain and its activities are the mechanism that underlie content. To put it differently,
if some entity has a function, then there must be a mechanism that carries out that
function. The function of the kidneys is to filter blood, so there is a mechanism that
carries out this function: many small filter cells compose the kidney, each of which
has a mechanism that captures waste and sends non-waste back to the blood stream.
One of the brain’s functions is to characterize the world, providing information, and
thus there is a mechanism that carries out that function. To discharge this function
the brain’s activity (somehow) creates an inner representation, a vehicle for content,
that is a representation because it expresses some proposition. The brain, e.g., may
represent via inner language-like entities. Or, as will be relevant for us later, the
brain may represent not linguistically but via iconic simulations of the world. To
have an attitude in a proposition will consist in the following, where r is a content
vehicle, S is an agent, Att is a propositional attitude, and p is a proposition:
(1.6) ∃r(S Att r & r expresses p)
For S to have an attitude whose object is p is to bear a relation, functionally defined
as a given attitude, to an inner content vehicle whose content is p. For the language
of thought theory, the content vehicle will be a sentence of mentalease. For a
simulation theory, the content vehicle will be some inner simulation.
Here is an impressionistic way to understand M1: The M1 theorist pays greater
attention to r and especially the process that gives rise to r when crafting a theory of
p in the second conjunct. Conversely, a proposition-first theorist can craft a theory
of p while ignoring some facts about the mechanism by which the brain carries out
its representational function. What this means in practice is that the M1 theorist
9See McGinn (1989, p.182) for the distinction.
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first considers how the mind represents—through some series of actions that result
in a mental representation. Then, the M1 theorist will extract abstract objects from
those series of actions. If the M1 theorist doesn’t have good reasons to show that
the mind in fact represents the way she claims, then we have no reason to accept the
existence of the abstract objects, i.e. her propositions. The details of these mental
processes constrain one’s account of propositions. For example, with King, since
his propositions depend on a mechanism that individuates content according to
syntactic difference, difference of syntax, for King, entails difference of proposition.
Yet this is prima facie unintuitive since a single content that can stand over minor
differences in the details that gave rise to that content was one reason we wanted
propositions in the first place.
The propositions-first theorist doesn’t face such a dependency. Stalnaker (1987,
p.22) makes the point here:
The pragmatic picture and the possible worlds definition of propo-
sition does not then deny that beliefs are internally represented. But
it remains neutral on the form that those representations must take. It
should be emphasized that the possible worlds conception of propo-
sition does not present an account of the form in which propositions
are represented which is a rival to the linguistic account. Accepting
this account of propositions does not, for example, commit one to a
psychological hypothesis that our minds represent a space of possible
worlds point by point, with individual representations of individual
worlds. The aim of the definition is to give an account of the structure of
what is represented while leaving open questions about the means by
which this is accomplished.
Thus, there may be some relation between the traditional properties of grain and
structure that both the content vehicle and its associated proposition share. But
the proposition-first theorist can safely ignore the underlying process that gives
rise to mental states that have such properties. In fact, the possible worlds theorist
can remain neutral regarding the mechanism by which the mind represents, as
Stalnaker (1987, p.22) notes here:
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In attributing beliefs and desires, we are attributing certain kinds of
internal causal properties which have the structure that tends to reflect
the world in ways that make it appropriate to call them representations.
These representations could conceivably take the form of sentences of
a language of thought written in the belief center of the brain, but they
also could take the form of pictures, maps, charts, or graphs, or (most
plausibly) a diversity of redundant forms, none of which are very much
like any of the forms which our public representation take.
Now that we have an understanding of M1, let’s list its virtues. The driving idea
behind these virtues is that M1 theories give propositional representation a kind
of independent reality that doesn’t depend on the philosopher for interpretation.
Because these propositions and their representative powers have an independent
reality, M1 theories have the prospect of solving the following issues that P1 theories
have difficulty with.
1.2.3.4 Benefits of M1
The Benacerraf problem. Since chapter 2 covers this problem exclusively, I’ll be
brief. A Benacerraf problem can arise when a philosopher reduces or identifies one
class of entities to another. In the classic mathematical version, the problem targets
the reduction of numbers to sets. The problem proceeds in the following steps. First,
the objector that raises a Benacerraf problem locates multiple, non-equivalent reduc-
tion/identification bases. By non-equivalent here I mean simply that the reduction
bases are different entities. Second, the objector argues the candidate reduction
bases are equally explanatorily virtuous, so that choosing one base over another
would be arbitrary. The final step concludes that the reduction/identification fails.
The problem straightforwardly applies to set-theoretic theories of propositions.
For example, a set of worlds and its characteristic function are, metaphysically
speaking, different things, but both work equally well satisfying various propo-
sitional roles by the world theorist’s own lights. So, for a given proposition p, it
would be arbitrary to identify it with either the set of p worlds or the function that
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pairs p worlds with truth and non-p worlds with falsity. Therefore, p is neither the
set nor the function.
In chapter 2, I will argue that P1 theories, such as sets of worlds or tuples, in my
view, are best seen not as propositions themselves but indices of propositions. A
theorist employs an index—typically a set of abstract objects—to individuate aspects
of reality, and the index is theoretically fruitful when it shares relevant structure
with the object of its index, and when there is a function that pairs members of the
index with states of reality. For example, we use real numbers to index temperatures
because states of reality that we want to individuate in terms of heat share a relevant
similar structure with real numbers, and there is a function that pairs the states of
reality with the numbers. In this case, there is no risk of confusing heat itself with
the numbers used to measure that heat. But it’s my hunch that we risk conflating
an index with its object when the object of the index is abstract. Such is the case
with sets of worlds or tuples, which, in my view, are best thought of as such
indices: They are logical devices that index, among other things, abstract objects
that are themselves the content of mental states. But if we suppose that traditional
propositions are instead actual propositions and not indices thereof, we run into
trouble.
Let’s move to the benefits of M1. The first is the prospect of solving the Benacer-
raf problem. For the mind-first theorist, the mechanism that gives rise to content
fixes a unique set of abstract objects that serves as that content. For example, King
claims we have good reason to believe that the brain in fact composes semantic
values in the way that syntacticians and semanticists tell us, giving rise to the ab-
stract objects that he identifies with propositions. The mind could have composed
semantic values in different ways, giving rise to different abstract objects, but the
mind will really work some way or other. But, if the empirical results about the
mechanism are correct, then those facts pick out a unique set of abstract objects. For
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Soames, minds engage in a series of actions that result in a representation of the
world. While the mind may have engaged in some other series of actions, it in fact
engaged in some specific series of actions, which determines a unique event token
that is a token of a unique event type. And it will be these mental actions that non-
arbitrarily demarcate the propositional facts/events from the non-propositional
facts/events. The ability to solve these arbitrariness problems, which is no small
feat, is tied to the next issue.
Another arbitrariness worry: The demarcation problem. There is a newer, less dis-
cussed arbitrariness worry in the propositions literature:10 Non-sui generis propo-
sitions are members of a class of entities that contain non-propositional members.
We’ve seen the M1 theorists identify propositions with either facts or events, yet
there are many facts and events that are not propositions. The world and tuple the-
orists have identified propositions with sets of worlds or object-containing tuples,
respectively. But there are lots of sets, functions, and tuples that aren’t propositions.
We may ask any propositions theorists, what is it about the entities that you identify
as propositions that makes them different from the non-propositional entities? Call
this, specifically not having an answer to this question, the demarcation problem.
The demarcation problem seems to apply to some P1 theories. Why does the set
of white-snow worlds represent that snow is white while the set of even numbers
doesn’t represent anything? Why does the tuple that contains Rachel and the
property of being a reader represent that Rachel reads but a tuple containing a dog
and a cat doesn’t represent anything? No answer seems forthcoming. The second
benefit for the M1 theorist, then, is the prospect of avoiding this problem. King’s
facts are different from other facts because they contain a relation that encodes
10I first found this worry in King (2007, ch1)
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instantiation, and Soames’ events are different because they involve mental actions
that are responsible for creating content.
The source and nature of propositional representation. There are a few important,
related issues regarding propositional representation. A successful theory of propo-
sitions will make sense of how propositions characterize the world in a way that
doesn’t involve outside interpretation. We need some way to make sense of some
basic propositional desiderata, such as being able to say the same thing as someone
else, believing the same thing as someone else, etc.—the notion of shared content.
Two sentences say the same thing if they have the same content; two people believe
the same thing if they each have beliefs that share the same content; and so on.
When two people believe the same thing, it is not in virtue of us, from the outside,
interpreting their mental states to have the same content. Rather, there’s something
about their mental states, or two sentences that say the same thing in different
languages, such that it makes sense to say they share something in common. But if
propositions require our interpretation to represent, then they’re no different from
sentences: We would have to attribute content to them. But then what is the nature
of that content and what is the source of its representational powers?
The problem with P1 theories is that their representational powers seem to come
from the outside. Take, e.g., the function version of the worlds theory. Why choose
truth values over a function from worlds to the set {1, 0}? Or, to make a point that
Soames has made, why not a function from worlds to a dog and a cat? Put this
way, the claim that traditional propositions represent intrinsically seems absurd
on its face. The only reason various set-theoretic structures, both structured and
unstructured, serve equally well for various purposes, is because, to represent, they
require outside interpretation. If representation requires interpretation, propositions
no longer intrinsically represent and thus are no different from sentences. But if
that’s true, then we no longer have a way of making sense of shared content.
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The third benefit of M1 is the promise to solve this problem. The mind-first
theorist combines intrinsic and derivative representation. The source of a proposi-
tion’s representative powers derives from the activity of the mind, but such activity
endows propositions with structure and properties that make a plausible case
that propositions intrinsically represent. Let’s return to King and Soames, yet
again. For King, humans at some point interpreted syntax to have a particular
semantic significance. This interpretation brought into existence abstract objects
whose syntax has that semantic significance as an intrinsic property, which en-
dows King’s propositions with their truth conditions and representational powers.
Thus, although the representational capacity of King’s propositions derive from
humans’ representational powers, the property of representing is intrinsic to King’s
propositions. What’s more, there is something about King’s propositions in and of
themselves and absent our interpretation that explains how they represent the world.
For Soames, humans engage in a variety of mental actions among which predication
is fundamental: When I think that Rachel reads, I predicate the property of being a
reader to the person Rachel. Such an event is a token of a cognitive event type that
Soames identifies with propositions. The nature of the representational property of
Soames’s propositions is the same as King: intrinsic yet derivative. The propositions
come to represent as a result of our mental lives, but these propositions have the
intrinsic property of representing because there is an intrinsic connection between
a token’s and type’s representing. Like King, there is something about Soames’s
propositions, in and of themselves and absent outside interpretation, that accounts
for their representational capacity.
Propositional unity. I would be remiss to leave out the problem of propositional
unity, which looms large in the literature. This is a problem for structured theories
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in particular—theories of propositions with parts.11 On the one hand, consider a
list of two objects and a relation—Desdemona, the loving relation, and Cassio—and
on the other, the proposition that Desdemona loves Cassio. What’s the difference?
What it is about the latter that explains its unity, so that it is not a mere collection of
individuals and a relation? The only structured P1 theory, the tuple theory, doesn’t
seem to have a deep answer to this problem. The difference between Desdemona,
the loving relation, and Cassio, on the one hand, and 〈Loves, 〈Desdemona, Cassio〉〉
seems to simply be two sets of brackets.
While we generally accept the force of the Benacerraf problem, and while we
want to account for the nature and source of propositional representation, the
force of this issue is less clear to me.12 The tuple theorist’s answer may just be
what we just said: the brackets provide structure, and a tuple is a unified, single
thing while a list is, well, an un-unified list of entities. But the problem may not
be simply what unifies the proposition but rather two deeper problems: First,
why that unity rather than another—why 〈Loves, 〈Desdemona, Cassio〉〉 rather than
〈〈Desdemona, Cassio〉 , Loves〉? And second, what is it about those brackets that
confers propositional properties on that tuple? But these two questions point back
to two previous problems that M1 theories promise to solve—Benacerraf and the
source of representation. While it’s unclear exactly the force of the problem of unity,
M1 theories have an account of unity: The special glue that holds propositional
constituents together is mental activity, and that activity pins down a reduction
base the members of which have important propositional properties intrinsically.
11We can refine the target of the problem more since, after all, a possible world, in some sense,
is a part of a set of possible worlds, and possible worlds theories are usually thought of as the
paradigmatic unstructured propositions. Rather, a structured proposition has parts, and these
parts are semantically significant and, usually, something like syntax structures these semantically
significant parts.
12Soames (2010) makes this point.
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1.2.4 Motivating iconic propositions
Why be interested in an iconic theory of propositions? If we accept the general
M1 approach, as we provisionally are for this paper, then we commit to propositions
that depend on some etiology that is responsible in the end for some kind of human
representation. This is what the two major contemporary theories of propositions,
King’s and Soames’, do. King claims that humans create content via semantic and
syntactic operations, and Soames claims that humans create content via mental
actions, and they both disagree about the ontological category of the resulting
proposition—fact or event.
We’ve noted that if the M1 theorist is wrong about the etiology that is responsible
for their content, then we can call into question her theory of propositions. If
mainstream formal semantics is seriously mistaken in the way that we calculate
semantic content, then King’s theory may be in trouble. But even if the M1 theorist
is right about the ground-level processes that are responsible for the content on
which she bases her theory, it’s important to see the scope of such a theory. An
M1 theory will be a theory of that kind of content—the kind that a given mental
process is responsible for. For example, for King, it’s most plausible that his theory
is a theory of linguistic content. The empirical processes he appeals to, after all,
attempt to explain how humans come to calculate linguistic meaning. But there
are multiple kinds of content-bearing mental states, and it’s not obvious that a
single processes will be responsible for each kind of content. For example, if one
thinks that perceptual states are content-bearing, it’s not clear that the same mental
processes that are responsible for calculating linguistic content are also responsible
for producing perceptual content. In presenting his theory, Soames often uses
perceptual examples: For example, Soames (2016) says, “When I perceive or think
of o as red, I predicate redness of o, which is to represent o as red.” Such mental
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events seem plausible for calculating linguistic content, but I see no reason to accept,
prima facie, that such mental actions occur at the perceptual level.
King recognizes this point. King (2007, ch3) wrestled with the worry of the
origins of his propositions: to explain how our ancestors first brought Kingean
content into the world. To explain, e.g., how lexical items came to have semantic
values, it seems we would have to appeal to our ancestors’ beliefs and desires, so
propositions would need to exist in the first place. In his book, King sketches a
quick story about how our pre-linguistic ancestors had “proto” intentional states
before the dawn of propositions. Later, King (2014, p.60) says a bit more about these
proto-intentional states, that they may have been perceptual states that had their
own kind of content, which is different from linguistic content. King (2014, fn.19)
thus recognizes that the etiology that produces his content should limit the scope of
his theory: His book, as he says, should have been titled The Nature and Structure of
Linguistic Content instead of just content. He then goes on to say the following:
I believe that many things have content other than sentences of natu-
ral languages. Maps, diagrams, perhaps pictures and, most importantly
for present purposes, perceptual experiences have contents. In the case
of each sort of thing that has content, there will be an account of those
contents in the spirit of the present account of the contents of natural
language sentences. Due to limitations of space, time and knowledge,
the details of the theory of the contents of perceptual experiences that
is in the spirit of the present account of contents of natural language
sentences cannot be sketched here.
This is exactly what I’m beginning to do in this paper: I’m trying to give an account,
in the spirit of King’s, of a certain kind of mental content that we have some reason
to believe may not be linguistic in nature.
To close this section, I note that M1 theories have a built in limitation: Such
theories provide content for a certain kind of mental state. It may turn out that,
as an empirical fact, that all content arises from the same process, but I think it’s
likely that we’ll find that humans represent multi-modally. The takeaway from
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this discussion is that M1 theories, depending on how the empirical facts end up,
may result in a kind of pluralism: we may need an M1 theory for linguistic content
which may not, as King recognizes, carry over to other kinds of content. Pluralism
about propositions is woefully under-discussed. If pluralism has been raised at all,
it has been in terms of propositional roles that may conflict. I suggest that if M1 is
true, a pluralism of a different kind arises—a pluralism of etiologies that give rise
to different kinds of contents and so different kinds of propositions.
For the rest of the paper, I want to stress the limited scope of an M1 theory given
this pluralism, and this scope limits the force of certain objections. For example,
since King is giving a theory of a certain kind of content, it’s not enough to object
that his content can’t play some role that the objector is interested in. In what
follows, I will attempt to provide content for certain kinds of mental states, and
objections that such content can’t play some different roles may be irrelevant.
1.3 Varieties of Iconic Representation
The topic of iconic representation is vast, and the following is but a mere sample.
I give a small survey and then try to establish some important properties of iconic
representation that will qualify it as a basis of content suitable for a theory of
propositions. The idea that the mind represents iconically is not by any means new.
Aristotle, in De Anima, defends the view that the mind becomes like its object of
representation in a way that’s appropriate for the mind. As Shields (2016) puts it:
Aristotle is reasonably understood as holding that S thinks some
object of thought O whenever S’s mind is made like that object by
representing salient structural features of O by being directly isomorphic
with them, without, that is, by simply realizing the form of O in the way
O does.
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Aquinas endorses and builds upon Aristotle’s view, and in the early modern era,
Hume, under a certain interpretation, has an iconic view.13 F.P. Ramsey is the
modern source of something like the view in his adage that “belief is a map. . . by
which we steer.” Let’s quickly motivate, from different directions, the idea that the
mind represents in this way.
1.3.1 Perceptual content
Let’s start small, with a particular kind of iconic content in the perception lit-
erature, specifically the conceptual vs. non-conceptual content debate. Those in
favor of non-conceptual content claim that the contents of some of our perceptual
experiences don’t depend on our conceptual recourses (I’ll still see this or that
shade of green regardless of whether I possess that fine-grained concept). Accord-
ing to one sub-view on the non-conceptual side, some perceptual content is iconic
and, in virtue of that, non-conceptual. In the philosophy literature, Fodor (2007)
brought this view to light. Fodor distinguishes between two different kinds of
representations: discursive representations, which involve concepts, and iconic
representations, which don’t. For Fodor, both kinds of representations are com-
positional, meaning that the syntactic structure and semantic content of the parts
of a representation determine the syntactic structure and semantic content of the
whole representation. While discursive representations satisfy compositionality in
the usual way, Fodor offers what he calls the “picture principle” to account for the
compositionality of icons:
Picture Principle If P is a picture of X, then parts of P are pictures of parts of X.
What distinguishes discursive from iconic representations, according to Fodor, is
that iconic representations don’t canonically decompose while discursive represen-
13See Jacobson (2013) for historical views of iconic representation.
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tations do. What this means is that discursive representations, being language like,
contain constituents in the sense that the parts of the representation decompose in a
unique way. For example, in the sentence John loves Mary “loves Mary” is a part
but “John loves” isn’t. With icons, any grouping of its parts still represents some
part of its object of representation. What’s important for us is that, as Fodor notes,
icons are semantically evaluable—meaning that they are icons of some object. Yet, for
Fodor, iconic representations play a limited role. They occur only at the beginning
of perceptual cognition, and their role, unsurprisingly, is sub-personal. Iconic repre-
sentations are stored briefly as an intermediary between being a representation on
the surface of the retina to being a representation in short- or long-term memory.
Let’s now consider wider views of iconic content, specifically mental maps and
models.
1.3.2 Mental Maps
We often employ non-linguistic representation to navigate the world. To get
a feel for this, for example, when I make my way around the library, I consult an
inner, map-like representation of the library. This map isn’t linguistic at all—it
doesn’t say, in sentences, that these books are on this floor, next to these books,
and so on. Maps and pictures come to mind when we think of non-linguistic
representation, but we categorize any kind of representation in which isomorphism
plays a significant role as a mental map. The isomorphism involved in pictures may
involve physical similarity while the isomorphism involved in a diagram, say a
Venn diagram, may be highly abstract. This contrasts with linguistic representation
in which isomorphism plays no role in explaining representational capacity. The
case of perception presents a kind of iconic representation that is, if Fodor and others
are right, a sub-personal, very technical sense of representation. The content of
such perceptual states doesn’t seem to enter into rational relations with other iconic
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states, though presumably they can somehow enter into relations with conceptual
content. The contents of mental maps, on the other hand, enter into rational relations.
Just think of updating the mental map of the library from the example in light of
experience: I knew where the philosophy books were in the library, but I thought
the logic books were toward the west side of the floor but are in fact toward the
middle. The next time I am in the library I will consult the updated mental map
to find the logic books, and the process of updating the mental map is a rational
process.
Heck (2007) proposes mental maps as one among other examples of non-
conceptual content, which humans employ in cognition, along with conceptual
content. On the other hand, there are at least two prominent sets of defenders of the
view that the mind represents in a map-like way in general. First, Braddon-Mitchell
and Jackson (2007, ch.10) offer mental maps as an alternative to the language of
thought, and so seem to claim that thought in general occurs in a map-like medium,
and Armstrong (1973) presents a similarly holistic view of map-like mental repre-
sentation.
1.3.3 Mental models
The mental maps literature in philosophy shares a likeness to the large, and more
empirically informed, mental models literature in cognitive psychology, beginning
with Craik (1967). The following quote encapsulates the mental models view:
If the organism carries a “small-scale model” of external reality and
of its possible actions within its head, it is able to try out various alter-
natives, conclude which is the best of them, react to future situations
before they arise, utilize the knowledge of past events in dealing with
the present and the future, and in every way to react in a much fuller.
safer, and more competent manner to the emergencies which face it.
Like the mental map theory, according to the mental models perspective, the mind
represents in an iconic way, creating a simulation of reality. Our creation and
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manipulation of mental models occurs both sub-personally and personally, as the
theory is usually coupled with a dual process theory of reasoning wherein the mind
reasons both unconsciously and automatically, on the one hand, and consciously
and deliberately on the other. What’s more, humans reason by manipulating these
models—i.e. running simulations on them—without having to manipulate external
reality directly.
This reasoning occurs in different mediums. For example, humans seem to make
visual inferences on mental models. According to one experiment, participants
were asked to decide whether two images of objects were the same objects. Cubes
that appear glued together at right angles composed the objects. Subjects seem to
rotate a three-dimensional model of one onto the other to decide if it’s the same
object, and the larger the size of the angle of rotation, the longer a decision tended
to take. It’s important that the manipulation took place in three dimensions—not
just the spinning of a two-dimensional representation of a three dimensional object.
The model in this case is a three-dimensional model from which a two dimensional
representation is derived. Thus, if we were to understand the mental map of
the library earlier in this way, we wouldn’t have an egocentric, two-dimensional
internal picture of the library. We would construct such a picture from a mental
model, which would in this case be a three-dimensional array, similar to the way a
computer employs a three-dimensional array, analogous here to a mental model, to
project a two dimensional picture on a screen.
1.3.4 Computationalism
Finally, iconic representations have been couched in terms of the computational
theory of cognition (CTC) according to which we reason by manipulating symbols
according to rational rules. The CTC is a variegated theory type. The theories
it houses all agree that cognition consists in symbol manipulation. On the CTC,
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propositions are, unsurprisingly, the objects of propositional attitudes: An agent
has an attitude A to a proposition p in virtue of standing in a relation to an inner
symbolic representation whose content is p and whose functional role determines
which attitude A is—belief, hope, etc. On the standard interpretation of the CTC,
symbols bear their content, i.e. have the semantics they do, in a way that is similar
to the way language bears its content.
Iconic representations in the CTC provide an alternative to the language-like
representations of the standard interpretations. Such representations have been
employed in AI implementations of both human and non-human (viz. insect)
cognition. In philosophy, Cummins (1989) gives an account of s-representations—“s”
for “simulation.” Defenders of iconic representations in the CTC claim that the
representational capacity of the symbols of the CTC are required to understand our
inferences that the CTC underwrites. To use an example from Ramsey (2007, pp.81-
85), a cognitive system may use something akin to a family-tree graph to represent
familial relations and work out a relative relation of some node on the graph. If
a cognitive system uses a simulation that the symbols participate in in order to
perform some task, then we can’t understand the success of a given task absent
representational features of the simulation. Ramsey asks us to imagine a Chinese
Room-like thought experiment in which someone works out familial relations yet is
semantically ignorant of the input-output representations. In addition, the person
is ignorant about the labels as well as the meanings of the tree connections. In other
words, the person employs syntax alone to pair the correct input representations
(questions) and output representations (answers). But unlike the Chinese Room,
we can’t understand this person’s success without her operating on a simulation
that has an isomorphic pattern of relations among its constituents as reality does.
As Ramsey puts it, this person’s success can’t be explained by appealing to the fact
that she focuses on shapes alone and follows shape-involving instructions. The
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graph must represent family relations in order to understand this person’s success;
likewise, we must treat a mental simulation as representing.
1.3.5 Iconic content as a viable base
To motivate iconic propositions, an iconic basis of content needs to satisfy
certain properties. Unfortunately, it’s easy to muddle some of these issues, so we
must be careful here. We discussed the issue of structure in section §1.2.2 in the
context of P1 theories. In the propositions literature, structure refers to whether
propositions contain semantically significant parts. The underlying issue in the
debate around structure in the propositions literature concerns the grain issue. If
we have, e.g., two syntactically distinct sentences that intuitively express different
propositions, but those sentences have the same truth conditions, we can appeal
to the constituents that are associated with sub-sentential items to distinguish the
propositions. What’s especially important is that we can appeal to a difference
of constituents to distinguish various necessary truths, which all have the same
truth conditions and thus all express the same proposition on unstructured, coarse-
grained theories.
Structure differs slightly in the context of mental representations—as a way to
make sense of two key desiderata for a theory of mental representation: productivity
and systematicity. A system of thought is productive if there is, in principle, no
upper bound to the construction of novel thoughts and is systematic if there are
systematic connections between the kinds of thoughts thinkers can think. For
example, if one can think “John loves Jane” then one can think “Jane loves John”
or “John loves. . .” for any object that you fill in the eclipses with. Philosophers
in this area argue that we must appeal to the structure of thoughts to explain how
they are combinatorial in a way that satisfies productivity and systematicity. It’s
not clear to what extent the notions of structure differ in the propositions and
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mental representations literature, but let’s just say this: The propositions literature
tends to focus on whether propositions comprise constituents that correspond to
sub-sentential entities, and the mental representation literature tends to focus on
whether a system of thought is combinatorial in the right way, which requires the
system to have parts, but those parts don’t necessarily need to be sub-sentential.
Productivity and systematicity are easy to come by if thinking occurs in a
language-like system—a language of thought—with a structure similar to first-
order logic, with the mechanisms of connectives, quantification, predication, etc.
While LOT theorists often speak as if their thesis requires thought to occur in a
medium like first-order logic, the official definitions given by Fodor only require
that thought proceed in a medium that has a syntactic structure and compositional
semantics.14 What I want to note here is that various philosophers have argued that
certain iconic content is structured, systematic, and productive, which is my main
concern and that, as such, that content qualifies as a kind of language of thought in
a weak sense.
Let’s see what notion of structure may be relevant to iconic content. Braddon-
Mitchell and Jackson (2007, p.178) claim that a content is structured if the similarities
and differences of content are systematically related to the similarities and differ-
ences of the objects of the content. If we have representations R1, R2, ...Rn that
correspond to states of the world W1, W2, ...Wn, differences in the Ws will corre-
spond to differences in Rs. The level at which we find this correspondence may
be highly abstract. To use an example from Braddon-Michell and Jackson, Arabic
numerals are structured representations the objects of which are numbers since
there is a systematic correspondence between the similarities and differences of the
14I found a distinction between strong and weak sententiality that I’m working from here in
Rescorla (2009, p.397)—strong sententiality requiring first-order logic like structure, and weak
requiring only syntax and combinatorial structure. Resorla notes that the official definition of
mentalease from Fodor (1987, pp.134–8) only requires the weak sense. Also see Camp (2007, p.152).
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Arabic numerals and their number objects. The idea when applied to iconic contents
is that there will be systematic differences and similarities in iconic representations
that correspond to similarities and differences among their objects.
Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson (2007, p.181–182), Camp (2007, pp.152–154), and
Rescorla (2009, §7) all argue, in different ways, that iconic representation can pro-
ceed in a medium that is combinatorial, systematic, and productive. The specifics
of the arguments for those properties will depend on the details of the iconic rep-
resentational system, and here I merely want to mention how this might work.
Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson and Camp both focus on maps in the ordinary sense.
Both argue that such maps contain reoccurring, combinable elements. As Camp
(2007, p.154) puts it, mental maps are made up of “recurrent formal elements that
make a common semantic contribution each time they occur.” There is no upper
limit to recombining these elements—satisfying productivity. What’s more, if one
can entertain one combination of locations and relations among them, one can en-
tertain those elements in a nearby configuration, satisfying systematicity. The above
two philosophers have ordinary maps as their paradigm, but there are many other
formats that iconic content can take. For example, Rescorla (2009) notes, according
to one account of a kind of iconic representation, cognitive systems employ vectors
that participate in computational models that interpret those vectors in terms of
Euclidean distance metrics. Since these vectors comprise coordinates, an organism
that can entertain a mental map vector composed of a certain set of coordinates can
also entertain another mental map comprising the same coordinates swapping one
out for another, satisfying systematicity.
1.3.6 Which content is a good base?
Mental representations—understood broadly as any semantically evaluable
mental state—play different roles, and not every role is suited to underwrite a
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theory of propositions. We’ve seen iconic representation implicated at a technical,
sub-personal level, and, on the other side, we’ve seen that mental models, when
coupled with a dual-aspect view of cognition, operate on a personal level, being
available to consciousness. It is common to distinguish three levels of explanation
regarding the mind: the hardware (neural level of the brain), software (abstract
structures that the hardware system realizes to engage in cognition), and the per-
sonal level (consciousness experience, beliefs, desires, etc.).15 The basis of content
for a mind-first theory of propositions will be the software level—the level at which
the mind represents that is common enough among humans to ground a theory of
propositions. This is clearly where King grounds his theory, and Soames is less clear
on this issue, though his theory would make the most sense if his mental actions
took place at the software level.16 For the purposes of this paper, any software
level iconic content, such as mental maps or models, will serve as a basis for iconic
propositions.
1.4 Iconic Propositions
We’ve motivated the need for iconic propositions and have laid out some ground-
level details. For the sketch of a theory of iconic propositions, there will be some key
pieces and some decision points. The first key piece of the sketch is to understand
iconicity in terms of a string of ideas: We account for iconicity in terms of similarity,
similarity in terms of isomorphism, and isomorphism in terms of properties. This
is the most important part of the account. Next, we’ll need some way of ensuring
that iconic contents are both intrinsically representational and determinate. We
face a decision point in how to solve these problems, and I’ll take the theory in one
15See McGinn (1989, p.185).
16For example, Soames often uses perceptual examples—when we see that a ball is red we
predicate redness to a ball. Presumably we don’t consciously perform such actions.
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direction—accounting for them in terms of teleology, though I’m not ruling out
other ways. Last, we face another decision point—whether holistic or atomistic
representation takes priority. I take the theory sketch in the holism direction, again
not ruling out the alternative. And before moving on, I want to stress again the
message of §1.2.4: I’m not giving a univocalist sketch of propositions. Rather,
operating under an M1 and pluralistic framework, I’m giving a sketch of one kind
of proposition among others.
1.4.1 Iconicity’s core: Similarity and isomorphism
Iconicity ties together the disparate kinds of content that I’ve surveyed, but
what is iconicity? I’ve glossed iconicity in terms of similarity, but I have something
more precise than similarity in mind—in particular, isomorphism. Generally, an
isomorphism is a function in which relational structure is preserved. Swoyer (1991,
p.452), which focuses on what he calls “surrogative reasoning,” captures the notion
I’m after thus:
[T]he pattern of relations among the constituents of the represented
phenomenon is mirrored by the pattern of relations among the con-
stituents of the representation itself. And because the arrangement of
things in the representation are like shadows cast by the things they
portray, we can encode information about the original situation as infor-
mation about the representation. Much of this information is preserved
in inferences about the constituents of the representation, so it can be
transformed back into information about the original situation.
Isomorphism is the first major part of the theory I state below, and officially, I
implicate isomorphism generally in the theory. What I mean by this is that there
are different orders of isomorphism, and, at this point, I don’t commit to any order
or other being the correct order of isomorphism. I say this because first, cognitive
scientists are still actively investigating this question, and second, different types
of orders may capture different modes of iconic representation. I should note that
various authors have chosen second-order isomorphism as their preferred order.
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The kind of isomorphism that Swoyer describes above is second order. The idea
is that, while first-order isomorphism will typically capture the sense in which a
representation literally resembles its object, second-order isomorphism will capture
similarity in abstract relational structure.17
The pattern of relations contained within an iconic representation such as a
mental map will be highly complex, but in order to state the theory, let’s zero in
on the complex property of having that pattern of relations. Entertaining a mental
map, then, will consist in the mind/brain instantiating this complex property,
and successful representation will consist in the co-instantiation of properties—
the mind’s of a pattern of relations and the world’s instantiation of the complex
property of the mirrored pattern of relations. And it is this mirroring of relational
patterns that partially underwrites the usefulness of these representations—because
it allows us to deploy, to use Swoyer’s phrase, surrogative reasoning, in which one
reasons with a structural representation to draw inferences about the object of that
representation.
The first piece of sketching the theory, then, is that when the mind represents the
world, it instantiates a complex property—the property of having a certain pattern
of relations—and when the mind represents veridically, the world instantiates a
complex property—the property of the mirrored pattern of relations. If we set
aside for a moment the niceties of the context of propositions and the order of
isomorphisms and such, the general idea is that a map comprises a certain pattern of
relations—it will be some way or other. And when the map is useful, the world will
be the same way, under isomorphism. And the idea stays the same when the iconic
representation becomes more abstract—say, with a Venn diagram. Isomorphism
is only one part of the sketch because similarity, resemblance, isomorphism—all
17For cognitive scientific literature on the second-order view, see Shepard and Chipman (1970)
and Choe (2002).
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the basic concepts under which we explain iconicity—are all too easy to come by.
Anything is isomorphic to anything else under some interpretation. A map doesn’t
represent merely because it’s isomorphic to some aspect of reality. It represents
because it has the right kind of isomorphism to make it useful to us. It is our use to
which we put the map plus its pattern of relations’ being isomorphic to some aspect
of reality that explains how the map comes to represent reality. And as we’ve seen,
part of the problem with proposition-first theories is that they require interpretation.
Surely it cannot be “we” who interpret our own inner iconic representation on pain
of an infinite regress of inner homunculi.
1.4.2 Interpretation and securing unique content
Avoiding such a regress isn’t a problem alone for a theory that employs iconic
representations, and there are various strategies to avoid it. Here is one way,
employing teleology, that we may avoid the problem.
The strategy to avoid the problem for iconic representations is to show that such
representations can be run in a cognitive system that lacks any kind of interpretative
intelligence, yet the use to which the icons are put, in addition to isomorphism,
underwrites the icons’ representative powers. And this is the second piece of
the foregoing sketch—that iconic propositions represent, to borrow a phrase from
McGinn (1989), partially in virtue of natural teleology. This idea is developed by
writers both in18 and outside19 the mental models and maps literature. E.g., Ramsey
(2007, §6.1) illustrates the mindless strategy with a two-step analogy. The first
step involves an intelligent agent’s interpretation conferring representative powers
upon an icon; the second step involves removing the agent while keeping the
guiding function of the icon, the result being that its representational capacity still
18See Cummins (1996).
19For example, see the work of Ruth Millikan, such as Millikan (2002).
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remains. The analogy compares the iconic view with another prominent view of
representation—the “receptor view”—in which neural states represent because they
reliably detect certain external conditions. To illustrate:
Step one. Two windowless cars, car A and B, respectively, traverse an “S”-shaped
path. They do so as follows:
• Icon. A driver guides the car with a map of the “S” combined with dead
reckoning.
• Receptor. When the car approaches a wall, sensors on the front bumper push
inward, closing a circuit, which illuminates a light, which the driver uses to
guide the car through path.
Step two. Now we remove the drivers, and the cars traverse the path as follows:
• Icon. The map is replaced with an “S”-shaped groove, isomorphic to the track,
in which a rudder runs. The rudder moves along the groove and controls the
steering wheel via arms connected to the rudder, guiding the car through the
path.
• Receptor. When the car approaches a wall, sensors on the front bumper push
inward, closing a circuit, which controls a rod that pushes the steering wheel
in the opposite direction, which guides the driverless car through path.
Once we remove the driver, the most natural way to interpret the process in the
receptor car is that a mere causal process guides the car. There is no component
of the process—the sensors, the circuit, the rod—that seems representational. On
the other hand, the best way to explain the success of car A in step two is that
the groove is a map, a representation, of the track. At some much, much more
complicated level, the iconic representations that guide our behavior are analogous
to the groove, and the conclusion that Ramsey draws, that I want to employ, is that
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our cognitive systems can mindlessly use iconic representations to target aspects of
reality, and in so doing, the icons acquire their representational powers.
Natural teleology can solve another problem for the iconic content—that such
content is indeterminate. This is perhaps one of the most obvious worries for any
theory of representation based on isomorphism or similarity. The worry is that a
single iconic representation can target any object—as Fodor puts it (tweaked for
our purposes) one model may represent a chess game or the Six Day War if, at
some level of abstraction, the two targets are functionally identical. The source
of this objection comes from thinking about everyday models as well as scientific
models. We’re familiar with, at least before the days of Google Maps, scrawling
a map of one’s neighborhood that could serve to represent any number of things
given the right purpose. But everyday and scientific models, maps, etc., require
interpretation from us—they only extrinsically represent. However, if we pair such
iconic representations with a use to which they are put, then we do get a unique
content. We wouldn’t be impressed if, in the midst of discussing directions via my
hand-drawn map of my neighborhood, someone objected that my map represents
Napoleon’s strategy in the Battle of Austerlitz. Natural teleology performs a similar
purpose except that the “interpretation”—or the use to which it’s put to—isn’t
extrinsic, and this use can pin down what an iconic representation represents.
This determination of content also resolves another immediate worry for the
theory: The representation relation should be typically asymmetric, for the objects
of representations don’t represent their representers. Language-like representation
obviously satisfy this desideratta. I’ve grounded the representational capacity of
my propositions partially in terms of a kind of similarity, in particular a kind of
isomorphism. Yet similarity is a symmetric relation. If this is the case, then I face an
objection: If iconic proposition p represents r, then r will also represent p, which
seems strange at the very least. The solution is this: Iconic contents and their targets
36
may be symmetrically isomorphic, but the targets of such content aren’t put to any
use and so don’t represent anything.
1.4.3 Holism and atomism
The last decision point is a priority issue. Iconic contents may not encode the
entirety of an agent’s belief state at some time. Still, such contents can encode lots
of information. Yet at the very least, to give a sketch of a theory of propositions, we
need individualized contents. Let’s first consider, at an intuitive level, how we may
extract such contents. If the content of an agent’s mental state with respect to some
issue at some particular time is a complex, holistic map, then an individualized
content will be some part of that map. Just as a map may represent some expanse
of land, some portion of that map represents a part of that land. More abstractly,
a Venn diagram may represent various properties and relations between sets as a
whole and particular relations and properties when we consider an aspect of the
diagram—that, e.g., the intersection of two sets is non-empty. If we can understand
a mental map as a complex property of having a certain pattern of relations—one
that a cognitive system uses to target, via isomorphism, some aspect of reality—then
an individualized content will be some portion of that mental map. In other words,
it will still be a property of having a certain pattern of relations, but the pattern of
relations will be some portion of the agent’s holistic content.
How do we isolate the right parts that intuitively correspond to individualized
contents? This process, of extracting individualized contents from holistic content,
isn’t new, especially for possible worlds theorists such as David Lewis.20 And there
is, in fact, a close connection between possible worlds and iconic representation.21
20Lewis (1986, pp.32-34) gives four options to extract individualized content.
21Mental models theorists, Johnson-Laird in particular, have used possible worlds to precisify
mental models.
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There are various options to precisify the holistic iconic content with possible
worlds from which we can derive individualized content. Here is a typical strategy:
Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson (2007, pp.190-191) give a functionalist pairing of
sets of possible worlds with belief states the content of which are mental maps.
Their view is this: each belief state, when paired with an agent’s desires, causes
actions. These actions would satisfy an agent’s desires in some worlds but not others.
Those some worlds are the content of that agent’s belief state. Or we consider what
possibilities an agent’s mental maps rules in, rules out, and leave indeterminate. The
set complement of the set ruled out will be an agent’s doxastically accessible worlds.
Some of the supersets of these worlds will correspond to what we intuitively think
about as individualized contents. The Braddon-Michel and Jackson method is (but)
one way to pick out the right supersets.
Let’s revisit the library example. The relevant iconic content may be a highly
complex, albeit incomplete, map of the library. Now one aspect of this content is that
I represent the world in such a way that the logic books at the university library are
near the middle of the twentieth floor. The way that we would extract this content
from my holistic map according to the above strategy is that given my desire to
check out a logic book (for example), if the aspect of my map regarding the logic
books is accurate, then it would successfully steer my behavior to satisfy my desire.
In terms of possible worlds, one superset of my doxastically accessible worlds will
have in common the logic books being near the center of the university library on
the twentieth floor.22 Again, we’re considering one possible way of moving from
holistic contents to individualized contents, and for the sake of stating the theory in
the next section, let’s say that there is a content pairing between a holistic content
22This set of worlds isn’t the individualized content itself. Rather, it’s a theorist’s tool for precisify-
ing, out of my holistic content, a single aspect of it that corresponds to what we might specify with a
belief sentence.
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and an individualized content when in fact there is such a pairing on a process like
the one I just described.
1.4.4 Statement of theory
To recap: According to the mind-first trend, the fundamental source of repre-
sentation is the mind upon which all others forms of representation, including
propositions, are derivative, though this doesn’t impugn the intrinsicality of propo-
sitional representation. This view promises to solve some recalcitrant problems,
such as locating a plausible fundamental source of representation, solving the Be-
nacerraf problem, and solving the problem of propositional unity. The mind-first
trend, then, requires us to pay mind to the details of mental representation. Toward
this end, we’ve considered a diverse view according to which the mind represents
partially iconically. Iconic representations represent not only in virtue of isomor-
phism, but also, according to the option we took, in virtue of a cognitive system’s
natural teleology—a kind of use that doesn’t require inner homunculi—that delivers
a determinate content for the system. I’ve understood an isomorphism between
mind and the world as the sharing of a pattern of relations, and I’ve considered
the property of having some particular pattern of relations as one’s iconic content
as a way of specifying that content. We’ve then considered aspects of that highly
complex property that are an individualized content, and we’ve sketched different
ways to precisify that individualized content. With this in hand, we can now give a
statement of the sketch that we’ll refine and expand upon:
Iconic Propositions (IP) An iconic representation c (a mental map, model, diagram,
etc.) is a complex pattern of relations that form an isomorph that a cognitive
system uses to navigate the world. The content of c is the property i of having
the pattern of relations involved in the isomorph. An iconic proposition p is a
property r that isolates an aspect of i for which there is a content pairing with
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i, and the mind represents the world veridically in terms of p when both the
mind and world instantiate r.
To explicate the theory, let’s see how various propositional issues play out
according to it.
1.4.5 Basic propositional issues
I first consider how the sketch deals with basic issues, which will set us up to
discuss the more complex, contemporary issues from §1.2.3.4.
General content. Can iconic propositions represent anything general? If they
couldn’t, I wouldn’t take that as a damning objection. We would still have a
software-level process that leads to non-general content for which we should still
account. Unfortunately the general–non-general distinction is somewhat vexed
since ways of understanding the distinction, say in terms of the singular–general
proposition distinction, are themselves a matter of debate. Fortunately, I think
there’s a clear sense in which at least some iconic content can represent general
facts, and the focus on concrete-style maps may lead one to think otherwise. For
example, diagrammatic content clearly represent general facts—that all dogs are
mammals, which isn’t about any particular dog or mammal.
Misrepresentation. There is no representation without misrepresentation, and
there is some disagreement about how misrepresentation works among those
that write about iconic representation.23 Misrepresentation comes about from a
disconnect between a representation and its target. The disconnect on the traditional
picture is between what an externally existing object describes and how the world
is. For IP, the disconnect comes between the content that isomorphism and natural
teleology fix and how the world is. If, according to the foregoing sketch, we
23See Cummins (1996) for a detailed view.
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understand veridical representation in terms of the co-instantiation of properties—
the mind and the world both instantiating the property of having a certain pattern
of relations—then it’s natural to understand misrepresentation as the asymmetric
instantiation of properties. But the world instantiates all kinds of properties that
the mind doesn’t instantiate, and in many cases we don’t want to say that we’re
misrepresenting the world. Misrepresentation, for IP, is a disconnect between the
fixed content of an icon plus natural teleology and how world is—a disconnect
between an “intended” target and the actual target. This idea should be familiar
on the analogy with everyday iconic content. We may intend to map a certain part
of the neighborhood for a party but misrepresent the streets, or intend to capture
family relations with a diagram and misrepresent those relations, etc.
Non-existant relata. A necessary condition on the satisfaction of many relations is
that the relata of that relation exist. If the loving relation obtains between Abelard
and Heloise, then both need to exist. Not so for representation. Agents can represent
the nonexistent: E.g., I can represent Pegasus, though such a being is nonexistent.
It’s important to note that accounting for non-existent entities, properties, etc.,
implicated in a relatum of the representation is a general problem. Here is how IP
makes sense of this: The mind instantiates a property that the relevant chunk of
reality does not instantiate. The reason that a given simulation represents some
non-reality is because that’s the use the cognitive system puts the model to.
Shareability of content. The way that IP accounts for the shareability of content
is perhaps one of the most interesting aspects of the theory in my view. There is
a sense which any number of people can say, believe, doubt, etc., the same thing.
And two sentences of the same or different languages can mean the same thing.
Indeed, we commonly give examples of shared content to introduce propositions
to the uninitiated. Above, in the midst of stating the theory, we considered how
the propositions of IP come to have determinate content rather than representing
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anything given the right purpose. Considering the key desiderata of shared content
will give me a chance to elaborate on the determinacy issue.
It appears to me that some philosophers take the notion of shared content quite
literally. When two people believe the same thing, the content of the states is literally
one and the same abstract object—the proposition. Similarly for natural language
sentences. This is the case for tuple theories as well as possible worlds theories:
You and I both believe that snow is white in virtue of our mental states having
literally one and the same proposition as content, whether it be 〈W, s〉 or the set
of snow-is-white worlds, etc. Some modern writers hold to this literal picture, for
example Schiffer (2003). Traditionally, then, to share content is to glom onto one
and the same object.
It’s not clear to me, since Soames and King don’t address these issues directly,
how we should understand their vision of shared content. It seems to me that
Soames’ picture must be different, for when you and I believe the same thing it is
in virtue of doing the same thing on his picture: When you and I both believe that
Rachel reads, we both predicate the property of being a reader to Rachel. Though
we engage in separate event tokens, both of our tokens are of the same predicative
event type. This mutual participation in the same event type is supposed to make
sense of shared content.24
IP diverges from the traditional picture of shared content. My notion of shared
content consists in a notion of sharing that we’re familiar with—that of properties.
Various minds will process information in different ways, but, when they represent
the world as being one way or another, they do so in virtue of an agents’ iconic
contents representing it as such. What these minds share is that, at some level of
24It’s unclear how to understand King on this issue. I would want to know more about how King
understands the nature of the syntax in his theory, an issue I raise in the next chapter. If his syntax
is idealized psychology, then I think we should understand his notion of shared content in a way
similar to Soames’.
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abstraction, they’re all similar—both with each other and with the object of repre-
sentation. And they’re all similar because they all instantiate the same property—a
sample (or attempted sample) of the world. So when agents share content, it’s not
in virtue of accessing the same object but in virtue of being relevantly similar to one
another.
One may worry that iconic representation is a poor basis for mind-first propo-
sitions because it just seems that mental maps, models, and others kinds of iconic
representation are just too variegated from person to person to ground any notion
of shared content. I think there is something to this worry, but I think it is a general
worry for the mind-first program, which I want to quickly address and note that I
consider this issue in more detail in chapter 2.
For Soames, and possibly for King, when we look closely at their respective bases
for their propositions, minor, seemingly trivial, details in individual representation
may seem to either impugn the shareability of content or push them in a direction
in which traditional problems, namely the Benacerraf problem, resurface. Let me
briefly say what I mean and why I don’t think these problems are genuine.
For Soames, we may consider how events are individuated. It seems plausible
that if we take a series of actions, and rearrange the order of those actions, then the
result is two event tokens that don’t fall under the same type.25 But if this is the
case, then trivial differences in event order will result in different propositions when
what we want is shared content. For example, suppose you and I are watching a
subtitled foreign news broadcast, and the following line flashes on the screen:
(1.7) Fighting in Aleppo intensified, and Turkey entered the Syrian conflict today.
25Soames doesn’t discuss whether he’s committed to this individuation of events, but the individ-
uation conditions seem extremely plausible to me. If I go to the store and then go to the bar, and you
go to the same bar and then the store, we seem to engage in separate events.
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I read the sentence normally, from left to right, and someone blocks your view
so that you read the conjuncts out of order. We both come to believe the same
thing, and although actions involved in either of our event tokens were the same,
they were performed in different orders, resulting in different event types and
thus different propositions. Soames’ account, because of this temporal aspect, is
especially vulnerable to the worry underway—that minor differences in the basis of
mind-first propositions will lead to distinct content when we want shared content.
For example, the series of actions in processing pIf p, qqmay be different from pq if
pq though we would plausibly want shared content here.
For King, we don’t have this worry since there is no temporal aspect to the
order in which semantic values, given some syntactic structure, are composed.
Yet for King, much depends on exactly what the syntactician and semanticist
are up to at a metaphysical level. While there is a strain of semanticists that see
themselves as describing a Platonic grammar, it’s my hunch that many semanticists
and syntacticians see themselves, if only implicitly, as modeling psychological
processes at some level of abstraction. And for King, the Platonic option is out
anyway if he is to be a mind-first theorist. Given all this, a kind of dilemma arises.
If we stick to the mind-first program to the letter, then trivial differences in bases
threaten the notion of shared content. If we depart from the mind-first program and
base propositions on models of psychological processes, then a Benacerraf problem
of a different kind arises. There may no be fact of the matter—at a metaphysical,
not epistemological level—whether one syntactic/semantic structure or a closely
related one is the syntactic/semantic structure.
These are complicated issues, but my point in bringing them up is that pinning
down a notion of shared content presents a general kind of difficulty for the mind-
first theorist, and IP doesn’t face a distinctly threatening version of it. At some level
of detail, individual iconic representations will surely differ from brain to brain.
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But if a crowd of people have mental maps that all represent the logic books as on
the twentieth floor of the library, then there will be some property based on that
representation that all of their minds instantiate, and they will share content in
virtue of that. If anything, IP fares especially well with the dilemma currently under
discussion because the notion of sharing is the familiar notion from the sharing
of properties. Many red objects can differ is innumerable ways, and may even
differ in their exact shade of redness, yet they may all share the property of being
red. Similarly for iconic representation: many minds may vary in exactly how they
represent some given fact, but they can still all share a property in common.
1.4.6 How IP fares with P1’s benefits
In §1.2.2 we noted that the P1 theorist’s main benefit is that she provides enough
propositions: The P1 theorist can provide a proposition for every possible content-
bearing mental state. The P1 theorist can also make sense of the objects that agents
entertain when they engage in logical inference. These are the main benefits that I
want to consider. We also noted that the P1 theorist can make sense of truths and
falsehoods before the existence of representing beings.
Let’s start with the issue of the number of propositions. Recall the problem:
Both King and Soames, as M1 theorists, employ bases of content from actual human
psychology. In order to generate propositions that no one has thought of yet (or
will think of), they both appeal to recursive devices familiar from syntax, and
such devices won’t generate enough propositions. While actual human agents
employ the cognitive models of IP, the theory can provide properties to ground
the representation of any iconic mental state. This is because the properties of my
theory aren’t human-centric, and isomorphism is an account of iconicity generally.
This being so, these properties could underwrite the representation of any being
that simulates the world.
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The main issue for M1 theories is a dearth of propositions, but this ignores
the other aspect of a parity between being and representation—that of too much
representation so that we end up with “propositions” that shouldn’t be propositions.
To my knowledge, no one has discussed this issue, but, prima facie, King has the
problem. Any syntactically well-formed sentence with lexical items that bear
semantic relations to their semantic values, for King, will express a proposition. If
this is the case, then so called category mistake, non-sense sentences will express
propositions: e.g., “Colorless green ideas sleep furiously." The defectiveness of such
sentences, for some, goes beyond mere falsehood: Such sentences are meaningless.
And if we analyze meaninglessness as the failure to express a proposition, then
King would have propositions where he shouldn’t. There is a lot to say about this
issue, but I want to note that IP doesn’t seem to have the too-many-propositions
problem: properties come prepackaged with instantiation conditions that prevent
non-sense from being some way the world could be.
As to logical relations, the idea of truth or satisfaction conditions starts from the
idea of simulating a fact that obtains. Now this might not fit the mold of traditional
truth conditions, but I also think this is OK: We need some understanding of what
it means for the content of someone’s mental state to be true, and IP gives us that
in terms of property co-instantiation. And we can begin to understand the logical
relations that exist among mental contents in terms of properties; one can’t simulate
something’s being maroon without simulating its being red, one can’t simulate
a square’s having three sides, etc., which means that certain kinds of properties
instantiate together, some can’t co-instantiate, etc. And given that much of the
iconic representation literature, mental models in particular, was introduced to
account for reasoning, much of that literature can be worked into an account of the
logical relations that hold among mental contents.
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As to the issue of truths before the existence of representing beings: For every
way that a cognitive being might simulate the world, I can provide a property to
ground such simulation, though before there were agents, there were no cognitive
systems to employ such simulations. On this worry, I have nothing new to add—I
would point to King (2007, ch3), in which King distinguishes between there being no
truths and the world not being a determinate way. Without representing agents, the
former will be true, but not the latter: the world will still be some way—i.e., it will
instantiate various properties—but there will be no representers to represent this
world. Presumably, things would be similar for Soames, but with event types. For
King, Soames, and I, there will be no propositions before agents and no propositions
at worlds lacking agents. For me, this means that the world was some way without
there being a representing agent to simulate the way the world was at that time.
In the end the metaphysical role category, however, in my view, is best under-
stood at the level of propositional models—for me, as noted above, in terms of sets
of possible worlds. Here, I mean “model” in the sense of a scientific model—an
idealized and theoretically fruitful representation.26 But this isn’t a demerit of IP
alone—that I can’t account for the metaphysical roles at the level of my propositions
and not at the level of their model. I think it holds for both King and Soames as
well. For any Kingian or Soamesian propositions, it’s not clear whether some given
logical relation holds between them. King and Soames thus will employ models,
and that’s just the situation that I am in: IP goes hand in hand with a worlds model
that elegantly analyzes logical relations in terms of set-theoretic relations.
1.4.7 How IP fares with M1’s benefits
Recall from §1.2.3.4 that M1 theories promise to solve the Benacerraf problem
as well as a the related arbitrariness worry that I called the demarcation problem.
26I discuss this issue in depth in the next chapter.
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They also promise to explain the ultimate source of representation and to explain
the unity of the proposition, although we noted that that benefit may not be as
important as the other issues.
First, the Benacerraf problem. The Benacerraf problem arises, to recall, when
we have multiple propositional candidates to choose among the choice of which
is arbitrary. This problem is most salient when we have multiple formal objects
with the right propositional properties, such as grain and structure. This is the
classic propositional version of the problem that plagues set theoretic theories of
propositions. IP identifies propositions with properties, not formal devices. The
decision to employ such formal devices is what leads to the surfeit of choices. If
IP had a Benacerraf problem, it would arise from indeterminacy of content—if we
had no way of choosing which of any iconic content may represent some way the
world is because any icon can represent anything with the right interpretation. If
this were the case, then to choose one icon over another would be arbitrary. But
we provided one way of pinning down unique content, which would prevent a
Benacerraf problem of this kind.
We answer the other demarcation problem with the same way that we pin
down a unique content, which for us was natural teleology. Sets of objects and
tuples don’t, in general, represent—so why do the traditional propositions? There
is seemingly no answer. King and Soames, on the other hand, do seem to have
an answer: Facts and event types don’t, in general, represent, so why does the
subset that are propositions represent? Because, for King, humans interpreted
syntax to have a particular semantic significance, and for Soames, because those
particular mental events are composed of tokens that involve mental actions. For
me, properties aren’t in general proposition like, but the properties of IP are the way
the mind is when it simulates the world.
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IP is able to face these two arbitrariness worries because the ultimate source
of representation, as a mind-first theory, is the mind. It is the mind’s activity that
creates simulations of the world. We know something about how this happens, as
we’ve seen in §1.3, but it is still, probably, mostly a mystery—a subject for further
inquiry. From §1.4.2, I sketched arguments from Ramsey (2007) that iconic contents
represent intrinsically. And as King oughtn’t be committed to the fine details of
the final true syntax and semantics, I shouldn’t be committed to the fine details of
iconic representation. The important part is that the broad outline of the program,
the very idea that the mind represents partially iconically gives me the materials to
extract abstract objects whose representational capacity depends on the creation
of simulations, which, together with natural teleology, intrinsically represent. My
answer to the problem of explaining the source of representation, then, is similar to
King’s: to extract abstract objects from the general outline of a theory of how the
mind represents without committing to the exact details.
What about the problem of the unity of the proposition? Though, as I said, it
may not be as serious an issue, I should say something about it given its large role
in the propositions literature. Iconic representations contain something like parts. I
need to explain the difference between a collection of things and a proposition that
involves the members of that collection. The difference is that, in an iconic content,
the mind uses those parts in a simulation of a world while alone the parts don’t
participate in such a model. The fact that our cognitive systems employ simulations
with parts unifies those parts and explains why they represent, which is a fact, given
the use, about the proposition all on its own.
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CHAPTER 2
THE PROPOSITIONAL BENACERRAF PROBLEM
Abstract
Writers in the propositions literature consider the Benacerraf objection
serious, often decisive. The objection figures heavily in dismissing stan-
dard theories of propositions of the past, notably set-theoretic theories. I
argue that the situation is more complicated. After explicating the propo-
sitional Benacerraf problem, I focus on a classic set-theoretic theory, the
possible worlds theory, and argue that methodological considerations
influence the objection’s success.
2.1 Introduction
How can any given propositional candidate be the proposition that p when
there are equally good candidates? Call this the propositional Benacerraf problem.1
This objection originates in the philosophy of mathematics, targeting set-theoretic
reductions of numbers, but generalizes to other entities, including some views of
propositions. Yet in the propositional case, we perhaps don’t fully understand the
problem, which the fast-changing nature of the propositions literature complicates.
Investigating and better understanding the problem will be this paper’s main goal.
The problem, we’ll see, most obviously targets set-theoretic theories of propositions.
These theories tend to come in two varieties: tuple theories and worlds theories. Af-
ter explicating the propositional Benacerraf problem itself, I consider its application
to the worlds theory as a case study. I claim that there are (at least) two plausible
defenses of the worlds theory from the Benacerraf problem. These defenses serve
1Benacerraf (1965) is the original source of the eponymous problem.
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to explicate the worlds theory in a way that coheres with realistic versions of the
worlds theories—not contrivance to show that it’s logically possible for the worlds
theory to avoid the Benacerraf problem.
On the first defense, I argue that in some instances the problem fail because the
objector confuses a philosophical representation for the object of that representation.
On the second, I argue that, given a certain view of philosophical analysis, the
arbitrariness at the heart of the Benacerraf problem is benign. This second defense
may bring out a more general, big-picture goal: to make sense of two impression-
istically distinct ways of thinking about propositions. Historically, some writers
have treated propositions as tools that they put to work in some larger theory. As
such, a theory’s requirements define and exhaust the nature of these tools. Writers
in this historical thread stipulate and define rather than discover. On the other hand,
some have approached propositions directly, believing them worthy of study in
their own right, with a nature to uncover rather than to define or stipulate. Here
I have in mind, e.g., the recent interest in propositions as such, notably from Jeff
King and Scott Soames.2 Such confusion, in my view, results in objections like this:
When I believe (doubt, justify, assert) some proposition, do I believe
(doubt, justify, assert) a function? On the face of it, this is not plausible.
Advocates of this reduction seem to have lost “the naive eye.” (Bealer,
1998, p.5)
Do philosophers such as David Lewis simply miss the forest for the trees? No. I
argue such objections only make sense absent the target’s methodology, a method-
ology that I argue provides a view of propositions that the Benacerraf objections
misses.
2For book-length statements, see King (2007) and Soames (2010).
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2.2 The Benacerraf Problem
We’ll start with the original Benacerraf problem in the mathematical context,
then move to the standard version of the problem in the propositional context,
looking closely at the problem with respect to developments in the propositions
literature, which gives rise to a new kind of Benacerraf problem whose force is less
clear than the standard version. I close with typical responses to the Benacerraf
problem.
2.2.1 Benacerraf 1965
Benacerraf raised a problem for the reduction of numbers to sets. For such a pur-
ported reduction, various progressions of sets work equally well. Two conspicuous
contenders are von Neumann’s ordinals and Zermelo’s, each progression which
goes, respectively, as follows:
(2.1) ∅, {∅}, {∅, {∅}}, ...
(2.2) ∅, {∅}, {{∅}}, ...
These two progressions may serve equally well as representations of the natural
numbers, but the question is, Are they the natural numbers? Benacerraf says no.
Benacerraf presents the objection in parable form in which different logician par-
ents bring up two children, Johnny (for John von Neumann) and Ernie (for Ernst
Zermelo), teaching them their respective progressions instead of usual counting
and mathematical instruction. Upon the set-theoretic instruction’s completion, the
children quarrel: Ernie insists that 3 is a member of 17 and Johnny disagrees. This
disagreement brings out the first step of the Benacerraf objection: the candidate
reduction bases are non-equivalent. The second step is the arbitrariness step. The
naturals can’t be both progressions since they’re non-equivalent by step one, so the
naturals must be one or the other (or some yet other progression). If the naturals
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are, say, the von Neumann progression rather than Zermelo’s, then there must be
an argument for that choice. Yet, no argument is forthcoming—what could the
reasoning possibly be since both work equally well foundations-wise? The final
step is to conclude that the purported reduction/identification fails—in this case,
that numbers aren’t sets.
We can generalize the problem thus:
Benacerraf problem If there are multiple, non-equivalent classes of entities that
contend for an identification (or reduction) base for some class of entities E,
and there’s no non-arbitrary reason to choose one reduction/identification
base over another, then E in fact isn’t (or can’t be reduced to) any of those
bases.
2.2.2 The Propositional Benacerraf Problem: The Classic Version
The objection applies straightforwardly to worlds theories. Step one: Worlds
theorists employ both sets of worlds and functions from worlds to truth values. We
may have the set of worlds at which snow is white—
{w1, w2, w3, ...}
—and the function that pairs those worlds with 1 (or true, or whatever) and the
others with 0—
{〈w1, 1〉 , 〈w2, 1〉 , 〈w3, 1〉 , ..., 〈wn, 0〉 , ...}.
And it’s clear that, ontologically,
{w1, w2, w3, ...} 6= {〈w1, 1〉 , 〈w2, 1〉 , 〈w3, 1〉 , ..., 〈wn, 0〉 , ...}.
Thus, the two are non-equivalent. Step two: Both sets and their characteristic
functions work equally well by the world theorist’s lights. Conclusion: Propositions
53
are neither sets of worlds nor their characteristic functions. Call this the classic
propositional Benacerraf problem, or just the classic problem since we’ll focus mostly on
propositions, and I’ll flag the mathematical case below.
2.2.3 The Propositional Benacerraf Objection: Further Thoughts and Another
Version
The key feature of a Benacerraf problem of any type is untoward arbitrariness.
About that arbitrariness, I raise two points that I discuss at once. First, the source
or nature of the arbitrariness is important, for it gives rise to importantly different
kinds of Benacerraf problems the strength of which may depend on the source of
that arbitrariness. Second, different kinds of potential constraints may eliminate the
arbitrariness.
The arbitrariness in the original mathematical Benacerraf problem involved, as
Benacerraf himself presented it, the epistemic idea of cogent reasons: If one doesn’t
have a cogent reason to favor that a = b rather than that a = c (where b 6= c), or vice
versa, then it’s arbitrary whether a = b or a = c. And if it’s arbitrary whether a = b
or a = c, then a 6= b 6= c. But it can’t be merely that if we lack cogent reasons, at
present, whether a = b or a = c, then a Benacerraf problem arises. If either the
butler or the gardener solely committed the murder, and we don’t have a cogent
reason to identify one or the other as the murder, that may give us reason not to
accuse or indict either—that would be arbitrary. But it’s not arbitrary, holding
fixed the disjunction, which is the murderer despite our ignorance. It mustn’t be
that we merely lack a cogent reason, but that, for some reason, no cogent reason is
forthcoming.
Why is no cogent reason forthcoming? In the original mathematical Benacerraf
problem and in the classic propositional Benacerraf problem, it seems that not only
is no cogent reason forthcoming, but no reason could ever possibly be forthcoming.
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In no possible world could we obtain cogent reasons that would favor choosing
one set progression over another in the mathematical problem. In the classic
propositional case, if we grant that there are roles for coarse grained propositions,
then, as in the mathematical case, there is no possible world in which we could
have cogent reasons to favor the set version versus the function version. In both
the mathematical and classic propositional Benacerraf problems, we’re choosing
among candidates according to role suitability—whether, respectively, some entities
behave like natural numbers (in that we can define arithmetical operations on them,
e.g.) or whether some entities behave like coarse-grained content (in that factually
equivalent propositions are identical, logical relations are definable, etc.). And given
that the candidates in both reduction/identification projects are formally equivalent,
there can be no possible cogent reasons to favor one candidate over another.
We solve a Benacerraf problem when we resolve this arbitrariness, and we
resolve the arbitrariness on the basis of some kind of criteria or other. Yet there are
different kinds of criteria, and recent developments in the propositions literature
give rise to a new kind of criterion that can affect the modal profile of the just-
mentioned cogent reasons. We’re familiar with the two typical kinds of criteria on
which we judge candidates in an identification/reduction. The first I’ll just call role-
filling criteria. These criteria are simply whether the candidate class of entities really
satisfies the recognized desiderata for a theory. In the original Benacerraf problem, if
we couldn’t define the successor relation on either the von Neumann or Zermelo
progressions, then the arbitrariness would obviously resolve. For propositions, any
entities that we identify with propositions have to play whatever propositional
roles we intend those propositions to play. It may be that one class of entities can
play all of the propositional roles, or perhaps only some roles if "[t]he conception
we associate with the word ‘proposition,”’ as Lewis (1986, p.54) says, is “a jumble
of conflicting desiderata."
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Whatever the case may be, if we set out to give a theory of, e.g., the objects
that enter into logical relations, then we need to be able to define logical relations
on those objects. If one class of entities satisfies this criteria and another doesn’t,
then that favors the role-filling class of entities. I may be stating the obvious—that
desiderata-satisfaction favors one class of entities over another—but this arbitrariness
resolver contrasts with another: instrumental criteria, such as simplicity, economy,
etc. While such criteria can perhaps be called upon to break ties—simplicity in
particular has in the propositions literature—such criteria are applied after role-
filling criteria. If we’re presenting a theory of the objects of logical relations, and
we can define such relations on one class of entities and not another, then it doesn’t
matter how simple, e.g., the latter entities are.
The propositions literature has recently taken an empirical turn, what I will
call the mind-first movement, and with this turn comes a different kind of tie-
breaking criteria. I won’t dwell on whether this kind of criteria is fundamentally
different from role-filling criteria. According to the mind-first movement, the
mind is the ultimate source of representation from which propositions inherit their
representational capacity, and the basis of content—the workings of the mind that
give rise to content—constrain the mind-first theorist’s proposed propositions.
What this means is that in addition to the propositions filling their various roles,
propositions must somehow be related to the actual, empirical workings of the
mind. Thus, if we have an apparent tie between two candidates both of which
satisfy their proposed roles equally well—and both are equally simple, yet one
actually is derived from the basis of content while the other is somehow in error
in its understanding of the empirical facts that give rise to content—then the tie
is broken in favor of the empirically informed entities. For example, for King,
suppose we focus on two propositional candidates for the proposition that p, one of
which includes binary branching syntax only while the other includes some ternary
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branching in its syntax. The candidates may serve equally well as the objects of the
attitudes, or as the content of assertive sentences, or whatever. Further suppose
that linguists inform us that the binary branching hypothesis is true. Then, since
one candidate gets the empirical facts about the basis of content wrong, we break
the tie.
Let’s see how this material plays out with some concrete examples from the
literature. The Benacerraf problems that writers have recently raised have mostly
targeted King’s theory.3 For example, Caplan and Tillman recently raise two Benac-
erraf problems for King’s theory. Here I focus on an aspect of King’s theory relevant
to the Benacerraf problem. Consider the simple sentence, “Rachel reads.” As the
words “Rachel” and “reads” stand in the sentential relation R, the person Rachel
and the property of being a reader stand in a propositional relation. According to
King’s original account, the propositional relation was this:
(PR1) Rachel stands in the PR1 relation to the property of being a reader iff in
language L, ___ is the semantic value of a lexical item x, and ___ is the
semantic value of of lexical item y, occurring at the left and right terminal
nodes, respectively, of the sentential relation R.
King’s original account of the proposition that Rachel reads was the fact that
PR1(Rachel, reading). King (2007) amends the account in a few ways. First, he notes
that syntax, in this case the relation R, has semantic significance—that R “instructs”
the semantics to deploy the instantiation function at syntactic concatenation points.
PR is updated thus:
(PR2) Rachel stands in the PR2 relation to the property of being a reader iff in
language L, ___ is the semantic value of a lexical item x, and ___ is the semantic
3But see Dixon and Gilmore (2016) for a recent Benacerraf problem targeting Speaks’ theory.
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value of of lexical item y, occurring at the left and right terminal nodes,
respectively, of the sentential relation R, which in L encodes instantiation.
Second, King worried that it is contingent that syntax instructs semantics to deploy
the instantiation function rather than, say, the anti-instantiation function. Because
of this, King claims that PR itself encodes instantiation, which, according to King,
secures the intrinsicality of propositions’ truth conditions—call this King’s new
account:
(PR3) Rachel stands in the PR3 relation to the property of being a reader iff in
language L, ___ is the semantic value of a lexical item x, and ___ is the semantic
value of of lexical item y, occurring at the left and right terminal nodes,
respectively, of the sentential relation R, which in L encodes instantiation, and
PR encodes instantiation.
King’s new account comes with a story to explain how PR came to encode in-
stantiation.4 Since King’s theory is mind-first, the representational capacity of his
propositions is derivative. So there is something humans did to something—call it the
“proto”-proposition—to endow propositions with their representational capacity.
The proto-propositions are simply the facts involving the relevant entities standing
in the PR2 relation. At some point in our distant past, “speakers attempted to make
use of structured contents, in part by beginning to employ that-clauses to talk about
them, they would have implicitly taken the structured content of a sentence to have
the same truth conditions as the sentence” (King, 2009, p.267). In doing so, the
propositional relation came to encode instantiation.
Caplan and Tillman (2013) claim that we can’t break the tie between King’s
account involving PR2 and his new account involving PR3. Both have truth condi-
tions, although the new account has them intrinsically while the old account has
4See the “First Objection” section from King (2007, ch3) and King (2009, pp.266-67).
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them extrinsically. Yet, they claim, the old account is simpler while the new account
is more complex. Here I think our different criteria and their order of importance
shows why this is not a genuine tie, and the impression that we have a Benacerraf
problem arises from mixing the importance of criteria. Intrinsic truth conditions is
a role-filling criteria while simplicity is an instrumental criteria and the former take
priority over the latter.5
They raise a second Benacerraf problem for different candidates for the proto-
proposition. They claim that King’s original account involving PR1 and PR2 are
equally well-suited. As they say:
The difference between . . . [King’s choice for the proto-proposition,
involving PR2] and . . . [King’s original account] is that only the former
includes as a conjunct the fact that [R] encodes instantiation. But, as long
as [R] does encode instantiation, the [original account] will have the
right truth-conditions and so shouldn’t be a worse candidate for being
[a given proposition].
As Fletcher (2014, pp.8-10) notes, Caplan and Tillman’s second proto-propositional
Benacerraf problem gives rise to a full-fledged Benacerraf problem. If King’s original
account involving PR1 is the proto-proposition, then the following will be the final
account of full-fledged propositions:
(PR2.5) Rachel stand in the PR2.5 relation iff in language L, ___ is the semantic value
of a lexical item x, and ___ is the semantic value of of lexical item y, occurring
at the left and right terminal nodes, respectively, of the sentential relation R,
and PR encodes instantiation.
The only difference is whether R encodes instantiation. But so long as PR does, then
it doesn’t matter, says Fletcher, whether R does. So we have a tie between the fact
that PR3(Rachel, reads) and the fact that PR2.5(Rachel, reads) for the proposition
that Rachel reads.
5Fletcher (2014, p.8) makes this point without my language of criteria and their order of impor-
tance.
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While the relative importance of criteria resolves Caplan and Tillman’s first
Benacerraf problem, their second, and Fletcher’s improvement, may be solved with
the new kind of criteria—the empirical criteria. Let’s grant that Caplan, Tillman, and
Fletcher are right when they say that both candidates are eligible—in my language,
that both serve equally well in terms of role-filling criteria. Something may be said in
favor of the proto-proposition involving PR1 (and so the full proposition involving
PR2.5) in terms of simplicity, but that doesn’t seem very appealing. The Benacerraf
problems under discussion revolve around whether the proto-proposition included
R’s encoding instantiation or not. Here things get complicated—which is why I
said empirical criteria “may” resolve the problem—since there are different views
on the nature of linguistics.6 Since King recruits Chomskyan syntax as his favored
syntax that provides propositional structure, I think it’s fair to say that the syntax
involved in his propositions is an idealization of psychological processes. But if this
is the case, then, regardless of the role suitability of the candidates, the evolution
of our syntactic and semantic modules may break the tie here. It’s hard to know
how seriously King takes his evolutionary story that culminates in his final account,
but regardless of that, there will be some empirical fact of the matter regarding R.
Regarding syntax providing instructions to the semantics, King (2007, p.34) says
the following:
[O]n any approach to compositional semantics for natural languages,
even one that eschews propositions altogether, one will have to invoke
this idea. For on any compositional semantics, the semantic values of
expressions at terminal nodes need to compose to yield new semantic
values for non-terminal nodes, which themselves must compose, until
we get a sentence level semantic value. The syntax gives the instructions
as to how the semantic values are composed. . . . Semantic approaches
differ only on what they claim is the instruction that a given bit of
syntax provides. They are all stuck with the idea of syntax providing
instructions.
6I cover some of these complications in chapter 1.
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Here, King (2009, pp.266-67) describes his evolutionary story that brought the
propositions in his final account into existence:
Now here let me tell a highly idealized and mythological story about
speakers coming to interpret the propositional relation of the fact that
is the proposition that Dara swims in the way they do. Consider a
time when languages had come into existence, bringing such facts into
existence, but the propositional relations had not yet been endowed
with the significance that gives propositions their truth conditions. As
speakers attempted to make use of structured contents, in part by be-
ginning to employ that-clauses to talk about them, they would have
implicitly taken the structured content of a sentence to have the same
truth conditions as the sentence. Now consider all the facts that consist
of Dara and the property of swimming bound together by some relation
and that would have been candidates to be the proposition that Dara
swims. My thought is that whichever of these had been ‘chosen’ to be
the proposition that Dara swims, the relation binding together Dara and
the property of swimming in the proposition inevitably would be inter-
preted as ascribing the property of swimming to Dara in virtue of the
fact that speakers implicitly and without thinking took the proposition
to be true iff Dara possesses the property of swimming.
To the Caplan and Tillman objection, there will be some fact of the matter—if the
whole evolutionary story is true—regarding the role of the proto-proposition. It will
be an empirical matter in linguistics what the nature of R was in our distant past,
and that will, on one view of syntax, be a question of our past psychology vis-a-vis
syntax. And if this is the case, then to Fletcher’s objection, there will be some fact of
the matter regarding the nature of R in King’s final account. Thus, one may criticize
King’s evolutionary story and his metaphysics of syntax. And it may turn out
that King will have to tweak his account in light of further empirical investigation.
These are all potential problems, but they won’t be Benacerraf problems.
We’ve just gestured toward empirical criteria breaking ties. Yet the empirical
turn in the propositions may give rise to a kind of indeterminacy, previously foreign
in the propositions literature, that can crop up amidst any empirical investigation,
and it’s unclear whether this indeterminacy results in a Benacerraf problem or
not. We’re familiar with indeterminacy arising from vagueness, future contingents,
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translation, reference, etc. The list goes on and isn’t restricted to such philosophical
mainstays: For example, given the historical city-planning facts, it’s indeterminate
whether Princeton is the borough of Princeton or the borough in addition to the
surrounding township.7 Why is this relevant to us? Because that’s what the
Benacerraf problem involves in other words—irresolvable indeterminacy. But the
kind of indeterminacy that often arises in metaphysical investigations is different
from the kind that arises in empirical investigations, especially investigations that
employ modeling methodology.8
I have in mind scenarios involving a non-theoretical level of description un-
derdetermining facts about a theoretical level of description whose purpose is to
account for that non-theoretical level. Here are a few examples:
• Consider formal epistemological facts about someone’s subjective confidence
in some proposition—say whether it will rain tomorrow. There are, on the
one hand, the facts about the person’s brain and her behavior (say betting
behavior), and on the other, her subjective confidence in rain, say it’s .5. There
may be no fact of the matter whether her credence in rain is .5 or .50000...1 (add
in as many zeros as you like). This is because the one level of description—the
facts about her brain, her behavior—whatever goes into determining whether
and to what degree someone believes something—underdetermines what her
credence is.
• Consider the Lewisian view about the relationship between languages and
language in Lewis (1975/1983). On the one hand, we have language as a
convention-governed social phenomenon—conventions that Lewis accounts
for game theoretically; and on the other, we have language as a formal seman-
7This example is from Lewis (1988, p.129).
8“Modeling” here means the methodology discussed in philosophy of science; for example, see
Weisberg (2013) for a contemporary book-length discussion.
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tic function from strings to meanings, where meanings determine extensions
in possible worlds. Given that there will be some indeterminacy in the regu-
larities that govern linguistic conventions, which in turn determines which
language some population speaks, there will be indeterminacy in the rela-
tion between a given population’s language as a social phenomenon and the
formal semantic account of that language.
• Suppose at the end of syntactic inquiry, there is no evidence to distinguish be-
tween whether every branching node is binary or whether some branches are
n-ary. Further suppose that syntacticians model actual human psychological
processes, as many take themselves to be doing. Of course one reason that
such a situation may arise is that our science will just never be good enough.
But it may be that human physical and behavioral facts underdetermine
fine-grained theoretical distinctions at the level of the syntactic model
The level at which this indeterminacy resides is, respectively, a given agent’s subjec-
tive confidence, the correct semantics for a natural language, or human syntactic
knowledge. I’m not interested in the models of these—respectively, candidate cre-
dence functions, set-theoretic formal semantics, and tree- (and so set-) theoretic
syntax. As we’ll see, Benacerraf objections don’t apply at the level of a theoretical
model.
The above scenario types look similar to the classic mathematical and propo-
sitional versions: We have multiple theoretical candidates to choose from among
which no candidate is better than others in terms of cogent reasons. For the classic
propositional Benacerraf problem, only role-filling and instrumental criteria could
break the tie. Like I said, the lack of cogent reasons is necessary and the indeter-
minacy is necessarily irresolvable. Yet there is a feeling of contingency once we
introduce empirical investigation into theories of propositions. It may very well
turn out that certain facts will remain unresolved not merely as a matter of our
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clumsy science but even at the end of actual ideal science. In these cases, it seems to
me that it’s possible that some evidence could distinguish the candidates. It’s just
that (or at least we’ve stipulated) that there is no actual evidence to distinguish the
cases. If we can distinguish between .9 and .1 credences with some confidence, then
it seems possible that for some very fine-grained distinction, there could be some
behavioral or brain fact that distinguishes them. Similar considerations go for the
other two examples: there will always be indeterminacy in the relation between
Lewis’ two notions of language, but for two given formal semantics, we can produce
a world where that indeterminacy resolves. And if we have constituency tests that
give us cogent reasons to identify obvious constituents, we can imagine speech
and brain facts that would resolve the indeterminacy between binary and n-ary
branching. That we’re left with these indeterminacies and not some others at the
end of science just seems to be a contingent fact about our world.
I want to be clear with what I mean about "contingent" indeterminacy. When
I say that familiar cases of indeterminacy, for example vagueness, are necessarily
irresolvable, what I mean is this: Once we fix upon our concept of, e.g., baldness,
and we fix upon some borderline bald person, it doesn’t matter how other facts
vary from world to world—that person will be a borderline case in every world.
Once we fix our concept of what a proposition is and fix that a given proposition
p’s identity is indeterminate between a set of worlds and a characteristic function
thereof, we can vary other facts and the indeterminacy will remain irresolvable. I’m
contrasting this case with a different kind of indeterminacy, and this different kind
of indeterminacy is relevant in our current propositions literature. This difference,
in the propositional case, arises from theorists introducing empirical considerations
into their theories. For example, King employs syntax in his facts that are his
propositions. Syntax is, of course, an ongoing filed of investigation, and King
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employs syntax in his propositions however, with some constraint,9 syntax turns out in
the end. Now, in our world, it may turn out that, with respect to some syntactic facts,
those facts don’t turn out one way or another. There may be some irresolvable actual
indeterminacy between the facts about our brains and speech behavior and syntax.
But how things turn out at some other world may be different—such indeterminacies
may resolve. And this is what I mean by the indeterminacy being contingent.
This matters for us because which candidate proposition is the proposition that
p may depend on the resolution of some actual indeterminacy that may, in our
world, be irresolvable. The binary/n-ary branching example is just one example.
Thus we may end up with multiple propositional candidates equivalent in role
and instrumental suitability, and because of empirical indeterminacy, they may be
equally empirically well-suited. It may seem, then, in such cases that we have a
Benacerraf problem on our hands, but I think this is the wrong conclusion to draw.
In this set up, where empirical investigation stalls out, I think the indeterminacy is
benign and should be chalked up to the complexities of the empirical world. If a
Benacerraf problem were to threaten here, at the propositional level, then we would
have an explosion of Benacerraf problems wherever there is indeterminacy in the
interface between philosophy and science.
2.2.4 Reactions and responses in the Literature
The Benacerraf problem, as I noted in the outset, plays an important role in the
contemporary propositions literature. King’s theory was partially constructed to
be Benacerraf immune (as he was reacting against theories he thought succumbed
to the problem) and has been dismissed for nevertheless succumbing. Soames
leveled a Benacerraf objection against what I thought was a promising theory—
9For example, syntax not providing instructions to the semantics to perform the relevant compo-
sitions may doom King’s program.
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his own “deflationary account”—that leads him to his current “cognitive realist
theory” according to which propositions are event types that involve mental acts.
Others have drawn dire conclusions in the face of the arbitrariness worries like the
Benacerraf objection. Moore (1999) and Bealer (1998) argue from the Benacerraf
objection to the conclusion that propositions are sui generis entities; Armour-Garb
and Woodbridge (2012) employ the problem to argue for a fictionalist account
of propositions; and Jubien (2001) presents a dilemma a horn of which is the
Benacerraf objection to argue that propositions don’t exist. The reaction has been
that the Benacerraf problem is not merely a demerit for a theory but a theory ender,
and the possibility of a general Benacerraf problem has lead to the rejection of
propositions all together.
Despite obvious disanalogies between the mathematical and propositional cases,
the responses to the propositional problem mirror the mathematical problem—
platonism, nihilism/fictionalism, and structuralism. The propositions case, how-
ever, differs from the mathematical case in that platonism dominates. Most current
propositional proposals identify propositions with some kind of abstract entity, but
as noted, Armour-Garb and Woodbridge take a fictionalist line that shares similar-
ities with Hartry Field’s work in the mathematical case. Benacerraf inaugurated
structuralism in the mathematics case in response to his own problem. Though
structuralism is conspicuous in the mathematics case and seemingly absent in the
propositional case, there is a coherent structuralist-like view of propositions to be
had. Inferentialism, the view that the meaning consists in the licensing of various
inferences, may lend itself to a structuralist interpretation. The content of the claim
that p, according to the inferentialist, consist in the inferences from and to p. Thus
we can think of a web of inferences as a certain kind of structure, and we have a
structuralist analogue in the propositional case.
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Having brought out the complexities of the propositional Benacerraf problem
itself, let us turn to the complexities in its application.
2.3 Worlds theories
This section splits into two. I consider one of the main, and what seems to be
(one of the) easiest, targets for the propositional Benacerraf problem, the worlds
theory, and I consider two different ways to respond. I focus on two different con-
texts among others in which worlds theories may be employed. I argue that, once
we look more closely at methodological issues, the Benacerraf objection against the
worlds theorist in either context isn’t an inevitable winner. For each section, I will
bring in various philosophers as representatives of that kind of worlds theorist. My
categorization of each philosopher squares with what I think is the best interpre-
tation of that philosopher, or at least a compatible interpretation. But this section
isn’t principally hermeneutic. Each of the following contexts constitutes a plausible
direction to take a worlds theory regardless of which philosopher actually fits into
which context.
2.3.1 The modeler
One kind of worlds theorist employs sets of worlds (or characteristic functions
thereof) to represent or model propositions. Of course, one properly lodges the Be-
nacerraf problem at the level of the target of a model. If the Benacerraf problem
fails at the level of the modeler’s target, then this kind of worlds theorist may
escape the Benacerraf problem. But the cost of such a view may be that the modeler
isn’t really giving us any insight into the metaphysics of proposition—she “merely”
provides representations, as the attitude goes. I want to suggest that we can plau-
sibly combine the worlds theory and modeling methodology, and that the target
of such models are Benacerraf resistant, at least on some ways of understanding
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the approach. The plausibility of the approach, then, will rest upon whether the
targets really are Benacerraf immune and whether the attitude of “merely” pro-
viding representations can be resisted. To show that the latter part is plausible, it
needs to be shown that theorizing about propositions obliquely via a model is a
fruitful approach to propositions. To show as much, I think we need to appreciate
two things. First, that modeling in metaphysics isn’t isolated to just propositions
but constitutes a mainstream methodology. Second, that when we look at what
propositions do, even on contemporary, mind-first theories—ones which have taken
to investigate the metaphysics of propositions “directly”—what propositions do
on such theories is only clearly revealed at the level of the model, just as with the
world-theoretic modeler.
If sets of worlds represent or model propositions, then what, at the level of
fundamental ontology, are propositions? There are two general options: The target
of the propositional models may be sui generis entities or not. It’s not always clear
what a given philosopher means by sui generis. The idea is supposed to be that
some entity is of a type that we can’t reduce to some class of entities we already
recognize. In the propositional context, we may mean that propositions can’t be
reduced or identified with some other entities such as sets of worlds, event types,
syntactic-semantic facts, etc. So, in one sense, propositions, if sui generis form
their own ontological “category” in that we count them among the basic entities
in the universe that we don’t identify with or reduce to something more basic.
The individuation of what counts as an ontological category is somewhat unclear,
though, so in another sense, we may still assimilate propositions to this or that
ontological “category” in the sense that we may think they are objects or properties,
abstract or concrete, etc. For example, according to Schiffer’s theory,10 propositions
10See Schiffer (2003).
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are sui generis, yet they are things rather than, say, properties, and they are abstract
rather than concrete.
Many may find the sui generis view implausible, but there is a feel of added
implausibility when we combine the view with modeling methodology. Sets of
worlds model various properties and relations that a given proposition may have
and stand in. When we represent a proposition as having a given property or
standing in a given relation to some other proposition, it’s hard to see why such
modeling works. We have the propositions at the level of ontology and their
representations at the level of the model. In virtue of what makes one given model
rather than another successful? One standard way to think of the success of a model
is in terms of isomorphism: The model is explanatory because it is, in some useful
way, isomorphic to the target. But with sui generis entities, what could account for
the success of one model over another? What about the proposition that snow is
white, at the level of fundamental ontology, accounts for its pairing with the set of
worlds where snow is white rather than the snow-is-green set? The answer may
just be a restatement of the view that entities can primitively represent, so that the
correct pairing captures the primitive representational content of the proposition.
There is, however, a powerful argument against any such view in Lewis’ argument
against magical ersatzism in On the Plurality of Worlds.11 Philosophers haven’t
perhaps appreciated the scope of Lewis’ argument, which applies to any primitively
representational entities, not just ersatz worlds.12
Here is an extremely compressed version of the argument: Sui generis proposi-
tions will stand in the selecting relation to this concrete world just in case a proposi-
tion represents it. This relation is either internal—depending only on the intrinsic
natures of the elements—or external—depending on the intrinsic natures of the
11See Lewis (1986, §3.4).
12I got this idea from Bricker (2006).
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relata taken together. If it’s internal, then there must be some differences among
the sui generis propositions to explain why the snow-is-white proposition stands
in the relation while the snow-is-green proposition doesn’t. Being a vast collection
of abstract, sui generis entities, the only difference between the two propositions
would seem to be that one represents this world while the other doesn’t. This leads
to a vicious circularity: A proposition p is selected because it represents the world
as thus and so. But why does it represent the world as thus and so? Because it is
selected if and only if the world is thus and so. If the relation is external, then we
have an unacceptable necessary connection between various propositions (those
that represent this concrete world) and this concrete world. But the goings on at
this concrete world and the relations that it enters into with abstract sui generis
propositions seem related, if at all, only contingently and not necessarily. This is
Lewis’ argument adapted for sui generis propositions.
I want to be sure that I don’t characterize Lewis’ argument as decisive—it’s
complicated, as usual. van Inwagen (1986) argues that he isn’t sure what, exactly,
is wrong with the argument, but if the argument does work, then it will threaten
the relation of set membership, which may count as a kind of reductio of Lewis’
argument. Jubien (1991) provides a comprehensive overview of Lewis’ argument,
weighing in against. In this dialectic, I should note two things. I’m raising the
possibility that sets of worlds are models of sui generis propositions. First, to
move onto non-sui generis views, I am noting that such a view of propositions
has problems on its face—that Lewis’ argument, if one finds it plausible, applies
straightforwardly to such a view. And I’m noting that the combination of such a
view with modeling seems extra strained, especially when we consider the main,
developed view of sui generis propositions—Schiffer’s—according to which, in
addition to being sui generis, propositions are simple (i.e. structureless). Jubien
(1991, p.266), an opponent of Lewis’ argument in the abstract, would seem to agree:
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[I]f we agree that propositions are simples, then it certainly does seem
far-fetched to think that their intrinsic properties could be such as to
represent ways the world might be. Perhaps there could be enough of
them to do the representing, with each intrinsically different from every
other, but it does not seem that the nature of their intrinsic features would
make any one of them flat-out be, say, the proposition that a donkey talks.
Assuming they are simples is in this respect a little like reducing them to
numbers (say, unreduced ordinals). We might be able to concoct a model
of “proposition theory” from a certain class of numbers, but there would
of course be no intrinsic reason to select some one particular number as
the proposition that a donkey talks; any other number would do just as
well.
Some class of simple, structureless entities may be useful as the model—if there are
enough of them—but not as the modeled. Yet one may still insist on identifying sui
generis entities with propositions at the level of fundamental ontology and model
them with world-theoretic devices, and whatever problems such a view may incur,
it won’t be from a Benacerraf problem. The problem fails at step one since there
isn’t a surfeit of candidates by stipulation.
The more plausible option is that sets of worlds model propositions that, at the
level of fundamental ontology, are non-sui generis entities. What kind of entity?
Properties are a natural answer. First this squares, hermeneutically, with the ways
that some theorists, such as Stalnaker,13 describe possible worlds and set-theoretic
devices—that the former are “ways the world might be” and that the latter explain
or explicate such ways of the world’s being. And second, there are explicit views
13Stalnaker often says that possible worlds explicate or explain propositions, or that propositions
determine a set of worlds/function from worlds to truth values: “The explication of proposition given in
formal semantics is based on a very homely intuition: when a statement is made, two things go into
determining whether it is true or false.”(Stalnaker, 1970/1999, p.32, my emphasis on “explication”)
“If we explain propositions as functions from possible worlds into truth-values, they will have the
properties that have traditionally been ascribed to them.”(Stalnaker, 1970/1999, p.33, my emphasis)
“[A]ny proposition determines a set of possible worlds.” Stalnaker, before this quote, writes that “a
propositions is a function from possible worlds into truth-values.” But soon after he writes in typical
analyst language: “A proposition—the content of an assertion or belief—is a representation of the
world as being a certain way. But for any given representation of the world as being a certain way,
there will be a set of all the possible states of the world which accord with the representation—which
are that way.”(Stalnaker, 1999/1978, p.79, my emphasis)
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of propositions in the literature according to which propositions are properties.
The views in the literature differ, but the overarching idea identifies propositions
with ways the world might be.14 According to one view, propositions are 0-adic
properties (or relations).15 We canonically represent an n-addic relation as a sentence
with n places missing, e.g. the two-place relation of loves as _loves_. When we put
some particular object, say Bob, in one of the slots, we get the property Bob loves_.
Then if we add another object, say Mary, we get the zero-addic property Bob loves
Mary, which is the proposition that Bob loves Mary. These properties that are
propositions, though, aren’t (typically) maximal in that they don’t settle every
aspect of a possible world; they only settle one if instantiated—that it is a p world.
One nice feature of this account is that it provides a clean demarcation between
properties that are propositions and those that aren’t in terms of adicy.
Lewis and Chisholm both advance property views not in the 0-adic tradition.
Both endorse a view in which propositional attitudes are relations between an
agent and a property while sentences don’t express properties. They both count
as pluralists, with properties playing the role of the content of mental states, and
propositional attitude ascriptions are analyzed in terms of the self-ascription of
properties. For both Lewis and Chisholm, propositional properties aren’t 0-place
but 1-place. Perhaps the most salient recent property view, Speaks’, is similar to
Lewis’ and Chisholm’s views in that propositional properties are 1-place, but his
view differs in two ways. First, Speaks is a univocalist about propositions, with
properties playing every role. And second, although his properties are 1-place,
they are not self-ascriptions. Rather, either everything or nothing instantiate Speaks’
14This requires, among other things, abundant properties.
15van Inwagen (2004, fn.17) endorses the zero-adic view, and Swoyer and Orilia (2014, §7.5)
explicate such a view.
72
propositional properties. Speaks identifies the proposition that p as the property
(or 1-adic relation) of being an x such that p.16
Speaks17 says that he doesn’t understand what a 0-place property is, and there
is something right about this. We have an intuitive grasp of properties and two-or-
more-place relations from which we start our philosophical analysis, but not with
0-place properties. What unites the 0-place view with views like Speaks’, Lewis’,
or Chisholm’s? To say that propositions, in some role, are properties is to say that
something is some way. For Lewis and Chisholm, in the limited role of propositional
attitudes, that thing is oneself. When I believe that snow is white the way that I
think I am is that I inhabit a snow-is-white world. For Speaks, that means that
something (viz. every thing) is such that snow is white. The zero-place view, I think,
is perhaps best understood as similar to Speaks’ view. If 1-place properties say
how some thing is, 0-place properties say how everything or nothing is.18 Thus
the overarching idea of the property view is that propositions are some way that
something is, be that a person or everything—call these world properties since the
model will be pitched in terms of worlds. Our modeler, then, will understand
p’s being the case in terms of property instantiation. And there is good reason
to think that at this level, at the level of properties, the Benacerraf objection fails.
However the details of a property view play out, there is good reason to think
that the Benacerraf problem doesn’t apply to properties. If I say that the world is
a certain way, there won’t be multiple candidates to be that way—just as if I say
some particular object is some way, say that a ball is red, there won’t be multiple
16My knowledge of Chisholm’s view is indebted to Dixon and Gilmore (2016). Also, as they note
(p.276), Speaks’ theory may need to be stated in a way less connected to language, but I’m merely
getting at the general idea here.
17See King et al. (2014, p.90, fn.36).
18As Williamson (2016, p.762) says: “What is a 0-place property or relation? It is a state of affairs,
in a sense to be refined by analogy with whatever theory of properties and relations is in play.”
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candidates to choose from in accounting for the ball’s redness. In other words
we either won’t have a Benacerraf problem or if we do, it will explode to include
properties, in which case it won’t be this theorist’s problem in particular. For the
rest of this sub-section, let’s focus on a property view like Speaks’ or the 0-place
view.
Like the sui generis view, the Benacerraf problem doesn’t apply, but unlike the
sui generis view, the property view is more plausibly combined with world-theoretic
devices as models. The sui generis and modeling methodology clashed because it
was difficult to see why any given set of worlds (or characteristic function) would
pair with one proposition rather than another, at least if the sui generis view is
something like Schiffer’s. The property view has enough structure and detail to
set up a fruitful isomorphism. Stalnaker (1987, p.9) captures the idea that I’m after
with an example concerning the relation between certain physical properties and
numbers. Why is it that we represent certain physical properties, such as height,
in terms of numerical properties relative to a scale—say, being 5’9”? It’s because
physical properties such as height and weight have a structure in common with
(positive) real numbers such that we can pick out these properties with numbers.
In doing so, we understand having a certain physical property in terms of an
object relating to a number given a unit. Thus we have a natural intermediary to
approach physical properties via numerical properties given a unit, and we give
a rigorous account of such properties via measurement theory, which we cast in
terms of numerical quantities. In this number–height case, there is a natural pairing
between the elements of the model and elements of the target and likewise for world
theoretic devices. We pair the the world-property p with the set of worlds that
have one thing in common—that they instantiate p—but otherwise vary in every
other possible way. In the number-height case, there is a systematic relationship
between the similarities and differences in the model and in the target. The same
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goes for world-theoretic devices and world properties. Such a relationship allows
us to explore relationships among the members of the model, which often lead to
discoveries, and transfer those insights to the target.
The move that I’m considering—that a world theorist can avoid the Benacerraf
problem by employing modeling methodology—isn’t clearly available to other
theorists. The other common target of the problem is the tuple theory,19 according
to which propositions are n-tuples containing constituents related to the sentence
expressing the related proposition and whose order mirrors that sentence’s syntax.
On one way of expressing the theory, the proposition p is the tuple 〈〈e1, ..., en〉 , Rn〉
where 〈e1, ..., en〉 is an n-ary tuple of objects and Rn is an n-ary relation, and p is true
just in case the entities stand in the relation. The theory is an obvious Benacerraf
target since, ontologically,
〈〈e1, ..., en〉 , Rn〉 6= 〈Rn, 〈e1, ..., en〉〉 ,
and since both tuples work equally well by the relevant theorist’s lights. In par-
ticular, as Schiffer (2016, pp.2553-2554) notes, working well for this theory means
making clear what the truth conditions of a given proposition are—as we’ve just laid
out—and the identity conditions, which depend, some say to the theory’s credit,
not only on the truth conditions but also on the proposition’s constituents and their
order. But, as Schiffer further notes, if we take tuples as models of propositions, it’s
hard to see what the target is. In other words, there won’t be some non-sui generis
entity that answers to those two defining features, for they can’t be any kind of
set-theoretic entity since the Benacerraf problem will remain, and no other sort of
target entity is obviously forthcoming. Of course, the tuple theorist can just posit
19I use “tuple theory” instead of the more common “Russellianism” since Russellianism is both
a thesis about structure and propositional constituents. The tuple theory can be combined with
Freagean constituents as well.
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entities with those two features to serve as the target of her tuples, but such a move
would seem more like a wish list for a theory rather than a theory.
I want to set up a comparison between the world-theoretic modeler and con-
temporary accounts. We’ve discussed King’s theory above, but let’s get on board
perhaps the other main theorist in the propositions literature: Soames. Soames
identifies propositions with event types. On Soames’ account, propositions’ represen-
tational capacity derives from the representational capacity of agents. According
to this account, to entertain a proposition is to engage in a cognitive activity—the
mental act of predication, which for Soames is a primitive mental act, basic among
others. When an agent sees o as red, there is an event token of her predicating
redness to the object o. Now of course this event token can’t be the proposition that
o is red. Instead, Soames takes the cognitive event type of predicating redness to o
to be the proposition that o is red expresses. And more complex propositions and
differing propositional attitudes are built upon the mental event type of predication.
Regarding other attitudes, some examples: To judge that o is red is to predicate
redness to o and then to endorse that predication; to believe that o is red is to predi-
cate redness to o and to be disposed to judge that o is red (and so to be disposed to
endorse the predication of redness to o). Regarding more complex propositions, an
example: To entertain the proposition that o isn’t red is first to predicate redness to
o and then to predicate not being true to the result of that first predication.
On to the comparison: Perhaps the most basic requirement that we ought to
have of a theory of propositions is that it provides the correct logical structure
among the propositions. By this I mean that propositions relate to one another
in terms of logical strength, entailment, as contradictories, as contraries, etc. The
properties view, at the level of ontology, translates naturally to the worlds view,
which provides a very elegant understanding of these basic logical relations, all
in terms of set theory, which illuminates relations among property instantiations.
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So, e.g., p will entail q, at the level of ontology, just in case p can’t be instantiated
without q also being instantiated—or, at the level of the model, just in case p is a
subset of q. Gigi is a cat entails Gigi is a mammal, so, to use Speaks’ theory, being
something such that Gigi is a cat can’t be instantiated without being something such
that Gigi is a mammal is also instantiated. The model has this as the Gigi-cat worlds
being a subset of the Gigi-mammal worlds. These relations between sets mirror
relations between the instantiation of world properties. And we can build more
complicated structure with the worlds apparatus as our various theories demand—
again, with the full power of set theory. For instance, we capture the structure of the
domain of a credence function in an elegant way.20 A similarity in structure between
world-properties and set-theoretic models explains the ability of the latter to so
fruitfully represent the structure of the former. As we advance our understanding
of physical quantities via measurement theory defined on numbers, we advance our
understanding of propositions via systematizing propositional relations defined
over set-theoretic constructions.
Now take any two of Soames’ propositions. That is, consider two event types
the tokens of which involve agents predicating properties of objects and other more
complex events involving mental acts. Is there a clear answer to the question of
whether, for example, they relate as contraries? Or for any two, is one logically
stronger than the other? Likewise consider two Kingean propositions. These will be
complex facts comprising semantic properties and relations and syntactic relations
that encode semantic operations which on one interpretation are similar to Soames’
mental operations. Is there a clear answer to whether standard logical relations
hold between those two propositions? I hope it strikes the reader that at the level
20For various technical reasons, we take the domain of the credence function to be a σ-algebra over
the space of possibilities rather than just the space of possibilities itself, and the worlds framework
captures the structure of such an algebra elegantly.
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of ontology, the answer is either "no," “I don’t know,” or "the question doesn’t
make sense." Of course both theorists can construct formal models to capture these
basic propositional desiderata, but now we’re making my point: That contemporary
views are no better off than the classic worlds view when it comes to the most basic
propositional requirements.
To recap what I’ve said in other words, we can think of proposition theory
construction as proceeding in two steps.21 In step one we find some entities,
sui generis or otherwise, whose existence we accept. I think the modeler we’re
considering is in at least of a good a spot as King and Soames. Properties, one
might think, are less controversial than propositions, so reducing propositions
to properties counts as progress since accepting properties into one’s ontology is
commonplace.22 In step two, we give good reason to think that those entities are
propositions. Whereas historically a lot of the debate was on step one—and perhaps
still is for sui generis theorists—I think, nowadays, step two is where all the action is,
and this is the step where the Benacerraf problem arises. If we are on step two and
decide that some entity e isn’t the proposition that p, then we’ll think that because
e doesn’t fill the right propositional roles, e isn’t instrumentally acceptable, or e
doesn’t satisfy empirical criteria if the proposition theory is mind first. If I’ve been
successful in this subsection, then this particular worlds theorist escapes at least
the Benacerraf problem. As I noted at the outset, we must also resist the attitude
that such a theorist “merely” models/represents propositions instead of telling us
what they really are. We’ve said, in this case, what propositions really are. The point
just underway was that much of the theoretical payoff occurs at the level of the
model—not only for the worlds theorist but also for King and Soames. True, King
21This is how King (2007, p.25) describes giving an account of propositional structure.
22Events and facts, especially facts, are perhaps more controversial than properties. E.g., see the
debate between Lewis and Armstrong over states of affairs, with Lewis supporting the view that
there only things, not facts. See Bricker (2015) for an overview of the debate.
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and Soames have deep stories about how their propositions come to have structure,
represent, and have truth conditions. One may find the modeler under discussion
to be lacking in this area, but we can’t easily dismiss the theory on the grounds of a
Benacerraf problem.
Construing world-theoretic devices as models isn’t an eccentricity to avoid
the Benacerraf problem. Indeed, Paul (2012) argues that modeling is the main
methodology of metaphysics, the result being that both science and metaphysics
share methodology but differ on subject matter. According to the mainstream view
of modeling in the philosophy of science literature, the semantic view, a theory
consists in a family of structures—models—that themselves consists of entities and
relations, usually mathematical, along with an interpretation of those structures.
Then, the theory is true if, and only if, one of its models is relevantly isomorphic to
its target.23 Such methodology is familiar in science. To use an example from Paul
(2012, p.10)24 biologists model population growth in ecology with the following
logistic equation:
dx
dt
= rx(1− x
k
).
The equation itself involves abstract mathematical entities and relations. Paired
with an interpretation, the entities represent population density (x) and rate of
increase (r). If the model is isomorphic to population growth rates, then the target
satisfies the model.
We understand metaphysical models on the semantic approach, and the differ-
ence between the scientific case and the metaphysical case is just the subject matter.
Paul (2012, p.12) gives the following example:
[A] theory of composition can be thought of as a class of models of
composition relations between parts of composite objects. Consider a
23Paul (2012, §2).
24Which comes from Lloyd (1988).
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theory of the composition relation such that some xs compose a y if and
only if the activity of the xs constitutes a life. The models we can take
to be the theory are structures of abstract objects that represent activity-
constituting objects standing in necessitation relations to abstract objects
that represent composites or wholes of the activity-constituting objects.
The theory is a class of (suitably abstract) models, where these models
are isomorphic to various instances of the activity-constituting relations
between parts and wholes.
The view that I’ve given in this subsection fits this mold. The abstract family of
structures are sets of possible worlds or functions from worlds to truth values.
The target, as we’ve seen, are world properties. The interpretation connects the
set structures to the instantiation of these properties. One structure will be a set
that collects worlds that have one thing in common—the instantiation of p. The
interpretation is especially conspicuous on the function version—for it doesn’t really
matter what we pair the p and non-p worlds with, so long as we have two distinct
elements of the model. True and false are common, but we could use 1 and 0, or,
to use Soames’ example meant to show that such “propositions” don’t really have
truth conditions, a dog and a cat. These structures are then isomorphic to various
world properties, and we study the world properties and their relations obliquely
via the set-theory-powered model. That the interpretation component is essential
brings out the absurdity of thinking that world-theoretic devices are themselves
intrinsically representational—a point that has sometimes went unrecognized. For
example, we find Field (1986, p.101), in a review of Stalnaker’s Inquiry, saying that
[I]f we view take as the object of the belief-state [that Caesar crossed
the Rubicon] the set of possible worlds in which Caesar crossed the
Rubicon. . . that too is a conception of objects of belief as intrinsically
representational.
The reason being is that that the set “can be construed as representing the world
as such that Caesar crossed the Rubicon.” Of course it can be construed as he says,
but it needn’t be. I have a hunch that Stalnaker never took his set-theoretic devices
to be intrinsically representational, and Lewis, the other main worlds theorist and
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subject of the next subsection, definitely did not on the grounds of his argument
against magical ersatzism.
2.3.2 Lewis
Perhaps the most conspicuous worlds theorist, Lewis (1970a/1983, p.193), said,
somewhat famously now,
[i]n order to say what meaning is, we may ask first what meaning
does, and then find something that does that.
This paper (“General Semantics”) pre-dates both Lewis (1970b/1983) ("How to
Define Theoretical Terms") and Lewis (1972/1999) (“Psychophysical and Theoretical
Identifications")—both of which firmed up his methodology. The aspect of Lewis’
methodology that we’ll be concerned with is the so-called “Canberra plan.”
Lewis first articulated a narrow methodology in “How to Define Theoretical
Terms,” giving a method for defining theoretical terms within the context of philos-
ophy of science that F.P. Ramsey inspired. He then generalized the method to any
term-introducing theory—terms that don’t necessarily have to be new, as is the case
with Lewis’ well-known generalization of the method to apply to folk psychology.
The methodology proceeds in two steps. Step one: Make explicit implicitly defined
functional roles for target terms. Here, we gather platitudes if the target term is
a folk term, or we gather the sentences from some scientific theory if the term is
theoretical. These sentences will contain terms that we want to define and other
terms. The outcome of this step is the production of functional roles. Step two: Find
non-trivial (i.e. not just the target terms) role fillers that respect our methodological
commitments (e.g., for many, naturalism). In other words, we go about finding
something that plays the various roles that have been defined in terms of their
(usually causal) relations to the other terms.
With respect to propositions, the first step is more fraught than I think enough
writers have recognized for reasons I’ve alluded to above. The worry for the
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Canberra plan when generalized past the scientific domain is that there is a greater
threat that the functional role or roles will be, as we quoted Lewis saying earlier,
conflicting desiderata. When we apply the Canberra plan to, say, electrons, it’s very
likely that we’ll have a univocal role for some naturalistic entity to play (a trivial
one—viz. electrons). On the other end, we may have some folk term—say, the term
“snack”—whose platitudes are obscure enough to foil the Canberra plan. Is a snack
something you eat between meals? When you’re not hungry? Does a snack have
to be small? Can’t one snack for dinner and snack even though one is full? The
right attitude, it seems to me, is, Who knows? We thus need the various roles that
propositions play to be univocal enough to find suitable naturalistic realizers.
To apply the first step of the Canberra plan to propositions, we identify the roles
they play and determine whether there is some univocal role that admits of a single
realizer. The best-case scenario is a single entity. If nothing answers to the roles,
then on the one view, the term “proposition,” like “phlogiston,” fails to refer to
anything. Another option would be pluralism, in which different sorts of related
entities fulfill various semantic, epistemic, and metaphysical roles. This would
occur if the roles are incommensurable, yet each role is itself clear and univocal so
as to admit some entity to fill that role. And in such a case, I don’t think much will
turn on whether we want to call this plurality different kinds of the same entity
or distinct kinds of entities all together. The roles that propositions play divide
naturally into two categories: the metaphysical roles and the epistemic/semantic
roles, and there is, despite received opinion, prima facie reason to believe that there
isn’t one entity type that plays these roles. Perhaps the main reason is this: The
metaphysical roles seem to be only sensitive to the facts while the non-metaphysical
roles are sensitive to more.
Though Lewis at one time associated propositions with sets of (real) worlds, he
is perhaps most well known for identifying propositions, in the role of the objects of
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attitudes, with properties. The distinction between the two was never a difference
in the kind of entity each is but rather which of various roles the entity in question
played.25 For Lewis, sets of things are properties and worlds are just big things. As
we saw above, the objects of the attitudes, for Lewis, are properties of the type being
in a world such that thus and so. And he then analyzes propositional attitudes in terms
of self-ascribing such properties. And then Lewis analyzes such self ascriptions
in terms of sets of possible individuals. To believe thus and so is to locate oneself
among various sets of possible individuals. As we noted above, the content of an
assertive sentence will still be a garden variety set of worlds (although for lewis,
concrete worlds of course).
The status of Lewis’ set-theoretic devices has puzzled some theorists.26 Are
they tools playing a role in an analysis of various philosophical phenomena, or
does Lewis actually identify them with properties or propositions? This may sound
like an important question since Lewis makes for a prime target of the Benacerraf
problem. Yet Lewis has remarkably little to say about the problem, though Lewis
(1970a/1983, p.201) does say the following, in the midst of a semantic project:
It may be disturbing that in our explication of meanings we have
made arbitrary choices—for instance, of the order of coordinates in an
index. Meanings are meanings—how can we choose to construct them
in one way rather than another? The objection is a general objection to
set-theoretic constructions, so I will not reply to it here. But if it troubles
you, you may prefer to say that real meanings are sui generis entities and
that the constructs I call ‘meanings’ do duty for real meanings because
there is a natural one-to-one correspondence between them and the real
meanings.
Though here he mentions indices of evaluation, the attitude plausibly extends to
any point in an analysis that involves an arbitrary choice among entities. Given
25This is the case before Lewis (1979).
26E.g., Weatherson (2014) is indecisive between whether, e.g., properties are or determine sets for
Lewis.
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the extensive use of set theoretic devices, the Benacerraf problem would seemingly
extend to many aspects of Lewis’ philosophy, including his view of properties,
relations, and propositions.
Asking whether Lewis’ world-theoretic propositions really are propositions or
are mere “tools” that represent propositions is a question that doesn’t properly take
into account Lewis’ methodology. Playing a role and “really being” something
is a distinction without a difference for Lewis. To apply the Canberra plan to
propositions, we first gather the platitudes about propositions. As I noted above,
this may be difficult since, prima facie, the different propositional roles pull in
different directions. Furthermore, the curious status of propositions complicates
the straightforward application of the plan. The plan usually has two types of
applications. In the first instance, theorists applied the plan to scientific theories,
with the roles usually being causal roles that physical entities realized. Later, Lewis
applied the plan to folk theories, like folk psychology, but the roles were still causal.
Later still, theorists applied the plan to metaphysics and ethics in which the roles
weren’t obviously causal. The first step in the non-causal scenario is generalized to
gathering non-causal platitudes about some term.
Propositions are odd because they straddle the technical-folk border. Some
philosophical notions have a clear intuitive and non-theoretical status. E.g., free
will, knowledge, belief, desire—these all have a clear intuitive status. Of course the
debates about these terms can become technical, and at least the epistemic notions
can be used in technical endeavors, but there are a robust set of folk platitudes in
these examples from which to start the plan. I have a hunch that much of the talking
past that occurs in the propositions literature has to do with the hybrid status of
propositions. The folk sources of propositional platitudes all surround the notion
of shared content: two sentences from the same or different languages “saying the
same thing” or various people having propositional attitudes toward the “same
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content.” But the folk view of meaning is somewhat of a mess and perhaps should
be barred membership from the regimented platitudes that make it into step one of
the plan—this, for reasons that Lewis (1980/1998) first noted:
Unless we give it some special technical meaning, the locution ‘what
is said’ is very far from univocal. It can mean the propositional content,
in Stalnaker’s sense (horizontal or diagonal). It can mean the exact
words. I suspect it can mean almost anything in between.
One of the main complaints against King’s theory has been his theory’s fineness of
grain is far too fine, for any difference of syntax results in difference in propositions.
In response, King echoes Lewis:
There just is no pretheoretical notion of a proposition to which our
theories of propositions must do justice. (King, 2013, pp.767–78)
If Lewis and King are right, then there will only be fully theoretical roles that we
gather in step one. If this correct, then all we need from propositions is that they
are the meanings of assertive sentences that result from composing sub-sentential
meanings modeled in formal semantics; that together propositions have the correct
logical structure; that we can construct the correct domain for a probability function
taken as a credence function; etc. Possible states of the world are one kind of entity
that fill some of these roles.
Supposing that a Lewisian completes step one, the major questions of this paper
will be raised on step two. In step one, we will have found a role for coarse-grained
propositions. This is in fact the step at which much of the debate will take place—
many will object to coarse-grained content on the basis of folk intuitions. But setting
that aside, the question—translating the Benacerraf problem to the idiom under
discussion—is, What do we do when we have multiple realizers of the platitudes?
Both the set and characteristic function version of the worlds theory are exactly
equal deservers of the role if they’re deserves at all. And further, once we fix upon
the roles in step one, the two versions will likely be perfect deservers of the role.
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Lewis changed his mind about this kind of situation over his career. Initially,
Lewis (1970b/1983) required that the roles be uniquely realized. It’s important to
note that that paper concerned scientific theory where the uniqueness requirement
is most plausible. But as Lewis generalized his method, he relaxed the uniqueness
requirement. For example Lewis (1984, p.223) says the following about a kind of
descriptivism involving “Jack the Ripper,” but the points apply to our discussion:
The description needn’t fit perfectly. ‘Jack the Ripper’ might take as
referent the one who comes closest to doing this, that, and the other, if
no better candidate is available. The intended interpretation of the aug-
mented language, then, is to be that extension of the old interpretation
that comes as close as can be to making the new Jack-the-Ripper theory
come true. . . . There might be two candidates that both fit perfectly;
more likely, there might be two imperfect candidates with little to choose
between them and no stronger candidate to beat them both. If so, we
end up with indeterminate reference (in addition to whatever results
from indeterminacy of the old interpretation of the old language): the
new term refers equally to both candidates.
In our case, we have (at least) two candidates that fit perfectly, and so by Lewis’
lights, it’s indeterminate which version of the worlds theory we ought to pick.
Here, it’s important to stress how Lewis construes step one in the plan. His main
concern is that there are various (mostly) theoretical roles that we need some entity
to play. The result of existentially quantifying over some subset of these role
involving sentences (since Lewis is a propositional pluralist) will result in a kind of
structuralism.27 While the mathematical structuralist posits an abstract structure,
this structuralism just is the functional roles that step one in the plan produces.
It will be indeterminate which version of the worlds theory is the witness of the
roles, but the point is to provide a class of entities, tools for further theorizing. What
matters is that the propositions theorist provide anything with the right structure
that satisfies step one of the plan. Thus, stipulating that, e.g., the set version is the
27I am indebted to Phillip Bricker for this point.
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one that we’ll employ to feed into our formal semantics, or formal epistemology, or
whatever, is a benign kind of stipulation—one that the Benacerraf problem doesn’t
threaten.
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CHAPTER 3
THE OBJECTS OF CREDENCE
Abstract
Chalmers (2011a) presents an argument against “referentialism” (and
for his own view) that employs Bayesianism. He aims to make progress
in a debate over the objects of belief, which seems to be at a standstill
between referentialists and non-referentialists. Chalmers’ argument,
in sketch, is that Bayesianism is incompatible with referentialism, and
natural attempts to salvage the theory, Chalmers contends, requires
giving up referentialism. Given the power and success of Bayesianism,
the incompatibility is prima facie evidence against referentialism. In this
paper, I review Chalmers’ arguments and give some responses on behalf
of the referentialist.
3.1 Introduction
Roughly, referentialism is the view that the object of a belief about an individual
and property is wholly determined by that individual and property. In a recent
paper, Chalmers (2011a)1 argues that referentialism is incompatible with a suc-
cessful theory in formal epistemology, Bayesianism, which I explicate below. In
particular, he argues that standard Bayesian reasoning breaks down if a bare version
of referentialism is true, and any attempt to salvage the core of the bare version
requires giving up referentialism. According to Chalmers, the referentialist, then,
faces a dilemma: She must either reject Bayesianism or give up her theory—both
undesirable options.
1Chalmers (2006b), which was presented for the Online Philosophy Conference in May 2006,
is the predecessor of Chalmers (2011a). In what follows, I will also be citing Braun (2006), which
he gave as comments on the Chalmers paper at that conference. I found Braun’s paper only after
writing the initial draft of this paper, but I have since worked in some of his comments.
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Something like referentialism is a view familiar from the literature on Frege’s
puzzle, a literature that is vast and one in which referentialists2 are well represented.
The referentialist faces some old worries—that, for example, one believes the same
proposition in believing that Hesperus is a celestial body and that Phosphorus is a
celestial body, which seems false.
In response, some referentialists claim that the very same proposition can be
taken in different ways—that agents bear various attitudes toward propositions
only under a guise. A novelty in Chalmers’ paper is his claim that the familiar appeal
to guises raises new problems, new problems that can break what he views as a
stalemate in the Frege’s puzzle literature. As I understand him, Chalmers claims
that we ought to make the three-way identification among the objects of belief,
the objects of credence, and the objects that inhabit the domain of the credence
function. Then, he argues that if the referentialist includes her guises in the domain
of the credence function, then referentialism is false. My thesis is that Chalmers has
not broken the stalemate. Specifically, I argue that Chalmers’ second horn—that
attempts to salvage referentialism requires giving the theory up—fails. For this
thesis, I provide numerous arguments below, each with a similar structure: That
while an unadorned version of referentialism indeed conflicts with Bayesianism,
the core of the unadorned version can be recovered and built upon, resulting in a
theory that does no worse than Chalmers’ own theory and doesn’t require giving
up the core of referentialism. Given that I’m arguing for a stalemate thesis, my tu
quoque objections are not fallacious. After arguing that the second horn fails, I focus
on how I think the thesis of referentialism should properly be understood. Once
properly understood, one sees that Chalmers’ arguments don’t target referentialism
but instead conclusions that follow from referentialism packaged with auxiliary
2Or at least the theorists that Chalmers associates with referentialism. In what follows, I argue
that Chalmers mischaracterizes how we should properly understand referentialism.
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theses. Once those auxiliary theses are dropped, one sees that Chalmers’ arguments
miss their mark.
Before moving on, let me make a few terminological and structural points.
Terminological: Given that one of the conclusions of this paper is that Chalmers
mischaracterizes the theorists he intends to argue against, it will benefit us to make
some terminological points to avoid confusion. I’ll call the thesis that Chalmers
calls “referentialism,” which I’ll quote shortly, “naive referentialism.” I’ll call the
class of theories that Chalmers is attacking on the second horn, theories that employ
something like guises, “sophisticated referentialism.” And finally, I’ll call what I
think should properly be described as referentialism, which won’t be revealed until
the end of this paper, “true referentialism.”3 Structural: This paper is structured to
mirror Chalmers’ dilemma. In §3.3 I canvas the ways in which naive referentialism
conflicts with Bayesianism. At this point, I want to stress that we’re considering
naive referentialism, which doesn’t include the notion of a guise. Only in §3.4 does
the notion of a guise come into play.
3.2 Background: Bayesianism, Referentialism
I take Bayesianism to comprise at least the following claims:
• A credence function, cr(·), defined over propositions, represents an agent’s
belief state. A credence function takes a proposition as argument and returns
a real number in the interval [0, 1]. These real numbers represent an agent’s
subjective confidence in a proposition, with 0 representing absolute certainty
of falsehood and 1 representing absolute certainty of truth.
3I am intentionally avoiding the term “Millianism” because many Millians employ something
like guises, which won’t surface until §4.
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• A credence function represents both an agent’s unconditional credence that a
proposition p is true (notated cr(p)) and an agent’s conditional credence that
a proposition p is true given that a proposition q is true (notated cr(p | q)).
• An agent ought to update her credences, in light of evidence, via conditionaliza-
tion: When an agent receives evidence e, her new credence in any proposition
h should be her old credence in (h | e).4
Probabilism—the constraint that an agent’s credence function ought to be a probabil-
ity function—is often included in the Bayesian package, but I take the constraint to
be independent. I soon raise an argument that referentialism conflicts with proba-
bilism, but there I will flag that the argument doesn’t target the core of Bayesianism
but a claim often conjoined with Bayesianism.
Referentialism, unfortunately, isn’t as easily glossed. Here’s what Chalmers
(2011a, p.587–588) has to say about it:
Loosely speaking, referentialism about belief says that in so far as
beliefs attribute properties to individuals (e.g. the belief that Nietzsche
is dead), the objects of these beliefs are wholly determined by those
individuals (e.g. Nietzsche) and those properties (e.g. the property of
being dead). On one version of referentialism, the objects of belief are
Russellian propositions composed from the individuals and properties
that one’s belief is about. On another version, the objects of belief are
sets of possible worlds in which the individuals in question have the
relevant properties.
This is what we will call naive referentialism. Here are some familiar consequences of
naive referentialism:
If ‘a’ and ‘b’ are two names for the same object, then in believing that
a has φ and in believing that b has φ (e.g. in believing that Hesperus is
a planet and in believing that Phosphorus is a planet), one believes the
same proposition. Likewise, in sincerely asserting ‘a has φ’ (‘Hesperus is
a planet’) and in sincerely asserting ‘b has φ’ (‘Phosphorus is a planet’),
one expresses belief in the same proposition.
4For simplicity, and since nothing hangs on it, I set aside other versions of conditionalization,
such as Jeffery conditionalization.
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Propositions play many roles. We can start by thinking of referentialism about
propositions generally and then move to the more specific thesis regarding proposi-
tions’ role as the objects of belief in particular. I’ll call the core of referentialism the
thesis that a proposition about an individual and a property is wholly determined
by that individual and property. As it stands, this thesis makes no predictions
that are relevant to Bayesianism. We need to add auxiliary theses regarding the
role these propositions play as the objects of belief and credence. Since the core
makes no predictions relevant to Bayesianism, it is consistent with Bayesianism.
To get naive referentialism we take the core, and we add the auxiliary claim that
nothing else is relevant to whether an agent believes a proposition so described.
In particular, what I have in mind here is the rejection of any non-referential com-
ponent, like guises, that mediates belief in propositions. Sophisticated referentialism,
as mentioned, includes guises. Note that naive and sophisticated referentialism
agree on the core of referentialism but disagree on the grasping of propositions
that satisfy the core. I want to stress that sophisticated referentialism isn’t a mere
extension of naive referentialism. For if it were, then if the conjunction of naive
referentialism and Bayesianism is inconsistent, then so is the conjunction of sophis-
ticated referentialism and Bayesianism. Rather, naive referentialism rejects, while
sophisticated referentialism includes, a mediating component, though both agree
on the core of referentialism. My thesis is that while naive referentialism is inconsis-
tent with Bayesianism, sophisticated referentialism isn’t. And since sophisticated
referentialism retains the core of referentialism, it is a referentialist thesis.
3.3 Arguments from Bayesianism against Naive Referentialism
Chalmers sets up his argument as a dilemma: Naive referentialism conflicts with
Bayesianism, and sophisticated referentialism’s philosophical machinery can’t be
imported into a Bayesian framework without giving up the core of referentialism.
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So the referentialist either has to accept that her theory conflicts with Bayesianism, a
powerful and successful theory, or give up her own theory to gain harmony—both
unpalatable options. Let’s call this “Chalmers’ dilemma.”
On to the first horn—that Bayesianism and naive referentialism are incompatible.
The simplest argument against naive referentialism involves probabilism. Since, in
my view, probabilism isn’t essential to Bayesianism, this argument is the weakest,
but it’s also the best warm up to the style of argument Chalmers advances. The con-
flict arises from an extension of Frege’s puzzle from full to partial belief. Consider
(1)—
(3.1) Hesperus is Phosphorus.
—which is necessarily true according to naive referentialism since the object of belief
that (1) determines is the same as (2), which is necessarily true by anyone’s lights:
(3.2) Hesperus is Hesperus.
It’s taken as a datum that one’s rational credence in (1) can be short of certainty.
But, on one understanding of it, a probability axiom requires agents to be certain
of necessary truths. Thus, naive referentialism runs afoul of probabilism. But this
argument isn’t weak only for targeting probabilism. As Chalmers notes, the typical
formulation of the relevant probability axiom only requires certainty of logical
truths, not all necessary truths, and (1) isn’t a logical truth (Chalmers, 2011a, p.599).
Another serious problem is on the horizon, though. (1) and (2), according
to naive referentialism, determine the same proposition. That is, insofar as we’re
concerned with a credence function, (1) and (2) are the same argument. But a rational
agent can have differing credences in (1) and (2)—cr(2) = 1 and cr(1) < 1. This
means that the agent wouldn’t have a credence function at all since one argument is
associated with two values.5 Probabilism aside, naive referentialism conflicts with
5Braun (2006) makes similar points.
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a central aspect of Bayesianism—representing credences with functions, which is
essential to the first two bullet points in my characterization of Bayesianism above.
Without the apparatus of credence functions, Bayesianism can’t even get off the
ground.
Chalmers’ main grievance is that naive referentialism conflicts with the core of
Bayesianism: conditionalization. Here’s a quick example.6 Suppose the facts are
as follows: 1/10 of people with P have schizophrenia and 1/5 people with Q have
schizophrenia, and 9/10 of people with P and Q have schizophrenia. Now suppose
Utterson knows that Jekyll has P but doesn’t know that he has Q. Since Utterson
knows that Jekyll has P and knows that 1/10 people with P have schizophrenia, his
credence in Jekyll having schizophrenia is as follows:
(3.3) cr(Jekyll has schizophrenia)=.1.
If Jekyll has Q, then since he has P and Q, and since 9/10 people with both have
schizophrenia, then (4) would give one of Utterson’s conditional credences:
(3.4) cr(Jekyll has schizophrenia|Jeckyll has Q)= .9.
We know that “Jekyll” and “Hyde” are two names for the same individual, but
Utterson doesn’t. Suppose Utterson comes to know that Hyde has Q. According to
naive referentialism, the proposition that Hyde has Q is the same proposition that
Jekyll has Q. Assuming naive referentialism is true, given the story so far, Utterson
should conditionalize:
(3.5) crnew(Jekyll has schizophrenia) = crold(Jekyll has schizophrenia|Hyde has Q)
= crold(Jekyll has schizophrenia|Jekyll has Q) = .9.
But intuitively, this is wrong. Since Utterson doesn’t know that Hyde and Jekyll
are the same person, seeing that Hyde has Q isn’t evidence for Jekyll having
6This has been adapted from Chalmers’ original example in Chalmers (2006b, §2)
94
schizophrenia. The culprit here is the claim that “Hyde has Q” determines the same
object of belief as “Jekyll has Q,” which naive referentialism entails. Thus, naive
referentialism must be false if Bayesianism is true.
The second horn of the dilemma, and my responses to it, will concern us for the
remainder of this paper.
3.4 Responses to the Second Horn
The second horn of the dilemma purports to block the sophisticated referentialist
from importing her account of full belief to a Bayesian setting. This horn begins by
identifying the objects of credence with the objects of belief. Then, as the arguments
from the first horn show, the objects of credence are determined non-referentially.
Then Chalmers invokes a crucial premise—that if the objects of credence, and so
the objects of belief, are determined non-referentially, then referentialism is false.
This is the premise I dispute, but let’s see how this dilemma plays out for actual
sophisticated referentialist theories.
It’s important to note that all referentialists are sophisticated in some way or
other. Naive referentialism has obviously untoward consequences. The dialectic in
the Frege’s puzzle literature has been to square the simplicity and theoretical consid-
erations7 that recommend referentialism with the seemingly absurd consequences
that follow from it.
This is where guises enter the picture. To block these consequences, as I men-
tioned, sophisticated referentialists claim that an agent can take the same proposi-
tion in different ways—that she can bear an attitude toward a proposition under
7The theoretical considerations are the direct reference theses that Kripke (1980) advances for
proper names, that Kripke (1980) and Putnam (1975/2007) advance for natural kind terms, and that
Kaplan (1989/2013) advances for indexicals. The simplicity (and also theoretical) consideration
that recommends referentialism is that it adheres to “semantic innocence”: the constraint that
an expression’s reference stays stable across linguistic environments. For more about semantic
innocence, see Crimmins and Perry (1989/2007).
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one guise and fail to bear it under another. There isn’t consensus regarding the
nature of these guises, but all sophisticated referentialists see their role as mediating
an attitude an agent bears toward a proposition.8 Furthermore, these propositions,
for sophisticated referentialists, are Russellian. A Russellian about propositions
claims that propositions are structured and, insofar as the propositions are about
individuals, those propositions are singular. A proposition is structured just in case
it contains constituents. A proposition is singular just in case it contains objects as
direct constituents. As an illustration, in outline, a sophisticated referentialist would
characterize Lois Lane’s (of the Superman story) situation as follows: Lois takes
the very same Russellian proposition—〈flies, CK〉, where CK is the person to whom
both “Kent” and “Superman” refer and flies is the property of flying—in different
ways, depending on whether she grasps it under the bespectacled reporter guise or
under the superhero guise. Russellianism satisfies the core of referentialism.
Sophisticated referentialists understand this three-place relation of an agent
bearing an attitude toward a proposition under a guise in different ways. According
to Schiffer’s (2007/1992) hidden indexical theory, this relation is just belief. Here is
the logical form of belief reports according to this theory:
(HIT) ∃m(Φ*m & Believes(a, p, m)).
Belief here is a ternary relation between a believer (a), a Russellian proposition (p),
and a contextually determined property of propositional modes of presentation to
which implicit reference is made (Φ∗),9 which is the non-referentialist component.
8There is some ambivalence regarding the nature of guises. According to one specific class of
views, guises are mental states (or more specifically sentences in the language of thought). See Braun
(1998, 2006) and Crimmins and Perry (1989/2007). One may object to the sophisticated referentialist
that the nature of guises is unclear, but that is an old objection, which I am not here to defend against.
9Implicit reference to a property of propositional guise (a guise that attaches to an entire propo-
sition rather than to propositional constituents) rather than a particular guise is made because in
many cases of belief attribution, a belief reporter will not be aware of the specific guise under which
the person to whom the belief is being attributed believes the proposition.
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According to another sophisticated referentialist, Salmon (1986, p.111), belief is two-
place but is analyzed in terms of the ternary relation of something like disposition
toward inward assent under a guise:
(SALMON) a believes that p iff10 ∃m(a grasps p by means of m & BEL(a, p, m)).
On both of the above accounts, the object of belief, p, is a Russellian proposition,
which satisfies the core of referentialism.
There are important differences between Schiffer- and Salmon-style accounts.11
For example, the accounts give radically different judgments of the truth values of
propositional attitude ascriptions. For this paper, it is important that, as McKay and
Nelson (2010) put it, accounts such as Crimmins and Perry (1989/2007)—who offer
a version of the hidden indexical theory—“embrace a metaphysics of belief similar
to the standard Naive Russellian’s [accounts such as Salmon’s]. The difference
between the views concerns whether or not the information semantically encoded
by utterances of belief sentences is sensitive or insensitive to differences in the way
a proposition is grasped." Furthermore, referentialists of both stripes have said a
great deal about numerous puzzles that might seem to carry over to Chalmers’
Bayesian challenge. For example, writers that embrace a Salmon-style account in
response to, among other things, Kripke’s puzzle have made claims not only about
the semantics and metaphysics of belief, but also about rationality. According to
such writers, an agent can believe a pair of contradictory propositions and still be
rational if she takes the proposition in different ways. It will benefit us to see how
the appeal guises works out in the Bayesian machinery. To avoid complication in
what follows, let us focus on theories like HIT.
10Salmon himself says that a believes that p “may be analyzed” as the material I have on the right
of the biconditional.
11My labels “naive” and “sophisticated” are somewhat non-standard. “Naive” is often associated
with Salmon-style accounts, and Schiffer-style accounts are sometimes referred to as “sophisticated”
or “contextualist.” What is important for me is that they both agree about the nature of propositions.
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The natural route for the sophisticated referentialist is to associate credences
with propositions and guises. According to this proposal, call it proposal 1, each
proposition can be associated with a guise under which that proposition is grasped.
The domain of the credence function comprises ordered pairs of Russellian proposi-
tions and guises under which those propositions are grasped. On this proposal, a
credence function, characterized set-theoretically, would look as follows:
{〈〈Gp1 , p1〉 , r1〉 , 〈〈Gp2 , p2〉 , r2〉 , ...},
where Gpi is a guise, pi a Russellian proposition, and ri corresponds to a number
in the interval [0, 1]. Since sophisticated referentialist accounts deliver (or aim to
deliver) the correct conditions under which an agent believes a proposition, this
route would also give the same results for partial belief.
Chalmers anticipates this strategy and gives a few objections. The first objection
is that, on the route we’re considering, the domain no longer consists of sets but
rather ordered pairs: guise–proposition pairs. On the other hand, Chalmers’ own
semantics, he claims, fits seamlessly with the Bayesian machinery. In a reply to
Braun, Chalmers (2006c) says the following:
By contrast, on my proposal about the nature of guises [primary
intensions], guises are naturally associated with sets of centered worlds .
. ., and credences in enriched propositions mirror credences associated
with these sets. This allows one to bring to bear the full set-theoretic
power of the probabilistic apparatus in the analysis of rational belief.
This is not a knock down argument for my view of guises, as a prob-
ability assignments can coherently be defined in the absence of the
associated set-theoretic apparatus. But doing so loses some important
explanatory structure. So if other things being equal, a view that allows
set-theoretic analysis is preferable.
Soon I’ll return to more of the details of Chalmers’ own semantics, on which, over
the course of numerous articles, he has spared no detail.12 Suffice it to say here that
12His fullest treatment can be found in Chalmers (2006a).
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his objects of credence are non-referential, avoiding the first horn of the dilemma,
and are set-theoretic, avoiding the current objection to proposal 1.
The first response to this objection is simple: The probability axioms can be stated
in terms of a logic on sentences instead of a set-theoretically.13 While the absence
of set theory might put the proponent of proposal 1 at some disadvantage, the
pressure is light. Chalmers (2006c) himself recognizes this, saying of the argument:
This is not a knockdown argument for my view of guises, as a prob-
ability assignments can coherently be defined in the absence of the
associated set-theoretic apparatus. But doing so loses some important
explanatory structure. So if other things being equal, a view that allows
set-theoretic analysis is preferable.
It would be preferable, however, for the referentialist to be at no disadvantage. This
brings me to the second proposal.
According to proposal 2, the referentialist associates her guise-proposition pairs
with non-referentially determined sets of worlds. On this proposal, the lines
between Chalmers’ own account and the referentialist’s begin to blur. But this
shouldn’t surprise. The reason that this shouldn’t surprise requires me to say more
about Chalmers’ semantics and in particular his view of propositional attitude
reports, though I will be very brief. On Chalmers’ two-dimensional semantics, sen-
tences and sub-sentential components are associated with two different intensions,
13Weisberg (2011, pp.5–6) suggests, in passing, something similar to my approach I’m giving:
On the other hand, philosophical considerations can make the
sentence-based approach more perspicuous. Consider, for example,
the sentences "Superman will save the world today" and "Clark Kent
will save the world today". To Lois, these two sentences represent very
distinct eventualities, though in fact they correspond to the same pos-
sible outcome. On the set-based approach, these two eventualities are
represented by the same set, and hence must have the same probability.
It seems reasonable, however, for Lois to think that they have differ-
ent probabilities, which is allowed if we use different atomic [for my
account, guise-proposition pairs], A and B, to represent them.
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one referential (secondary intension), the other not (primary intension), where an
intension is a function from a possibility to an extension. The referential intensions
are functions from metaphysically possible worlds to the entity of the correct type.
For the non-referential intensions, replace the metaphysically possible worlds with
epistemically possible worlds. The object of belief incorporates both intensions, as
Chalmers (2011b, p.6) describes here:
[T]he enriched intension of a simple expression is an ordered pair
of the expression’s primary intension and extension. The enriched in-
tension of a complex expression is a structure consisting of the enriched
intension of its simple parts (including any unpronounced constituents),
structured according to the expression’s logical form. The enriched
intension of a sentence is its associated enriched proposition.
As an example, “Hesperus is Phosphorus” expresses the following proposition—
Where a h′ is the primary intension of Hesperus, p′ of Phosphorus, =′ of identity,
and where = is the extension of identity, and v the extension of “Hesperus” and
“Phosphorus”: 〈〈
=′,=
〉
,
〈〈
h′, v
〉
,
〈
p′, v
〉〉〉
.
And, as I said, in his theory of propositional attitude ascriptions, primary intensions
play a similar role as the sophisticated referentialist’s guises. So it shouldn’t be
surprising that the differences between sophisticated referentialism and Chalmers’
account begin to disappear.
I’d like to pause to note that on either proposal, we escape the first horn. To
remind ourselves, the problems of the first horn were that naive referentialism
conflicted with three aspects of Bayesianism (and a related thesis): probablism,
measuring credences with a function, and conditionalization. The first and third
problems are dissolved on both responses I’ve given. Both problems arose from
straightforward substitutivity maneuvers. “Hesperus is Phosphorus” is no longer
associated with the same guise–proposition pair (or set of worlds) as “Hesperus
is Hesperus.” Similarly for “Jekyll has Q” and “Hyde has Q.” Substitution of
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co-referring names doesn’t require identity of credences on either option that I’ve
given. The second problem also dissolves: On either response I’ve given, cr(·) is
still a function. Take the Hesperus–Phosphorus example, and consider proposal 1
for focus (proposal 2 solves the function problem as well). We have two sentences
that express the same Russellian proposition, viz. 〈=, 〈v, v〉〉. But that proposition
is not what is fed into the credence function. Rather, it is an ordered pair of a
proposition and a propositional guise. If an agent’s credence under a guise in the
proposition that Hesperus is Hesperus and the agent’s credence under a guise in the
proposition that Hesperus in Phosphorus differ, and the agent is rational, then the
agent grasps the same proposition under different guises. That means two different
guises–proposition pairs are mapped to two different credences.
At this point, two natural objections arise. The first worry for both of my
proposals is that the referential material is an idle wheel. For proposal 1, the
credence function seems to operate only on the guise member of each ordered pair.
The Russellian component seems to be irrelevant to the determination of credences.
Call this the “idle wheel objection.” Proposal 2 faces a similar worry, though it’s not
quite as vivid. The referential component seems not to play a role, or a major role,
in determining the relevant non-referential set of worlds.
A second worry is that Chalmers can invoke the premise that the objects of
credence are the objects of belief, and so the referentialist, it seems, has to face
the fact that the objects of credence, and so the objects of belief, are either guise–
proposition pairs or non-referentially individuated sets of worlds. Here is what
Chalmers (2011a, p.601) says:
But this view now says that the objects of credence, as we are un-
derstanding them, are such ordered pairs. If so, the objects of credence
behave in a non-referential way. . ., and referentialism will be false of
the objects of credence.
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Even the sophisticated referentialists that we have canvassed claim that the object of
belief is a Russellian proposition, though some non-referential component mediates
that belief. With the premise that the objects of credence are the objects of belief, the
sophisticated referentialist seems to be in trouble.
To these objections, Chalmers faces a tu quoque response. To the first objection,
one of Chalmers’ dimensions, the referentialist dimension, is similarly an idle
wheel. As we’ve seen, Chalmers’ objects of belief contain a referential component,
the secondary intension, and a non-referential component, the primary intension.
But the objects of credence for Chalmers are unstructured primary intentions that
are associated with entire utterances. The referential dimension plays no role in
the determination of the object of credence; thus, Chalmers faces the idle wheel
objection as well. And Chalmers’ premise that identifies the objects of credence
with the objects of belief can similarly be reflected on him to cause trouble. Primary
intentions are unstructured as well as non-referential while Chalmers’ objects of
belief are neither. The object of belief, as we’ve seen, consists of both referential
and non-referential components, and furthermore, it’s a structured entity whose
constituents are primary and secondary intensions. So Chalmers’ own account can’t
satisfy the premise that the objects of credence are the objects of belief.
One response that Chalmers could give here is to raise the fact that he is a
“semantic pluralist.” As he says: “It is natural for a two-dimensionalist to be a
semantic pluralist, holding that there are many ways to associate expressions and
utterances with quasi-semantic values, where different quasi-semantic values play
different explanatory roles” (Chalmers, 2011b, p.5). This response is equally open
to the sophisticated referentialist, but anyway the issue is orthogonal. The question
at hand is whether Bayesian considerations put pressure on the sophisticated
referentialist, not whether Bayesian considerations favor semantic pluralism.
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The most plausible way to reject the foregoing argument is to notice its implicit
premise: That the objects that inhabit the domain of the credence function are the
objects of credence—and so the objects of belief. I accept the identification of the
objects of credence and the objects of belief. When I believe that it’s raining, doubt
that it’s raining, think it likely that it’s raining, etc., I bear those various attitudes
toward the same object. But I see no reason to grant the assumption that the
objects of credence are the objects that inhabit the domain of the credence function.
The domain of a credence function is a technical notion. For the sophisticated
referentialists considered so far, the objects of partial and full belief are Russellian
propositions, though a non-referentialist component plays a mediating role. That
the domain of the credence function includes a non-referentialist component doesn’t
impugn the thesis of referentialism unless we grant what I see as an implausible
assumption. There are various technical reasons for characterizing the domain of
the credence function set theoretically, but that shouldn’t commit us all to the view
that the objects of credence, and so the objects of belief, are structureless.
A nearby premise, however, might raise trouble for the sophisticated referen-
tialist: Though the objects of credence, the objects of belief, and the domain of
the credence function needn’t be identical, the objects of credence and the domain
of the credence function should share important properties in common, includ-
ing the property of behaving referentially or not. Thus, since the domain of the
credence function behaves non-referentially, then the objects of credence behave
non-referentially. Since I think the sophisticated referentialist shouldn’t give up
the identification of the objects of belief with the objects of credence, we ought to
conclude that the objects of belief behave non-referentially. Chalmers (2011a, p.608)
sums up the argument this way, where “surrogate” applies to both proposals I’ve
given:
If the surrogates behave referentially, then they are inadequate to
serve as objects of credence. If the surrogates do not behave referentially,
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then in so far as they are objects of credence, referentialism is false. It
follows that if the objects of credence are surrogates, referentialism is
false.
In my estimation, this version of the second horn of Chalmers’ dilemma is its
strongest form.
But the second horn rests on a crucial confusion. The confusion is the following:
(3.6) While it is true that Russellian propositions are individuated referentially, the
conditions under which they are believed—and derivatively the conditions
under which agents have partial belief in them—should behave
non-referentially since a non-referential component mediates belief in these
referentially individuated propositions. Another way of putting this is that
whether an agent believes a proposition in a given context doesn’t depend
wholly on the referentially individuated proposition that is up for belief.14
Everyone working on Frege’s puzzle is trying to square our Fregean intuitions with
various philosophical results that have developed in the last few decades. The
sophisticated referentialist has to explain, or explain away, how it can be that Lois
believes that Superman flies while she believes that Kent doesn’t. Both the refer-
entialist and Chalmers are trying to account for the data, albeit through different
routes—though how different the routes are is up to question.15 Chalmers’ second
horn stems from confusing the individuation conditions for propositions and the
conditions under which those propositions are partially and fully believed. The core
of referentialism is a starting point on which the sophisticated referentialist builds to
accommodate Fregean intuitions. Chalmers’ requirement that sophisticated referen-
tialists are committed to partial belief conditions that behave referentially amounts
14I have phrased this in terms of HIT-style accounts. For a Salmon-style account, the conditions
under which agents have a disposition to inwardly assent to a proposition when taken a certain
way—and so a disposition to partially inwardly assent—is determined non-referentially.
15This is especially clear when we compare Chalmers’ account with HIT.
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to the requirement that a referentialist theory must accept naive referentialism as
the whole story.
To clarify this point, consider the analogy between Chalmers’ second horn,
which regards partial belief, with full belief. The compressed version of Chalmers’
second horn is this one-premise argument: Partial belief behaves non-referentially;
therefore, Referentialism is false. The analogous argument for full belief would be:
(3.7) Belief behaves non-referentially.
(3.8) Therefore, Referentialism is false.
But no sophisticated referentialist should accept this argument. As I noted, the
sophisticated referentialist theories presented in this paper should explain our
Fregean intuitions regarding belief and credence. That is, Lois will believe that
Superman flies, she won’t believe that Kent flies,16 it will sometimes be rational
for an agent to believe that Hesperus isn’t Phosphorus while also believing that
Hesperus is Hesperus, and so on.
While the sophisticated referentialist accepts the core of referentialism, she
is in no way obligated to accept the absurd consequences that follow from this
core plus the claim that nothing else is relevant to propositions as the objects of
belief. Or more cautiously: Suppose you do think that the argument from (7) to
(8) is a good argument, and you do think that any referentialist theory ought to be
rejected because its only true form is naive referentialism, and naive referentialism
is absurd. This is a position one may take, but one doesn’t get any mileage from
recasting the argument in terms of credences. For if you think it is enough to
refute referentialism by showing that full belief behaves non-referentially, then
one would naturally expect partial belief to also behave non-referentially. And
16To put it again in terms of a Salmon-style account: Lois is disposed toward inward assent to the
proposition that Superman flies when that proposition is presented in the Superman way and not
when it is presented in the Kent way.
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recall that my goal has only been to show that recasting Frege’s puzzle in terms
of Bayesianism doesn’t award either side of the debate ground. Chalmers’ target
seems to be sophisticated referentialists of the type I’ve considered, viz. versions
that are committed to Russellian propositions, but as we’ve seen these arguments
rest on a confusion. Therefore, if I’m correct in this, then the stalemate resumes.17
There is yet a larger confusion in Chalmers’ argument, which brings me to
my final point: The referentialist needn’t even be committed to the claim that the
objects of belief are individuated referentially. What should properly be described
as referentialism—or true referentialism—needn’t even be committed to the core of
referentialism. As it turns out, the core of referentialism itself is a cluster of views
that needn’t come in a package. And once separated, we can see that Chalmers’
arguments miss the mark.
Sophisticated referentialists tend to claim that the objects of belief are individ-
uated referentially, though belief is in some way mediated by a non-referential
component. But that is an artifact of the majority of sophisticated referentialists in
the literature employing Russellian propositions. And indeed, Russellian propo-
sitions are individuated referentially: The proposition that Hesperus is a celestial
body and the proposition that Phosphorus is a celestial body are one and the same
proposition, 〈c, v〉, where c is the property of being a celestial body and v is Venus.
But here is a simple yet crucial point: The referentialist needn’t be a Russellian.
And that fact brings out what referentialism properly concerns. True referentialism
properly concerns how individuals relate to propositions that are about those indi-
viduals. Put semantically, true referentialism properly concerns the nature of the
17At this point, Chalmers might object that referentialism is, by definition, the thesis that belief and
credence behave referentially. Indeed, he may hold this view: He classifies Salmon as a referentialist
about language but a non-referentialist about belief (Chalmers, 2011a, fn.9). If Salmon ends up not
being a thoroughgoing referentialist about both language and belief, then, although I understand the
thesis that Chalmers is attacking, I’m less clear who holds it, for he gives no representative citations
in his explication of the thesis.
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contribution that certain pieces of language make to the proposition expressed. And
for structured propositionalists, true referentialism is a thesis about the nature of
some propositional constituents—that individuals are direct constituents. But that
is, for at least the structured propositionalist, one piece of the account. On certain
views of the nature of the structure of propositions, Chalmers’ initial characteri-
zation of naive referentialism and the core of referentialism are straightforwardly
false. To remind ourselves, Chalmers characterizes naive referentialism as follows:
“referentialism about belief says that in so far as beliefs attribute properties to indi-
viduals (e.g. the belief that Nietzsche is dead), the objects of these beliefs are wholly
determined by those individuals (e.g. Nietzsche) and those properties (e.g. the
property of being dead).”
To illustrate my point, consider the following:
(3.9) Bob Dylan wrote “Blowin’ in the Wind.”
(3.10) “Blowin’ in the Wind” was written by Bob Dylan.
According to the core of referentialism (9) and (10) determine the same propositions.
And according to the way Chalmers has characterized naive referentialism, since
nothing else is relevant to propositions in their capacity as the objects of belief, both
(9) and (10) determine the same object of belief. And indeed, according to most
sophisticated referentialists, being Russellians, this is true. It’s plausible that both
express the following Russellian proposition:
〈w, BD〉 ,
where w is the property of having written “Blowin’ in the Wind” and BD is the
person that both “Bob Dylan” and “Robert Zimmerman” name. However, consider
one the most detailed accounts of structured propositions on the market—Jeff
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King’s—a theory I consider for illustrative purposes, though I want to note that
I’m not here endorsing the theory.18 King adheres to what I think should properly
be deemed true referentialism: names, indexical, and demonstratives contribute the
individuals they designate in a context to the proposition expressed.19 According to King,
however, (9) and (10) express different propositions. King’s account is detailed
and rich, but for our purpose it will do to say that propositions are complex facts
that involve semantic and syntactic relations. These complex facts are constituted
by lexical items standing in semantic relations to their semantic values, and these
lexical items stand in a complex syntactic relation. And that syntactic relation
itself encodes a semantic function that instructs the semantics to interpret syntactic
concatenation as the instantiation function. To illustrate, the following sentence—
(3.11) Rachel reads.
—expresses the proposition that is the following complex fact, though a mouthful to
say: There are lexical items x and y of some language L occurring at the left and
right terminal nodes, respectively, of the sentential relation R that in L encodes the
instantiation function, where the semantic value of x is Rachel and the semantic
value of y is the property of being a reader.20 According to King, that complex
fact that is the proposition that “Rachel reads” expresses is true just in case Rachel
reads—that is, just in case the ordinary fact of Rachel reading obtains. Thus, a
difference in the complex syntactic relation R is sufficient for a difference in the
proposition expressed. That (9) and (10) differ syntactically is sufficient for each
18His fullest treatment can be found in King (2007).
19See King (2007, Ch1). To put the thesis non-semantically, propositions contain individuals as
direct constituents, a thesis that Russellianism includes but is not exhausted by.
20I’m leaving off some details of King’s account that have to do with indexicals because that aspect
of his account isn’t relevant to our discussion.
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to express a different proposition.21 Thus, the core of referentialism and naive
referentialism is false for King.
For at least one other referentialist, Soames, similar considerations obtain.22
On Soames’ recent account, propositions’ representational capacity derives from
the representational capacity of agents. According to this account, to entertain a
proposition is to engage in a cognitive activity—the mental act of predication, which
for Soames is a primitive mental act, basic among others. When an agent sees o as
red, there is an event token of her predicating redness to the object o. Now of course
this event token can’t be the proposition that o is red. Instead, Soames takes the
cognitive event type of predicating redness to o to be the proposition that o is red
expresses. And more complex propositions and differing propositional attitudes are
built upon the mental event type of predication. Regarding other attitudes, some
examples: To judge that o is red is to predicate redness to o and then to endorse that
predication; to believe that o is red is to predicate redness to o and to be disposed to
judge that o is red (and so to be disposed to endorse the predication of redness to o).
Regarding more complex propositions, an example: To entertain the proposition
that o isn’t red is first to predicate redness to o and then to predicate not being true
to the result of that first predication.
Soames still qualifies as a structured propositionalist in the sense that the cog-
nitive event types that are propositions contain parts. And Soames, like King, is
a true referentialist. But this doesn’t commit him to the claim that propositions
are individuated referentially. This is because the verb predicate, for Soames, is
an intensional transitive verb in the way that look for is. Lois can be looking for
Kent without looking for Superman even though Kent and Superman are the same
21This extreme fineness of grain that results from syntactic differences has been the source of some
criticism. For a critical discussion, see Collins (2007).
22See Soames (2010) and Soames (2011).
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person. Thus, on Soames’ account, “Tully shaved Cicero,” “Cicero shaved himself,”
and “Cicero shaved Cicero” all express different propositions even though the
semantic contribution of the subject and object of each sentence is the same.
As I’ve said, I’m not here to evaluate Soames’ and King’s accounts. The dis-
cussion under way illustrates what referentialism properly concerns. Chalmers
can insist that the thesis he’s attacking is the one he describes in his quote that
we have called “naive referentialism.” But that would be a mistake: King and
especially Soames are well-known supporters of what should properly be deemed
referentialism. What Chalmers ended up attacking was a thesis that followed from
referentialism plus other theses, specifically Russellianism. The two recent theories
of propositions from King and Soames show that, once Russellianism is dropped,
naive referentialism, as Chalmers describes it, can be separated from true referen-
tialism.23 And this brings to light the real nature of referentialism, which Chalmers’
Bayesian arguments leave untouched.
Chalmers hasn’t scored a point for the Fregean. However, his novel focus on an
uncharted interface has brought to light issues that deserve further exploration.
23One may find these two recent theories of propositions implausible and think that true ref-
erentialism ought to be packaged with Russellianism, but that would require much additional
argumentation that Bayesianism would likely be irrelevant to.
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CHAPTER 4
FIRST- AND THIRD-PERSON EPISTEMIC MODALS
Abstract
I introduce an epistemic modal distinction—the first-person–third-
person distinction—which, in addition to being interesting in its own
right, helps explain epistemic modal disagreement. In particular, I claim
that there are two different types of information sources involved in
epistemically modalized propositions. One information source is a
first-person epistemic state, or a group of epistemic states; another is
a third-person, external source of information. This distinction helps
make sense of felicitous and infelicitous responses in epistemic modal
disagreement cases, which I go through in some detail.
4.1 Introduction
"Jones might be home. His light is on."—a typical use of the modal “might”
in its epistemic sense. This small word has by now generated a vast literature
in philosophy and linguistics.1 Parties to the literature agree that such uses have
something to do with knowledge and information, but writers dispute how these
notions play out in the semantics. According to the orthodox theory of epistemic
modals, contextualism, the proposition that an epistemically modalized sentence
expresses can vary with context. Consider the lead sentence: I or we possess some
information (including, among other things, that the light is on in Jones’ apartment),
and the sentence is true just in case this information doesn’t rule out the proposition
that Jones is home. Contextualism’s motivating idea, then, is that context (often)
supplies the information that an unmodalized proposition is compatible with if
1The literature on epistemic modals is vast. For a representative sample of the literature, mostly
from philosophers but including some linguists, see Egan and Weatherson (2009).
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the sentence is true.2 We’ll call an epistemically modalized sentence an epistemic
sentence; the information involved in the epistemic sentence simply the information;3
and the proposition that the information purportedly doesn’t rule out the prejacent.
Heterodox theorists, relativists in particular, claim contextualism can’t make
sense of the ways we react to challenges to our epistemic sentences.4 If someone
with more information than I (or we) challenges my epistemic sentence regarding
Jones’ whereabouts, the natural response is for me to fold—i.e., to admit I was
wrong instead of digging in and insisting what I said was true. Yet, as the objection
goes, according to contextualism, my initial assertion was true—at the time I said it,
the information was consistent with Jones’ being home. Writers have taken such
evidence to shed light on the semantics of epistemic modals.
As the literature developed, writers introduced numerous complications. To
name a few: The knowledge that determines the information can be group or
solipsistic, digging in can sometimes be felicitous, and the prejacent rather than the
whole epistemic sentence can be the disagreement target. Regarding just the last
member of that list, von Fintel and Gillies (2008, p.83) say that “[b]efore resorting to
the CIA’s [the relativist’s] extraordinary measures, we would like to see it carefully
argued that flexibility in the target of denials and acceptances does not explain what
needs explaining.”
In this paper, I give a contextualist friendly solution to the puzzle that will
involve two pieces. The first is to take von Fintel and Gillies’ point and carefully
go through the data, but with respect to all of the complications. The second
2The version of contextualism I assume in this paper is simpleminded, mostly because it leaves
out the ordering source. I choose this version to keep things simple since the additions to make
contextualism sophisticated don’t affect what I say in this paper.
3Knowledge is often used here, but as we’ll soon see, epistemic modals involve more than just
knowledge, which is why I use information instead.
4See, in particular, John MacFarlane’s work (e.g. MacFarlane (2011)) and Egan et al. (2005) for
influential relativist works that also critique contextualism.
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is to introduce a novel distinction that I put to work in explaining some of the
cases. I distinguish two different information sources that the prejacent is asserted
against in an epistemic sentence. On the one hand, the source that determines the
information may be first-person knowledge; on the other, the source that determines
the information may be third-person external information.5 This distinction, which
I think is best understood as non-semantic, helps to make sense of the disagreement
data in the recent epistemic modals literature. One way of thinking of (part of) my
solution is that we may appeal to non-semantic features of disagreements to make
sense of them. And who doesn’t enjoy at least an attempted non-semantic solution
to a first-blush semantic quandary?
This paper will be fairly non-technical. I’m not going to map out all the various
semantic views on epistemic modality.6 In what follows, I assume that epistemic
sentences express propositions, and that these propositions determine or are truth
conditions. In §4.2 I make the first–third-person distinction. In §4.3, I give a
complete catalogue of the data and explain some of the easier cases. In §4.4, I focus
on the harder cases and draw some big-picture lessons. To close, in §4.5, I consider
the first–third-person distinction as such.
4.2 The First and Third Person
In this section, I distinguish the first and third person and draw some conse-
quences of the distinction.
To start, the distinction. The first two sentences of this paper—“Jones might be
home. His light is on”—constitute a typical epistemic-modal-involving situation.
In such a situation, I’m not sure, or we’re not sure, whether Jones is home. What
5I state the distinction in terms of different sources that determine the information rather than
different information simpliciter. I address this difference at the end of the paper.
6See Schaffer (2011) for a nice taxonomy of truth-conditional views.
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I or we know doesn’t rule it out, so I say that Jones might be home. The truth
conditions, according to the simple analysis that I’ll assume in this paper are
that the information source, in this case knowledge, leaves open the prejacent—the
proposition that Jones is in his office (at the time in question). Let me highlight
some features of the information source in this case in order to contrast with
another shortly. First, the information source is epistemic—knowledge. Second, the
information source is dynamic. What I mean by this is that the information source is
part of a system that changes all of the time, which I update, in the epistemic sense,
as I find my way through the world. Third, I have a kind of commitment to the
information source such that it doesn’t make sense to say that I could disbelieve or
be indifferent to it. Fourth, the information source is perspectival because I consider
it part of my perspective. Because of the perspectival, epistemic nature of the
information source in this situation, as well as similar situations, we’ll say that such
epistemic sentences are first person, or in the first person.
There is a very different kind of epistemic-modal involving situation. Let’s
say a while ago I opened up the Fox News website. Various articles claim that the
available information leaves open whether President Obama was born in the United
States. I say that according to Fox, or given what Fox says, Obama might have been
born outside the US. I say this while I of course know that President Obama was
born in Hawaii. The information source in this case contrasts with the above case.
First, the information source is external and non-epistemic. Second, the information
source is static. What I mean by this is that the Fox News website, although it may
change, contains static information that isn’t updatable in the epistemic sense. Third,
I don’t believe the information source, and in cases like this there are a range of
attitudes I can take: I may disbelieve, or be indifferent, or believe and know it. Such
flexibility isn’t available in the contrast case and in similar cases. Fourth, unless
we’re speaking loosely, the information source isn’t perspectival. Of course we
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can say things like “From Fox’s perspective,” but what I think we ultimately mean
involves the perspectives of people at Fox, not the “perspective” of the content on the
website. Because of the non-perspectival, non-epistemic nature of this information
source in this situation, as well as similar situations, we’ll say that such epistemic
sentences are third person, or in the third person.7,8
We find an analogous situation to the above two, one we’re perhaps more
familiar with, with arguments. There are at least two different ways we view
the premises, the conclusion, and the inferential relations between them in an
argument. Sometimes the premises are ours—we consider them our information
and as such we believe and often know them and we draw conclusions from that
information. In such a situation, the information that serves as the premises is
epistemic, it’s dynamic, and it doesn’t make sense to say that we’re indifferent to
or disbelieve it. This situation is analogous to the first-person. But we—and here I
mean philosophers—often find ourselves in a different situation: that of mapping
logical space. When we consider and give arguments amidst such mapping, we’re
most interested in the inferential relations between the premises and conclusion, and
we’re often indifferent toward the truth of the premises and conclusion (or perhaps
7von Fintel and Gillies (2011, p.112, fn. 9) note that epistemic modals can be relativized to any
source of intensional content. Kratzer’s (2012/1981) examples also make it clear that epistemic
modals don’t only involve epistemic states. I see this paper as working out the differences in
commitment of these insights.
8The person distinction might bring to mind a notion that Lasersohn (2005) and Stephenson
(2007) have put to work in their accounts of epistemic modals and predicates of personal taste—that
of the “autocentric” and “exocentric” positions. These accounts invoke the notion of an index
supplemented with a judge parameter. In one way of going about it, a judge parameter is added
to the index of evaluation, and an epistemic modal is true (relative to a world and context and
possibly more parameters) just in case the judge’s beliefs leave the truth of the prejacent open. While
it is often the case that the judge is the speaker—the autocentric stance—we can empathize with
another’s view of the truth of an epistemic modal or predicate of personal taste—the exocentric
stance. This distinction can be put to use in various ways, e.g. shifting the judge to the subject of
the matrix clause in an attitude report on someone else’s epistemic modal or predicate of personal
taste claim. Note that this distinction is not the same distinction that I am making. The first- and
third-person involve different sources of information, whether of one’s own or not, and is not limited
to the tastes and information of agents. Also, their distinctions are explicitly semantic.
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hostile). In this situation, the information that serves as the premises isn’t epistemic,
it’s static, and we’re, as noted, often indifferent about the information’s veracity. E.g.,
as we read some paper, we consider what propositions a philosopher’s premises or
commitments leave open or closed. These premises and commitments aren’t ours
and they’re not changeable. We don’t "update" them in the same way we update
our beliefs. This view is analogous to the second case that involved a third-person
epistemic sentence.
It’s no surprise that we find an analogy between arguments and epistemic
modals since the standard account of epistemic modality is built on, as Kratzer
(2012/1977, p.1) says, “a mechanism for drawing conclusions from premises.” The
upshot of this distinction, however, is surprising, and I think underappreciated:
That there is nothing necessarily epistemic about epistemic modals since the informa-
tion source can be knowledge or a non-epistemic information source. In other words,
different types of information sources determine the information involved in an
epistemic sentence, and while it seems that knowledge is the norm, non-epistemic
sources can determine the information. What’s important for this paper is that
the first-person–third-person distinction tracks differences in the commitment we
have to our assertions. I further consider the nature of the first-person–third-person
distinction at the end of the paper.
The idea of commitment is familiar in the pragmatic notion of speaker orientation.
A clause with some denotation in an utterance is speaker oriented just in case the
speaker commits to that denotation in speaking that utterance—else, it’s non-
speaker oriented.9 We’re familiar with the idea’s straightforward application: I
say that according to Bush, Iraq has WMDs. The embedded clause is non-speaker
oriented, so I don’t commit to the proposition it expresses. On the other hand,
9This is a definition from Harris and Potts (2009, p.524).
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if I say outright that Iraq has WMDs, I commit to the proposition that sentence
expresses.10
Commitment is also involved in epistemic modals, but the difference in commit-
ment between epistemic sentences in the first- and third-person is more subtle. I
want to develop the idea over the course of the next section, but the basic idea is
that the third person allows a kind of backing away from an assertion upon learning
that the prejacent is false whereas, at least sometimes, that option is extremely odd
in the first person. This is because, as mentioned, in the third person, we may only
be interested in the compatibility of the information and the prejacent yet not the
veracity of either. This difference in commitment will help explain the data in the
next section.
We’ve already seen in the Fox example that we can use an adverbial modifier
to dial in exactly what the information is. Thus, though contextualism is so called
because context often supplies the information, it doesn’t always. Complications
arise here, though, with the choice of adverbial modifiers: given. . ., it might be that.
. .; according to. . ., it might be that. . .; in light of . . ., it might be that . . .; etc. One of
Kratzer’s initial motivations for contextualism was to capture the neutral meaning
of modals when an adverbial phrase makes the flavor of the modal (i.e. deontic,
bouletic, circumstantial, epistemic, etc.) explicit.11 Adverbial modifiers, with
deontic modals, can reference this or that set of rules; with circumstantial modals,
can reference this or that set of circumstances; and with epistemic modals, can
reference this or that information source, whether it be first or third person.12 But there
10The distinction would seem uninteresting if not for surprising applications in contexts involving,
e.g., appositives and expressives in which material remains speaker oriented when we might expect
a shift to non-speaker orientation. See Potts (2005) for the view that appositives and expressives are
invariably speaker oriented and Amaral et al. (2007) for a critique.
11See Kratzer (2012/1977).
12This point militates against an objection that has been made to me regarding the first–third
person distinction: that, perhaps, in the third person, the information involved is really the speaker’s
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is a complication that Kratzer notes in a new introduction to Kratzer (2012/1981):
Different adverbial modifiers come with different strengths of commitment. I’ve
chosen “given.” What matters for my project is that there is a way to make salient a
third-person information source, and that one can assert such third-person epistemic
sentences while being agnostic about the prejacent (or even thinking it false). Kratzer
(and others in conversation) seem to think that “given” commits the speaker to the
veracity of the content of the information, but I don’t think this is right. A quick
example: I have three little cousins, Leila, Posie, and Alabama, ages five, four, and
one, respectively. There is a vase broken in the room, and I’m trying to find out
who, if anyone, did it. Leila and Alabama have been getting along, but Alabama
has been getting on Posie’s bad side. Neither Leila nor Posie know for sure who
broke the vase. Posie first tells me that Alabama was in the room when the vase
broke. Leila, coming to Alabama’s defense, tells me that Alabama was in her crib. I
then say: “Given what Posie said, Alabama might have broken the vase, but given
what Leila said, Alabama couldn’t have.”13 I didn’t commit myself to the veracity
of their sayings or to either modal.
knowledge, or the group’s knowledge, about the third-person information source. But as I said, just
as we’ve taken adverbial modifiers, in other flavors of modals, to reference some particular set of
rules, circumstances, or desires, etc., I think it’s reasonable that we can reference, in an epistemic
modal, some particular intensional content as well, regardless of its internal or external status. And
I think it goes without saying that we can speak directly about what propositions some external
source of intensional content leaves open or closed without discussing second order claims about our
knowledge of that content. Once we admit that, there is nothing in the way of external intensional
content determining the information directly in an epistemic modal.
13Note that my assertion of the conjunction of epistemic sentences doesn’t involve any kind of
reporting. It’s not a case in which I assert one person’s report and then assert another’s and then
ask, Who am I to believe? Neither little cousin said that Alabama might have/couldn’t have broken
the vase. Rather, the content of their sayings left open/closed off Alabama’s breaking the vase.
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4.3 Zooming in
In this section, I clarify the target of my explanation, distinguish data and
explanation, clarify my goal and strategy, and then consider the total number of
cases to explain before proceeding, finally, to concrete cases.
My explanation’s target. I narrowly aim to explain when and why it is either
felicitous or infelicitous to dig in or fold when a conversational participant (in
some sense) disagrees with one’s epistemic sentence. My explanation’s target
simply consists of numerous dialogues in which a speaker issues an epistemic
sentence, another speaker in the conversation (in some sense) disagrees, and the
initial speaker either digs in or folds—along with a judgement about the felicity
of that response, which I hope I am correct in and that the reader shares. The
number of such dialogues depends on the features that we can dial in, which,
in addition to the just-introduced first–third-person distinction, includes three
complications (that I mentioned in the introduction) that writers in the literature
have introduced. First, there is the so-called group versus solipsistic distinction.
When an epistemic sentence is first person, the information can belong only to the
speaker of that sentence, the solipsistic case, or, in the group case, to some group,
which may include the conversational participants and possibly others. Thankfully,
we can clearly distinguish between the two readings with adverbial modifiers,
either “Given what I know, . . .” or “Given what we know, . . . .” Second, as I’ve
quoted von Fintel and Gillies as noting above, there are complications regarding
in what sense a conversational participant disagrees with an epistemic sentence. It
seems in some cases, one may disagree with an entire epistemic sentence, and in
others one may only target the prejacent. Third, although the focus in the literature
initially was on the infelicity of digging in, we now recognize that digging in is
sometimes felicitous. Last—and this is just an obvious feature that I appeal to rather
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than an interesting complication—either the initial’s speaker’s epistemic sentence
will be true or false, according to orthodoxy, when she initially uttered it.
To sum up and to be clear, let me state the parameters exactly. Each dialogue
will be of the following form:
(4.1) Disagreement Dialogue Form
(a) (Speaker 1:) An epistemic sentence
(b) (Speaker 2:) Disagreement, in some sense, with that epistemic sentence
(c) (Speaker 1:) Either (i) or (ii) along with a felicity judgement:
(i) Digging in
(ii) Folding
In these dialogues, we’ll always assume that the disagreer doesn’t have the facts
wrong.
Here are the parameters along with their respective abbreviations that I’ll use
throughout the paper in parentheses:
• First vs. third person (1 vs. 3): Classify a disagreement dialogue as first/third
person just in case the sentence (1a) is in first/third person.
• Group vs. solipsistic (G vs. S): Classify a disagreement dialogue as group/solipsistic
just in case sentence (1a) is in the first person and group/solipsistic.
• Prejacent vs. modal (P vs. M): Classify a disagreement dialogue as preja-
cent/modal just in case the disagreer’s sentence (1b) targets the prejacent/modal.
• True vs. false (T vs. F) initial epistemic sentence: Classify a disagreement
dialogue as true/false just in case the initial epistemic sentence in (1a) is
true/false by the contextualist’s lights.
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• Infelicitous vs. felicitous (I vs. F ): Classify a disagreement dialogue as
felicitous just in case (1ci) is felicitous (and (1cii) is infelicitous) and infelicitous
just in case (1cii) is felicitous (and (1ci) is infelicitous).
Data vs. explanation. It’s important to note that, inevitably, I mix data, expla-
nation, and neutral features of the dialogues in the upcoming cases. Data, I take
it, are features of the dialogues that we agree about but call for explanation. The
felicity judgements are the sole data point for this paper: That a response is felici-
tous/infelicitous will be uncontroversial (again, I hope), but why it is so is puzzling,
at least given orthodoxy. Then there are aspects of the dialogues that are neutral in
that they are neither puzzling nor in need of explanation. The other four parameters
fit into this category in the sense that I take a dialogue’s membership in a given
category to be neither controversial nor puzzling. Last, there are the explanatory
aspects of the dialogues, which include the relationship between the first four pa-
rameters and the last. Showing how the first four parameters bear on the last is my
main argumentative task.
The goal and strategy. The goal ultimately is to explain when and why one can
felicitously reiterate an epistemic sentence in the face of challenge and when and
why one cannot. An utterance’s status as infelicitous doesn’t mean that that sentence
is false—just that it is defective in some way. One reason that it’s infelicitous to
dig in is simply because one’s epistemic sentence was false at the initial time of
utterance. It should be uncontroversial that you cannot utter a falsehood, have it
shown as such, and then insist that the sentence was true when you first said it.
But another reason for infelicity, as we’ll see, is that one’s epistemic sentence at
the initial time of utterance was true, yet for some reason it’s odd to reiterate the
sentence upon challenge. On the other hand, it may be that one’s initial epistemic
sentence was true at the time of utterance, yet it’s not odd to reiterate the sentence
upon challenge. I’ll argue that all of the cases in which it’s felicitous to dig in will
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fit into this category. Thus the goal is to explain these felicity intuitions, and the
strategy is to use the resources above to show that each dialogue fits into one of
these three categories:
• False initial epistemic sentence + infelicitous digging in because of falsehood;
or
• True initial epistemic sentence + infelicitous digging in because of inappropri-
ateness; or
• True initial epistemic sentence + felicitous digging in because of lack of inap-
propriateness.
The number of cases. As we’ve noted, the group–solipsistic parameter doesn’t
combine with the third-person parameter. Taking that into account, there are twenty-
four cases—an enormous amount. Fortunately, we can make some observations that
will rule out certain cases. Specifically, two observations rule out certain parameter
combinations: first, the stipulation that the challenger isn’t mistaken about whatever
it is that she is challenging, and second, that one cannot reiterate a false epistemic
sentence once one has been shown it is false.
• Rule out the M–T combination: If the challenger targets the entire epistemic
sentence, then that sentence couldn’t have been true since the challenger isn’t
mistaken. In other words, because the challenger isn’t wrong, M must go with
F, so M can’t go with T.
• Rule out the F–F combination: If the challenger shows the initial speaker’s
modal to be false, then she can’t reiterate that modal. In other words,F must
go with T, soF can’t go with F.
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• Rule out the M–F combination: If the challenger targets the modal, then that
modal must be false, and, as we’ve just seen, if the modal is false, it can’t be
reiterated. In other words, M must go with I , so M can’t go withF .
That cuts down the number of possible cases to twelve.
The distinctions grow almost unmanageable, and it may help the reader, as it
helps me, to keep track of them visually. At this point, I refer the reader to the
end of the chapter, which contains a table with all of the possible combinations of
the parameters. The top row contains the parameters and the left-most column
numbers the rows. The white rows are the cases we just ruled out, and the last
column contains the parameter combination that rules that kind of case out. The
grey rows are the live case kinds that we need to explain. Those cases have names
for concrete instances that we provide in the next section.
4.3.1 The cases
We can present the cases is different orders. Herein, I present them in terms
of ease of argument, starting with easy cases and ramping up. This is in some
ways less orderly—e.g., we could go through all the first-person cases and then
the third—but that would require some heavier before light lifting. When a case is
important—an illustrative case that combines the above parameters—I’ll name it
and put the parameter combination and row next to the name. We’ll start with the F
cases and then move to the T cases since the F cases have an easy explanation—false
initial utterance leads to infelicity. Going through the cases isn’t just fastidious
completeness, though. It’s illustrative to see, against what one might think, how
sparse such cases in fact are.
4.3.1.1 F cases
The easiest cases are those that fit the paradigm of disagreement wherein one
asserts p, another challenges p, and then, since we’ve stipulated the challenger is
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correct, the initial speaker retracts p. In terms of our parameters, this means that
we set the M/P dial to M so that the disagreer targets the initial speaker’s entire
initial assertion. Since the disagreer doesn’t have the facts wrong, other parameters
will fall into place—the initial assertion will be false, and because of that, digging in
will be infelicitous. Again, adverbial phrases will come to our aid to assure that the
entire utterance, and not the prejacent, is the disagreement target. Let’s start with
the third person case:
(4.2) Row 22—Logic-Modal: 3IMF
Context: A logic student and teacher are discussing what is left open by a set
of sentences. In particular, they’re looking at the following list:
p→ q; q→ ¬p
(a) (Student:) [Pointing at the list] Given this list, p might be the case.
(b) (Teacher:) [Gives some logic explanation showing how the list rules out
p’s being true, then says] So it’s not true that, given the list, p might be
the case.
(c) (Student:)
(i) I guess I was wrong.
(ii) #But what I said was still true./#But still, given this list, p might be
the case.
Here, the information is third person—sentences from propositional logic. The
challenger, the teacher, targets the entire epistemic sentence. That means that the
student’s initial assertion was false at the time of utterance, which results in infelicity
if the student digs in.
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Logic, being third person, is quite natural and almost not worth mention. It’s
my estimation that the corresponding first-person cases are quite rare, especially
if they are solipsistic. For what would such a case look like? It would be one in
which you claim that your knowledge leaves open some claim and then I object
that your knowledge doesn’t. But it’s often the case that I’m not privy to all of what
you know. This would suggest that robust, first-person–solipsistic disagreement is
rare. We can, however, construct cases that aren’t outlandish. Here’s one.
(4.3) Row 14—Solipsistic Tutoring: 1I SMF.
Context: I’m tutoring my little cousin, Leila, in math. I’m trying to show her
that whenever you multiply two even numbers, you get an even product.
We’re looking at the numbers 2 and 4. I say to her, “you have two numbers, 2
and 4, and you know that both are even (which we established earlier that
she knows). Given what you’ve learned,14 what do you know about the
product?” She then says,
(a) (Leila:) Well, given what I learned, It might be odd.
(b) (I reply:) No, Leila, that’s not right. It’s not true that, given what you
learned, it [the product] might be odd.
(c) (Leila:)
(i) I guess I was wrong.
(ii) #But what I said was still true./#But still, given what I learned, it
might be odd.
The explanation here is essentially the same as the last case: I target Leila’s entire
assertion, and since I’m not mistaken about the facts, then she was wrong that her
14I’m using “Given what you learned. . . ” because I actually used that. It would be more precise
to say “Given what you know. . . .”
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knowledge left open a possibility. So her assertion was false when she said it, so
she can’t felicitously reiterate it.
It is interesting to note that a more straightforward example (a 1I SMF case)
without a lot of context, strikes us as odd:
(4.4) Context: Jones and Smith wonder where Bob is, but they haven’t been
searching together for him and don’t know much about what each other
knows.
(a) (Jones:) Given what I know, Bob might be in his office.
(b) (Smith:) That’s not true.
(c) (Jones:) What’s not true?
(d) (Smith:) # What you said—it’s not true that, given what you know, Bob
might be in his office.
We’re rarely so privy to another’s knowledge, making such a challenge so prepos-
terously presumptuous as to result in infelicity. Again, this suggests that what we
might think of actual instances of archetypical modal disagreement are somewhat
rare.
We can turn the group–solipsistic knob to group, all else being the same, includ-
ing the explanation of the infelicity, although again the case is somewhat atypical:
(4.5) Row 10—Group Tutoring: 1IGMF.
Context: I’m tutoring my little cousins, Leila and Posie, in math. I’m trying to
show them that whenever you multiply two even numbers, you get an even
product. We’re looking at the numbers 2 and 4. I say to them, “you have two
numbers, 2 and 4, and you know that both are even (which we established
earlier that they know). Given what you’ve learned, what do you two know
about the product?” Speaking on behalf of the group, Leila then says,
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(a) (Leila:) Well, given what we learned, it might be odd.
(b) (I reply:) No, that’s not right. It’s not true that, given what you two
learned, it [the product] might be odd.
(c) (Leila:)
(i) I guess we were wrong.
(ii) #But what I said was still true./#But still, given what we learned, it
might be odd.
The 1IGMF case type raises some interesting issues that the corresponding
solipsistic case doesn’t, supposing we avoid recherché epistemological issues in-
volving agents unaware of their own knowledge. In a group modal, a speaker can
mistake what the information is by somehow mischaracterizing it, either including
propositions that don’t belong or by having the information incomplete. We can
generate a plausible case with a group in some official capacity to pin down what
counts as the group’s knowledge with respect to the prejacent:
(4.6) Investigation
Context: A police committee is investigating a death. The committee’s official
information—i.e. their knowledge that they’ve all decided should count as
the information in the case—is determined by the propositions e1, e2, and e3,
which, let’s suppose, rule out accidental death. One member of the
committee—let’s call him the representative—for some reason
mischaracterizes the information, either by including some extra information
or by not having the information complete. This mischaracterization allows
for the possibility of accidental death. The representative for the committee
gives a press conference, but a reporter has already talked with a more careful
member of the committee:
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(a) (Representative:) Given what the committee knows about the death, it
might have been an accident.
(b) (Reporter:) No, that’s not right. The official committee information has
ruled out accidental death.
(c) (Representative:)
(i) Well, I guess I was wrong.
(ii) #But what I said was still true./#But still, given what the committee
knows about the death, it might have been an accident.
In Group Tutoring Leila had the group’s information correct, but she bungled the in-
ference. Here, the investigator bungles the inference because he’s mischaracterized
the group’s official information. He has it wrong that the information leaves open
the prejacent in virtue of having the information wrong, a possibility that is more
salient in group rather than solipsistic cases.
What ties all of the M cases together is that the challenger targets the entire
modal, and that amounts to targeting an inference. In Logic-Modal, Solipsistic Tutoring,
Group Tutoring, and Investigation, the speaker of the initial epistemic sentence some-
how has the inference wrong, either simply or by mischaracterizing the information.
And having the inference wrong is another way of saying that the epistemic sen-
tence is false at the time of utterance, and this explains our data point—the felicity
judgement. We’ve now taken care of rows 10, 14, and 22.
Before moving onto the more interesting T cases, three rows remain, the first
two of which are first person and the last of which is third: 12, 16, and 24, which
we’ll call Group Prejacent Tutoring, Solipsistic Prejacent Tutoring, and Logic-Prejacent,
respectively. The explanation for the infelicity of digging in in these cases will be
the same as the above—you can’t reiterate a false sentence—but they can be messier
because the challenger in these versions doesn’t show the initial speaker that her
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entire epistemic sentence is false, though in these cases we’ve stipulated that it is.
In each case type, the challenger targets the prejacent of the initial speaker’s false
epistemic sentence. The initial speaker can then, by finding out the prejacent is false,
come to know that the epistemic sentence is false, ruling out its reiteration. This is
the cleaner option. On the messier option, the initial speaker may, despite coming
to know the prejacent’s falsehood, still think that the information at the time of the
initial utterance of her epistemic sentence was compatible with the prejacent. The
participants in this kind of case, specifically the initial speaker, however, are too
confused for the case to be interesting. The related case in which the initial speaker
is correct about the initial epistemic sentence’s truth are quite interesting, and are a
subset of the T cases, to which, having covered the F cases, we now turn.
4.3.1.2 T cases
The cases that most interest us, those that puzzle the most, are those in which
the initial epistemic sentence was true at the time of utterance. This interest arises
from the fact that contextualist truth is easy to come by—we only need the weak
logical relation of compatibility to hold between the prejacent and the information—
and reiterating a true sentence shouldn’t be a problem. Yet it often is. I focus on
these cases, the T cases, in this section, and then expand on big-picture themes
that the T cases involve subsequently. Instead of starting with the third-person
cases and moving to first, as in the last subsection, I’ll move from theF cases to
the I cases. Again, the organizing principle will be progressive argumentative
difficulty.15 Explaining why and when, in the subset of the T cases, digging in is
felicitous or infelicitous is the most important and challenging part of the paper.
So in this section, I lay out the cases and quickly explain the source of the felicity
15TheF cases are more surprising since it seems that the I cases are the norm, so the opposite
order may seem more natural. However, I think the norm cases are more difficult to explain.
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judgment, then in the next section, I give a more detailed, big-picture argument to
explain the felicity judgements.
To reiterate the dialectic in the literature to this point: It seemed at first that
digging in was always infelicitous, but then we realized that sometimes it isn’t odd,
given the right context, to dig in—though infelicity, it seems, is the norm. The few
cases above were all infelicitous cases, and we presently introduce felicitous cases.
We can take two views on the complicated data. First, we may say that we don’t
need to explain the data because they’re unclear. Or, as I prefer, as it is the point of
this paper, we may say that the data are more difficult to explain since we need to
explain why the felicity can go one way or the other. This is how things will go for
the rest of the paper.
We’ll start with the surprising felicitous cases first, starting with the one third
person case, row 19, which I think is the clearest example of felicitous digging in:
(4.7) Row 19—Bible: 3FPT.
Context: An atheist Bible scholar is explaining his findings to a lay theist he
just met. The findings involve a newly discovered manuscript, which we’ll
assume leaves open the possibility that Judas was a good man.
(a) (Atheist Bible scholar:) Given what this newly discovered manuscript
says, Judas might have been a good man.
(b) (Theist:) Judas was a treacherous man!
(c) (Atheist Bible scholar:) Look I have no opinion on Judas. I’m merely
saying: Given what this newly discovered manuscript says, Judas might have
been a good man.
Here, the digging in sounds fine—surely not infelicitous. This is because, as is
sometimes the case in scholarly pursuits, the Atheist Bible scholar doesn’t really
care much about how Judas in fact was. She is only interested in the compatibility of
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the information from the scroll and Judas being a good man, and about the veracity
of the information or the truth of the prejacent, she may be hostile or indifferent.
The theist, on the other hand, is concerned with the actual truth of the prejacent,
which explains her response.
The corresponding first person cases are next, which I name after von Fintel and
Gillies (2008, p.81, my numbering), who first showed (as far as I know) that digging
in is fine. As we’ll see, we can take this case to be either group or solipsistic. We’ll
call the group version Group vF&G and the solipsistic version Solipsistic vF&G:
(4.8) Rows 3 & 7—vF&G. 1F -G/S-PT
Context: Alex and Billy are looking for keys.
(a) (Alex:) The keys might be in the drawer.
(b) (Billy, Looks in the drawer, agitated:) They’re not. Why did you say that?
(c) (Alex:) Look, I didn’t say they were in the drawer. I said they might be
there—and they might have been. Sheesh.
The point of this case, as von Fintel and Gillies originally presented it, was to show
that the data were mixed—that digging in is sometimes felicitous. I agree that
this is a data point, but I’m going to explain the case in terms of our parameters.
The case sets theF/I parameter toF , which, once in place, automatically sets
the T-F dial to T—because one can’t reiterate a sentence that the challenger has
shown false. Setting that dial automatically sets the M/P dial to P since, if the
dial were set to M, then the initial epistemic sentence would be false. Since there’s
no obvious third-person information source in the context, it’s clear that this is a
first-person case. Last, the G-S parameters is a little more difficult to set because
both are compatible. The information involved in Alex’s initial epistemic sentence,
given the facts of the case, can either be Alex’s knowledge alone or both Alex and
Billy’s. It’s clear that Alex’s knowledge is compatible with the prejacent when she
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makes her initial assertion, and Billy looked for the keys after Alex’s initial assertion,
so Billy didn’t know where they were at the time of the utterance. So both G and S
are compatible with the case, but whichever option it is will be immaterial since
what I say below is compatible with either option. So we’ll count this case for both
rows 3 and 7. I do, however, think it’s much more plausible that this is an S case.
What one wants to say about Alex’s digging in, which I discuss more below, is that
she seems like she’s defending her intelligence, and I think the idea of defending
one’s intelligence is more plausible on a solipsistic rather than a group reading.
In the cases up until now, the setting of the non-F/I parameters explained the
theF/I parameter for that case. For example, being shown that one’s sentence is
false is enough to explain why one can’t reassert that sentence. We need to say more
in this case, though, to explain what’s going on with Alex’s digging in, and here the
first-person–third-person distinction transforms from an interesting distinction to
an explanatory one.
What exactly is Alex saying when she says “[the keys] might have been [in
the drawer]”? The epistemic modal operator tends to out-scope the past-tense
operator, so we tend to read sentences that involve the two operators as referencing
the current information about a past possibility. While “might have been” is often
read as non-epistemic, an epistemic interpretation of “might have been” appear in
sentences such as the following:
(4.9) Jones isn’t a philosopher, but he might have been.
This sentence still favors, it seems to me, the non-epistemic interpretation under
which Jones was never a philosopher, but it is counterfactually possible that Jones
was. The speaker in this kind of context probably thinks that although Jones
ended up (say) becoming a lawyer, his nature was compatible with the life of a
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philosopher’s.16 The epistemic interpretation of (9) is that I know Jones is not a
philosopher, but the current information leaves open whether—at some time before
now—he was. The corresponding interpretation isn’t what we’re looking for in
vF&G. This would mean that Alex, in (8c), is asserting that the keys aren’t in the
drawer, but the current information leaves open whether, at some time before the
assertion time, the keys were in the drawer. However, the context makes clear that
the keys weren’t in the drawer at some relevant past time—maybe they were days
ago, but an assertion with that meaning would be irrelevant.
The intended reading, then, is that the keys’ being in the drawer was compatible
with the speaker’s information at the past utterance time. If this is indeed the read-
ing, then I suggest that Alex’s digging in is a past-looking, third-person epistemic
sentence. Here, the information source is third-person; it’s Alex’s knowledge frozen
at a past time, and Alex claims that her frozen knowledge state at that time left
open the key’s being in the drawer.
Here’s another way to put the point. As noted, what we want to say about
Alex’s response, because of its defensive air, is that she is defending her intelligence.
But we shouldn’t stop there, for what does defending one’s intelligence consist
in in this case? It consists in, in this case, looking back on one’s knowledge and
asserting that it was compatible with some proposition at that time, which, crucially,
involves a different take on the information. The information source is now static
and non-updatable.17 I’ll leave this case here, but we’ll pick it up in the next section,
comparing it with the corresponding infelicitous case—for these two cases are what
I consider the most important for the paper.
16Indeed, I naturally read vF&G as counterfactual—that although the keys were never in the
drawer at the relevant time, events could have unfolded such that they were. A natural continuation
on the counterfactual reading would be “[the keys] might have been in the drawer, but since someone
didn’t put them where they were supposed to go they weren’t!”
17For the group version, Alex would be looking back at the group knowledge, frozen in time.
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We now have three I rows left: 11, 15, and 23. We’ll go in reverse order. Case
23 is a case in which the initial epistemic sentence is third person and true, the
challenger targets the prejacent, and then digging in is infelicitous:
(4.10) Row 23—Exploring: 3I PT
Context: Magellan and Drake are trying to find Atlantis with a scroll with
some vague references to Atlantis’ location. Magellan is holding the scroll,
and both Magellan and Drake believe the scroll to be accurate. The scroll
suggests that Atlantis is in the location that Magellan is pointing.
(a) (Magellan, pointing, but not looking:) Given what the scroll says,
Atlantis might be right there.
(b) (Drake:) Well obviously it’s not. We’re looking at landless ocean!
(c) (Magellan, pointing still:) ? But still, given what the scroll says, Atlantis
might be right there!
The adverbial phrase makes clear the third person reading, and we’ve stipulated
that the scroll leaves open the prejacent. Drake targets not the inferential relation
but rather simply the proposition that Atlantis is in front of them (or something
to that effect). So what’s wrong with Magellan’s digging in? Here, I want to say
that, given their joint activity—actively searching for an island (and not studying,
say, maps and scrolls)—Magellan’s response is bizarre, perhaps infelicitous. The
irrelevance of the digging in to their joint task explains the bizarreness. Again, I say
more about this in the next section.
Next, row 15, the kind of dialogue that started it all—the kind, as mentioned,
involved in the relativist’s anti-contextualist arguments. But we must be careful
with how we construct these cases, which are supposed to go something like this:
Jones says “Bob might be in his office,” Smith says “No, he told me he’s going
to be out of town this week,” and Jones says “I guess I was wrong” instead of
134
the infelicitous “Sure, but what I said was true.” This case is first person (since
there’s no salient third-person information source), and the felicity intuition is
robust enough. But the G-S parameter is tricky: Unlike vF&G—where Billy’s key
searching shows she’s ignorant with respect to the prejacent of the initial epistemic
sentence—in this case, Smith knows the truth of the prejacent (i.e. he knows that
Bob isn’t in his office) at the time of Jones’ initial utterance. This means that if this is
a group case, then we have an easy explanation of the felicity intuition: The initial
epistemic sentence was false since the group knowledge did not leave open the
truth of the prejacent. In other words, if we’re not careful, we’ll end up with a case
like Investigation again. Thus, we need a case in which the challenger is ignorant
with respect to the prejacent. In order to have a solipsistic case, we need a context
in which the participants aren’t involved in any kind of joint search, where it’s
much more plausible that the initial speaker isn’t referencing joint knowledge, one
in which it would be very strange to prepend “Given what we know, . . .” to the
epistemic sentence. Here is such a case:
(4.11) Row 15–Solipsistic Usual Relativist: 1I SPT
Context: Jones is looking for Bob, and Smith is nearby. Jones is the searcher
here—it’s clear that Jones and Smith aren’t jointly searching for Bob, and
Smith, though not so much an eavesdropper, is just hanging around.
(a) (Smith:) Hey Jones, How you doing?
(b) (Jones:) Good, I was just looking for Bob. Oh yeah, I think he might be in
his office.
(c) (Smith, glances at his office door, on which there’s a note:) Oh, no, he’s
not—there’s a note here that says he’s left for the day.
(d) (Jones:)
(i) Huh, I guess I was wrong.
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(ii) #Sure, but what I said was true.
For the group version—row 15, our last row, we change the context:
(4.12) Row 11–Group Usual Relativist: 1IGPT
Context: Jones and Smith are looking for Bob to ask him an important
question.
(a) (Jones:) Oh, Bob might be in his office.
(b) (Smith, glances at his office door, on which there’s a note:) No, he’s
not—there’s a note here that says he’s left for the day.
(c) (Jones:)
(i) I guess I was wrong.
(ii) #Sure, but what I said was true.
In both of these cases, digging in, unlike in Group and Solipsistic vF&G, is infelicitous.
Distinguishing these two sets of cases is crucial. What I want to maintain is that the
digging in would be irrelevant enough to constitute infelicity in these cases, or at
least deserve two question marks, whereas in the vF&G cases it wouldn’t. I explain
this crucial difference in the next section.
4.4 Zooming Out
Recall the narrow goal: to explain the felicity data in these dialogues. And,
recall, the strategy: to classify each dialogue as one in which
• reiterating a challenged epistemic sentence is infelicitous because the sentence
was false;
• reiterating a challenged epistemic sentence is infelicitous because, although
the sentence was true, it’s too irrelevant to reiterate felicitously; or
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• reiterating a challenged epistemic sentence is felicitous because the epistemic
sentence is true and, at the reiteration time, is relevant.
The following table classifies each dialogue:
False True + Odd True + Not Odd
Group Tutoring, Group
Prejacent Tutoring, Solip-
sistic Tutoring, Solipsistic
Prejacent Tutoring, Logic-
Modal, Logic-Prejacent
Group Usual Relativist,
Solipsistic Usual Rela-
tivist, Exploring
Group vF&G, Solipsistic
vF&G, Bible
Explaining the difference between the odd + true cases versus the not odd + true
cases is our current challenge. In other words, we have a handful of cases that
are alike in that the initial epistemic sentence is true and the challenger targets the
prejacent. Yet, in some of these cases—the vF&G cases and Bible—it’s not odd to dig
in whereas in others—the Usual Relativist cases and Explorer—it is. What gives?
To begin, let’s visualize the difference in the way that the actual world relates to
first- and third-person epistemic sentences. Consult figure 1. The I circle represents
the worlds that are compatible with the information, and the P circle represents the
worlds at which the prejacent is true. The “@” symbol represents the actual world;
the rectangle represents logical space, which “Ω” denotes.
The semantics for simple-minded contextualism—i.e. contextualism minus the
stuff about the ordering source—says that a sentence of the form pIt might be that
φq is true so long as the information and the prejacent are compatible, i.e. so long
as some of the information and prejacent worlds overlap. Erasing the actual world
symbols, Figure 4.1 pictures this semantics. The information source that determines
the information involved in the semantics will determine the possible locations for
the actual world. Figure 4.1(a) pictures what logical space looks like to someone
when she asserts a first-person epistemic sentence. Since the information, either
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(a) First Person
@
Ω
I
@ @
P
@
(b) Third Person
Figure 4.1. Epistemic modals
group or solipsistic, is knowledge, and since knowledge is factive, the actual world
is a member of it. One asserts an epistemic sentence when one is unsure whether
to locate the actual world in I \ P or in I ∩ P, though, in fact, it will be on one side
or the other if the proposition that the epistemic sentence expresses is true. On
the other hand, depending on the type of third-person epistemic possibility modal,
there are no restrictions on the location of the actual world, as Figure 4.1(b) pictures.
If the static content is past knowledge (or some other kind of factive content), then
the actual world will be somewhere inside of I. But if the content is some other
kind of non-factive content, then the actual world could be anywhere. Saying that
the assertor of a third-person epistemic sentence is indifferent to the information’s
veracity, as the atheist Bible scholar is in Bible, is another way of saying that speaker
is indifferent about the location of the actual world in Ω. Of course, in fact, the
actual world will be somewhere or other on the diagram.
The first-person naturally pairs with an interest in locating the actual world in
logical space. Cases like Usual Relativist, either group or solipsistic, are paradigmatic
here. Let’s just focus on the solipsistic version for concreteness. When I say “Jones
138
might be in his office” amidst searching for Jones, I’m trying to locate the actual
world in logical space. When I say that sentence, what I know leaves open my world
being a Jones-in-office world. But given my activity—searching for Jones—I’d like
to further narrow down Jones’ location—i.e., to further narrow down the location of
the actual world, finding out whether or not Jones is in his office. Applying Figure
4.1(a) to this example, where P is the proposition that Jones is in his office (at some
time), I’m not sure which side of the line on which to place the actual world, but
I’m actively trying to find out. The third-person, on the other hand, can pair with
merely filling out logical space. In other words, in the third person, one may only be
interested in whether the prejacent and the information are compatible regardless
of where the actual world may be in logical space. To give an example, consider the
police shooting of Walter Scott, in which the police initially claimed that the fatal
use of force might have been justified, but later video contradicted that. Suppose I
utter the following epistemic sentence: Given the initial local news coverage on the
Walter Scott shooting, the fatal use of force might have been justified. Now further
suppose that I say that after I’ve seen the video that shows that the use of force was
clearly unjustified. In this context, I’m only interested in the compatibility of the
worlds compatible with the initial local news coverage and the worlds at which
the use of force in this incident is justified—not in the location of the actual world.
Applying Figure 4.1(b) to this example, I’m not actively trying to place the actual
world in either I ∩ P or in I \ P—I know that the actual world isn’t even in I. I’m
just interested in whether the I and the P circles overlap.
Just as epistemic sentences pair with a certain attitude toward the location of
the actual world, so can conversations: some revolve around locating the actual
world in logical space; others, around filling it out. But when we mismatch the
conversational attitude with the wrong kind of epistemic sentence, a certain kind
of tension results because the epistemic sentence isn’t relevant to the conversation.
139
And now we’re in a position to finally say what distinguishes the true-yet-odd
epistemic sentences from the true-and-not-odd ones: If the tension is great enough, we
get infelicity. Tension here means a difference between the point of an assertion and
the point of a conversation. Note that, when I say “tension,” I’m not introducing
new or interesting philosophical terms here that are to do major work. I’m merely
saying, in other words, what irrelevance is: Conversations tend to revolve around a
given topic and if someone says something off topic enough, infelicity ensues. The
point I’m making, interesting if I succeed, is to say first that irrelevance explains the
typical confounding infelicity of digging in, and second, to point out the source of
the irrelevance. To put the second point differently: To say why a given instance
of digging in is irrelevant enough to result in infelicity, I need to say why such an
assertion is off topic, and here’s why: The topic is locating the actual world; digging
in isn’t on that topic.
Let’s see how this works out with our cases. First, let’s explain the different
felicity data in the Usual Relativist cases verses the vF&G cases, which I see as the
greatest challenge for this paper. In the vF&G cases, the context makes clear that the
participants are actual-world hunting. In other words, they’re trying to figure out
which side of the line to place the actual world on Figure 4.1(a), which is how logical
space looks at the time of the initial utterance. After Billy’s challenge, the actual
world moves to the left, in I \ P. But the challenger introduces a special feature of
this context: her assertion is somewhat heated and accusatory. This prompts Alex’s
response, which in terms of our diagram says that, although she currently knows
that logical space is such that @ ∈ I \ P, it was reasonable for her to place the actual
world on the line when she uttered her initial epistemic sentence. Alex’s assertion
in her digging in is in the third person: She’s defending the reasonableness of I and
P overlap. Being third person, Alex’s digging in also has the effect of abandoning
the hunt for the actual world. I said that we get infelicity if the tension is great
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enough. Here, the point of the conversation is initially to find keys, and Alex’s
digging in doesn’t contribute to that. But there is less tension because of the special
context—there is a reason for Alex’s response, viz. Billy’s need to relax a bit.
What I’m going to say about the Usual Relativist cases applies to both, so I won’t
differentiate them. I’ve given some context to Usual Relativist, but I think that it’s
no accident that similar cases are glossed with little to no context. Like vF&G,
Usual Relativist starts out in a context in which the participants attempt to locate
the actual world. But unlike, vF&G, the challenger doesn’t take an accusatory tone.
Because of this, there is no reason for Jones to defend his intelligence—doing so
would be bizarre. In other words, asserting the third-person epistemic sentence
implicated in digging in would introduce an intolerable tension between the point
of the conversation (locating the actual world—i.e. finding Bob) and the point of
the epistemic sentence (not locating the actual world). In yet other words, digging
in would be so irrelevant as to be infelicitous.
Before turning to closing remarks, we have two third-person cases to explain:
Bible-Prejacent and Explorer. Bible is quick to explain: The Atheist Bible Scholar only
cares about the overlap between I and P, not in locating the actual world, which the
Theist is interested in, as her reply shows. The Atheist Bible Scholar’s digging in is a
way of stressing that she’s only interested in I–P overlap, not in locating the actual
world. If there is any tension in this conversation, it’s that the Theist is somewhat
confused about the point of the Atheist Bible Scholar’s assertion, but the confusion
is mild, and the Atheist Bible Scholar simply let’s the Theist know what she is up
to. Another way to put this is that there’s no clear point, and some confusion, over
what the conversation revolves around, and the digging in resolves the confusion.
Explorer is interesting in that it somewhat mimics Usual Relativist. There are two
reasons for this: The context is one in which the conversational participants are
attempting to locate the actual world, and the conversational participants take the
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information to be factive. Drake and Magellan presume the map to be veracious,
and the feel of the context is that it’s somewhat high stakes—they’re on the high seas
searching for a lost island. If Magellan were to dig in, he would abandon his search
for the actual world to consider how logical space looked at some past time. The
result would be a tension between a conversational context that revolves around
locating the actual world and a sentence that would abandon that purpose—a
sentence whose point would be to consider the content of a map that they currently
know is faulty. Such tension would be too great, and so the digging in would be
irrelevant to the point of infelicity.
In summery, here is the diagnoses of both the true-and-odd cases and the true-
yet-not-odd cases:
True+Odd
• Both Usual Relativist cases and Ex-
ploring. Context involves locating
actual world. Digging in involves
consideration of logical space at
some past time with no special
prompt to do so.
True+Not Odd
• Bible. Context is somewhat unclear.
Digging in resolves the unclarity.
• Both vF&G cases. Context involves
locating actual world. Digging in
involves consideration of logical
space at some past time but there
is a special prompt to do so.
To finally close this section, let me recast the person distinction in such a way that
will highlight its importance. With the narrow focus on knowledge as the base for
epistemic modality, one might have thought that epistemic modality groups with
metaphysical, nomological (or circumstantial), and analytic modality in being alethic.
A modality is alethic if, but only if, necessarily, the actual world is a member of the
base. If must-p or might-p are true, and the modality is alethic, then, necessarily, the
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actual world will be a p world. And the following inferences are characteristically
valid for alethic modalities:
p  @p; @p  ♦p.
Unlike the just-mentioned modality flavors, deontic modalities are, paradigmati-
cally, non-alethic.
So, Is epistemic modality alethic? If we were to confine our attention to an
epistemic modality whose base knowledge determines—i.e. first-person epistemic
modality—the answer is yes. It’s hard to overstate how many critical papers in
at least the philosophy literature suggest that knowledge is the exclusive base
for epistemic modality, further suggesting that epistemic modality plays double
duty. Egan and Weatherson (2009), in their introduction to the only philosophical
anthology on epistemic modality, define contextualism in terms of knowledge and
expound on considerations that only make sense in terms of knowledge—e.g., the so
called “speaker inclusion constraint,” which requires that the speaker’s knowledge
is a part (proper or improper) of the knowledge that determines the base. Such a
consideration only makes sense, obviously, if something epistemic determines the
base. And contextualists aren’t alone in their narrow focus. Both content and truth
relativists speak in terms of an exclusive knowledge base.
But with the person distinction in hand, the answer is sometimes yes, sometimes
no, depending on the information source. If the information source is factive, then
the modal will be alethic; otherwise, not. Epistemic modality, as far as I know, stands
alone in housing both alethic and non-alethic versions of itself. And the alethic–
non-alethic distinction gives us another angle on some of what we’ve explained.
When a modality is non-alethic, it comes as no surprise that one can “dig in” in the
face of a prejacent challenge. For example, if I point to a crosswalk on a new road
and say that pedestrians can cross there, and someone informs me that it’s not true
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that pedestrians cross there (since none have), then I can felicitously reiterate my
deontic sentence. The same goes for an epistemic sentence that’s initially asserted
in the third person.
4.5 Closing remarks: The nature of the person distinction
If my arguments up to this point have succeeded, then I’ve achieved my narrow
goal of explaining the felicity data within one kind of modal disagreement. To close,
I want to quickly consider the nature of the first–third-person distinction. As I said
in the intro, I think we best understand the distinction as non-semantic, and I’ve
appealed to non-semantic notions, viz. relevance, in my main argument. I’ve also
tried to speak in terms of different information sources in distinguishing first- and
third-person epistemic sentences rather than different information simpliciter. To
close the paper, let me briefly say why I think we should understand the difference
between first- and third-person epistemic sentences as a difference in the way
information is determined rather than in terms of different kinds of content.
The kind of case that convinces me is one in which agents commit differently to
the same content, assuming the simple-minded version of contextualism that I’ve
been assuming in this paper. The difference in commitment arises from different
information sources, either first or third person. In other words, we can construct
a case in which an agent’s knowledge and some external information source de-
termine the same information that is involved in an epistemic sentence, yet the
commitment facts are different. Here is such a case.
Suppose I come into existence, tabula rasa, and read the entire Encyclopedia
Britannica, which exhausts the entirety of my knowledge and belief. Suppose
that Britannica strongly suggests that Shakespeare wrote all of the plays that are
attributed to him but also suggests that there’s a modicum of evidence that Francis
Bacon wrote a few of the plays. Now suppose I assert the following:
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(4.13) (I:) Bacon might have written Romeo and Juliet.
My information leaves open whether Bacon wrote Romeo and Juliet. Now suppose
that you have also read Britannica, but it doesn’t exhaust your knowledge and belief.
You are in fact a Shakespeare scholar and have considered all the information, and
you have ruled out that anyone but Shakespeare wrote Romeo and Juliet. You say:
(4.14) (You:) Given what Britannica says, Bacon might have written Romeo and
Juliet.
Here the same intensional content, Britannica, determines the information that (it
is asserted) leaves open the possibility that Bacon wrote Romeo and Juliet. For me,
however, that content exhausts my epistemic state. For you, it is the content of
a set of encyclopedias. According to a very simple version of contextualism, (13)
and (14) determine the same propositions, yet these different assertions come with
different commitments. In making your assertion, you play the role of arbiter.
You’re considering the inferential relation between some static information and a
proposition. This being the case, you can follow up your claim with “but of course
Shakespeare wrote Romeo and Juliet.” On the other hand, I, issuing a first-person
epistemic sentence, cannot give the same follow-up to my assertion.
Finally, let’s put this point in another, general way. We’ve repeatedly made
the point that we can reference particular information sources that determine the
information involved in the proposition an epistemic sentence expresses. And
though I haven’t spoken in terms of the formal semantics of epistemic modality
much up to now, in closing, I bring it in because I think it makes this point especially
clear. According to standard possible worlds semantics (leaving out the ordering
source), we associate the information with a set of possible worlds compatible with
that information, and the possibility modal particles might or may semantically
contribute an existential quantifier over that set of worlds. We state the truth
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conditions in terms of existential quantification over the information worlds: An
epistemic sentence is true just in case there is at least one world in the information
worlds at which the prejacent is true. If we identify these truth conditions with the
proposition an epistemic sentence expresses, then, at the level of the proposition,
different information sources can determine the same set of worlds, as in the above
case. And we can’t, by inspecting this or that proposition that an epistemic sentence
expresses, determine how a speaker or hearer may relate to that proposition vis-à-
vis how they relate to the actual world. There is, so to speak, no road backwards
from the proposition an epistemic sentence expresses to the information source
involved in that proposition. I’m not sure what to make of the equivalent point,
mutatis mutandis, for other flavors of modality—that, e.g., different rule sources can
determine the same quantificational domain for deontic modals. But for epistemic
modality, it’s significant.
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Table 4.1. Cases (gray rows are possible cases; white, impossible)
1 or 3 I orF G or S M or P T or F Case name Bad combo
1 1 F G M T f/M, M/T
2 1 F G M F f/F, f/F,
3 1 F G P T Group vF&G
4 1 F G P F f/F
5 1 F S M T f/M, M/T
6 1 F S M F f/M, f/F
7 1 F S P T Solipsistic vF&G
8 1 F S P F f/F
9 1 I G M T M/T
10 1 I G M F Group Tutoring
11 1 I G P T Group Usual Relativist
12 1 I G P F Group Prejacent Tutoring
13 1 I S M T M/T
14 1 I S M F Solipsistic Tutoring
15 1 I S P T Solipsistic Usual Relativist
16 1 I S P F Solipsistic Prejacent Tutoring
17 3 F X M T f/M, M/T
18 3 F X M F f/F, f/M
19 3 F X P T Bible
20 3 F X P F f/F
21 3 I X M T M/T
22 3 I X M F Logic-Modal
23 3 I X P T Exploring
24 3 I X P F Logic-Prejacent
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